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AGAM-P (M) (30 Oct 67) FOR OT RD-670468

9 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
1st Infantry Division

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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
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 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)
 1st Infantry Division

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1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
OPERATIONAL REPORT-LESSONS LEARNED
1 FEBRUARY 1967 - 30 APRIL 1967



FOR OT RD File
670468

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Declassified after 12 years.
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"Operational Report-Lessons Learned"

(RCS CSFOR-65)

1 February 1967 - 30 April 1967

I. Significant Organization and Activities

A. Introduction

1. This Operational Report-Lessons Learned covers the reporting period 1 February - 30 April 1967. During this period the 1st Infantry Division continued to conduct combat operations designed to locate and destroy Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces and installations in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Operating in the LONG NGUYEN area and in the Michelin Rubber Plantation, the Division conducted Operation TUCSON to preposition forces and equipment for participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY. Operating under the control of II Field Force Vietnam (IIFV) in the largest search and destroy operation to date of the Vietnamese War, the division fought four major battles in War Zone C during Operation JUNCTION CITY and defeated in turn all four regimental elements of the 9th VC Division. The division's activities in War Zone C were focused initially upon the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN) and VC/NVA forces. During Operation MANHATTAN the division, under IIFV control, returned to the jungle area northwest of the "Iron Triangle" to exploit the intelligence gained since Operation CEDAR FALLS.

2. The Indirect Support of the GVN Revolutionary Development Program by the 1st Infantry Division under Operation IAM SON II and IAM SON 67 continued on a greater scale. The task of the Revolutionary Development Task Force (RDTF) was assigned permanently to the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The IAM SON 67 program continues to play a key, integral role in the division's counterinsurgency effort.

3. Base camp security continued. Numerous resupply convoys were conducted without a major engagement through areas that were formerly under Viet Cong control. Snipers and mines continued to be a major road hazard. An increase in the number of VC mortar attacks per month was evident during the reporting period.

4. On 10 February 1967 Major General John F. [redacted] assumed command of the 1st Infantry Division from Major General William A. DePuy who was reassigned to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C.

B. Organization

1. The 1st Infantry Division continued to occupy four major base camps at DI AN (XT895065), PHU LOI (XT854160), LAI KHE (XT765380), and PHUOC VINH (XT963490), and a forward base area at QUAN LOI (XT818905). On 18 February the division forward command post displaced from LAI KHE, where it had been since the beginning of the reporting period, to MINH THANH (XT638673). The command post moved back to LAI KHE on 16 March and on 15 April returned to DI AN.

2. The 8-6 Artillery completed on 15 March its transition from a towed 155mm howitzer battalion to a self-propelled 155mm howitzer battalion.

3. There were no other major changes in the internal structure of the 1st Infantry Division during this reporting period.

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C. Intelligence

1. Enemy Order of Battle

a. The total estimated enemy strength in the 1st Infantry Division area of interest is 73,343. This figure represents a combat strength of 32,502 military; 17,650 militia; 8,540 political cadre; and 14,651 in administrative services.

b. Reinforcements are available from outside the division's area of interest. From the IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), the enemy is capable of reinforcing with one main forces (MF) regiment and one MF battalion. From the II CTZ he is capable of reinforcing with one MF artillery battalion and two MF infantry battalions.

c. The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units are:

(1) 9th VC Div - Northeastern TAY NINH Province

- (a) 271st Regt - Southwestern PHUOC LONG Province
- (b) 272d Regt - Unlocated in BINH LONG Province
- (c) 101st Regt - Northeastern TAY NINH Province
- (d) 273d Regt - Southwestern BINH LONG Province

(2) 7th VC Div - Northeastern TAY NINH and west central

BINH LONG

- (a) 165 NVA Regt - Unlocated in PHUOC LONG Province
- (b) 141st NVA Regt - Unlocated, possibly in

southern War Zone D

- (c) 52d NVA Regt - Unlocated
- (d) 76th Training Regt - Unlocated in western

QUANG DUC or eastern PHUOC LONG Province

(3) 5th VC Div - PHUOC TUY Province

- (a) 274th VC Regt - PHUOC TUY Province
- (b) 275th VC Regt - Northern PHUOC TUY Province
- (c) 89th Arty Gp HQ - PHUOC TUY Province

(4) 69th VC Arty Regt - Unlocated in northern TAY NINH

(5) 70th Guard Regt - Northwestern TAY NINH Province

(6) 80A VC Tng Regt - Western TAY NINH Province

(7) Independent Main Force Units

- (a) Dong Thap II Regt - HAU NGHIA Province
- (b) Dong Nai (AKA D800) Inf Bn - LONG KHANH Province
- (c) CIC Sapper Bn - SAIGON Area
- (d) Phu Loi Bn - BINH DUCNG Province
- (e) 2d VC LF Inf Bn - GO KON District
- (f) 3d VC LF Inf Bn - DI AN District
- (g) 4th VC LF Inf Bn - THU DUC District
- (h) 5th VC LF Inf Bn - NHA BE District
- (i) 6th VC LF Inf Bn - BINH TAN District
- (j) 7th VC LF Inf Bn - CU CHI District
- (k) 2d Indep VC LF Inf Bn - LONG AN Province
- (l) 506th VC LF Inf Bn - LONG AN Province
- (m) 14th VC LF Inf Bn - TAY NINH Province
- (n) D445th VC LF Inf Bn - PHUOC TUY Province
- (o) 1st VC MF Inf Bn - Northeastern HAU NGHIA
- (p) 8th VC MF Inf Bn - Northeastern HAU NGHIA

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2. Of particular interest, and in contrast to the local guerrilla, it was found that equipment captured from main force units, particularly weapons, were in excellent condition and in many cases new. The main force VC units appeared well trained and led. They showed remarkable determination during their attacks on friendly defensive positions.

3. VC losses for the reporting period include.

- a. 1,936 VC KIA (BC)
- b. 45 FWE captured
- c. 272 individual weapons captured
- d. 34 crew served weapons
- e. 1,976 tons of rice captured or destroyed
- f. 2,912 grenades captured or destroyed
- g. 32.15 tons of salt captured or destroyed
- h. 63,918 rounds of small arms ammunition captured or destroyed
- i. 460 mines captured or destroyed

D. Combat Operations

1. General: During the reporting period the 1st Infantry Division continued military operations to extend and consolidate the government of Vietnam's control and influence in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Five operations were conducted within and outside of the division's assigned Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). The operations were LAM SON II/67, TUCSON, JUNCTION CITY, HARVEST MOON, and MANHATTAN.

2. Operations LAM SON II and LAM SON 67: Operation LAM SON II, a continuous revolutionary development support program, started at 230915H May 1966 and terminated at 080700H February 1967; the program re-commenced immediately on 8 February as operation LAM SON 67. During February a total of 13 villages were sealed and searched in the LAM SON area. Jungle areas which formerly had provided a haven for Viet Cong guerrillas were stripped by bull-dozers and Rome Plows. An added benefit was derived from the jungle clearing—Vietnamese peasants moved to the cleared sites to cultivate the ground now open to agriculture. Seal and search operations were conducted to destroy the local VC infrastructure. Search and destroy operations were conducted to deny jungle and other base camp areas. As a result, the local VC are finding it increasingly difficult to find well concealed areas in which to build bases, a fact attested by captured VC documents. Main force VC units are being forced to operate in less heavily populated areas away from the 1st Infantry Division TAOR. During March, US and ARVN forces sealed and searched a total of 11 villages. The 2d Brigade controlled the operation until 17 March, then relinquished control temporarily to the 3d Brigade. Three infantry battalions, one mechanized infantry battalion, and a cavalry squadron were employed at various times throughout the month. Through continuous experience in the area of operations, the 1st Infantry Division's Revolutionary Development Task Force developed several useful techniques. One is to search hard-core VC villages on a continuous basis from month to month. The results achieved are significant. For example, the village of HUA NHUT (XT8816) was sealed and searched on 16 February, yielding 291 detainees. On 5 March, the same village was again sealed and searched yielding 88 detainees. After interrogation, in both cases, the detained groups produced confirmed Viet Cong. A second technique is to seal and search the same village twice during a very short period of time. For example, the village of AN MY (XT8418) was sealed and searched on 14 March and again on 19 March. The first seal and search yielded no detainees. It was suspected that the Viet Cong would return to the village once the seal forces departed. The second seal and search yielded 4 VC, 24 draft dodgers, and 176 detainees. Operation LAM SON 67 continued under the control of the 3d Brigade until 17 April when the 2d Brigade resumed control of the operation. The 1st Infantry Division's Revolutionary Development Task

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Force (RDTF) was absorbed by the 2d Brigade when, on 17 April 1967, the 2d Brigade was designated as the permanent command and control headquarters for Revolutionary Development Support operations. This action was taken to provide greater continuity in control, liaison, and coordination in Operation LAM SON 67. The following additional assets were attached or placed OICON to 2d Brigade for this mission: 2 IFW Teams, the 44th Public Information Detachment, USA Combat Tracker Team Number 5 (consisting of ten men and two dogs), a FSYOPS Team, and two civil affairs teams. Gordon and search operations were conducted during April in eight villages. Jungle clearing activity was centered on the THUAN GIANG Jungle (196 acres of jungle were cleared during April). There were no major contacts during the reporting period.

3. Operation TUCSON: Operation TUCSON was initiated on 140547H February 1967 and terminated on 212400H February 1967. This operation was a search and destroy operation in the northern section of the LANG NGUYEN Secret Zone and the Michelin Rubber Plantation. The VC "Northern Rice Route", which is also a VC route for troop movement between War Zones C and D, lies in this area. Operation TUCSON was planned to accomplish the following two-fold task: first, to apply pressure to and disrupt VC troop, supply, and communications-liaison movements along the "Northern Rice Route"; second, to cover the preparations for Operation JUNCTION CITY. Operation TUCSON did not produce a great number of enemy killed, but it sharply reduced the VC food supply. VC supply installations discovered during this operation yielded 1,700 tons of rice. Many storage and base camp areas were found and destroyed. Control of the operation was exercised from the 1st Division Forward CP at LAI KHE. The forward CP was displaced to MINH THANH on 18 February in order to assure adequate communications with division elements during the first phase of Operation JUNCTION CITY.

4. Operation JUNCTION CITY: Operation JUNCTION CITY was initiated by 11FFV at 220700H February 1967. The division participated in the first two phases of the operation. The first phase continued through 172400H March 1967; the second phase was conducted from 180001H March 1967 until 152400H April 1967. The operation had two main objectives; to destroy or capture the Headquarters, Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN) and the Headquarters, 9th VC Division as well as the destruction of VC/NVA tactical forces. Units under 1st Infantry Division operational control initiated the operation by conducting airborne, airmobile, and ground assaults into War Zone C. TAY NINH Province was the central area of operations. The participating brigades were given the task of blocking escape routes in the northern and eastern portions of the division AO and of conducting limited search and destroy operations against COSVN and VC/NVA tactical forces and installations. Intelligence reports indicated that elements of the 70th Guard Regiment, units of the U80 Artillery Regiment, the 271st VC Regiment, and the 101st NVA Regiment were occupying positions in central TAY NINH Province. Battalions of the 272d Regiment and TAY NINH Mobile Force (D 14 Bn) could be called upon by the VC for purposes of reinforcement. The 1st and 3d Brigades of the 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division (OFOON), and the 173d Airborne Brigade (OICON) participated in the first phase of Operation JUNCTION CITY. The operation included the first US mass combat parachute assault since the Korean War; the 2-503 Infantry and elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade CP jumped into DZ CHARLIE (XT349925) within three kilometers of the Cambodian Border on the morning of 22 February. The objective of the assault, the establishment of an effective blocking position in the shortest time possible, was achieved. Airmobile forces and armored/mechanized forces were deployed into blocking positions that resulted in a horseshoe configuration with the open end to the south. Armored and mechanized units conducted sweeps into the open end of the horseshoe. The 1st Division had one significant battle with the enemy during February. On 28 February 1967, the 1-16 Infantry was

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conducting search and destroy operations east of route TL4 when, at 1052 hours, B Company made contact with a force then estimated to be a VC platoon at XT2872. The company became heavily engaged. As the contact progressed it became apparent that B Company 1-16 Infantry was engaged with a battalion sized VC force. Intelligence later indicated that the VC force was a battalion of the 101st NVA Regiment. Numerous airstrikes and artillery fires were directed into the area. B Company 2-18 Infantry and the 1-16 Infantry (-) were airlifted to an LZ near the contact to reinforce B/1-16 Infantry. Contact was broken at 1620 hours. The results of the battle were 167 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC IW, 25 US KHA, and 27 US WHA. Operation JUNCTION CITY continued during the month of March. The first phase continued until 17 March with search and destroy operations being conducted in the area. A Class II airfield capable of handling C-130 aircraft was constructed at KATUM (XT3389). At TREK KLOK (XT2778), engineers constructed a Special Forces-CIDG camp and another airfield. Two significant engagements with multi-battalion sized VC units occurred during March. On 10 March 1967, at the TREK KLOK Special Forces camp construction site (XT2778), the 2-2 Infantry (Mech) (-) was securing Fire Support Base II came under heavy mortar and recoilless rifle fire for 30 minutes; 120mm, 82mm, and 60mm mortar and 57mm recoilless rifle fires were received. Near the end of the preparation, elements of the 272d VC Regiment launched a multi-battalion attack on the southern and eastern portion of the perimeter. The attack was met with US caliber .50 and M-60 machine gun fire from armored personnel carriers and from ground mounted positions. Individual weapons were fired from well prepared bunkers. Mutually supporting artillery bases fired intensive artillery concentrations around the perimeter in coordination with tactical fighter support. The battle ended at 0500 hours and a police of the surrounding area was conducted. The results of the battle were 196 VC KIA (BC), 5 VC IW, 3 US KHA and 38 US WHA (10 required evacuation). The first phase of Operation JUNCTION CITY ended at 172400H March 1967; phase II commenced at 180001H April 1967. The second phase of the operation had as its major target the VC/NVA forces in eastern War Zone C. The 2d Brigade and the 173d Airborne Brigade moved to the eastern portion of War Zone C and were deployed on VC lines of communication. The 1st Brigade, 1st Division secured QUAN LAI and the Route 246 area to the bridge construction site on the SAIKON RIVER (XT624815). The 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, (ICCN to the 1st Infantry Division, secured Route 13 from LAI KHE to QUAN LAI. Search and destroy operations were conducted in an area 10-30 kilometers west of QUAN LAI. Mutually supporting fire support bases provided 1st Division troops 105mm and 155mm artillery support wherever they moved in War Zone C. The VC tried to counter this by conducting ground and heavy mortar attacks against the fire support bases. On 20 March 1967 the 273d VC Regiment reinforced with local guerrillas attacked Fire Support Base 14 at XT7845. Numerous mortar attacks were directed against Fire Support Base CHALLIE (XT568850) and several infantry battalion night defensive positions. At Fire Support Base 14, A Troop, 3-5 Cavalry had been positioned to secure the perimeter of B Battery, 7-9 Artillery (105mm towed) in the vicinity of the destroyed village of AI BAN BANG. B/7-9 Artillery was inside a perimeter of 20 M-113 armored personnel carriers and six M-48A3 tanks. Prior to midnight the VC conducted a reconnaissance by fire of the perimeter with a caliber .50 machine gun; return fire silenced the enemy gun. At 0030 hours the base came under heavy caliber .50 machine gun, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire. Then, at 0048 hours the enemy launched a heavy ground attack against the entire perimeter with the main attack coming from the southeast. Immediately following this ground assault, friendly forces replied with intensive fires; sustained small arms, M-60 and caliber .50 machine gun, and 90mm fires; 4.2" mortars and artillery fires; and tactical air fighter support. A small armored relief force attacking north from LAI KHE conducted an armored sweep to the south of the perimeter and then joined the forces inside the perimeter. By 0630 hours the main battle was over; contact with the VC

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terminated at 1210 hours. A police of the battle area disclosed 227 VC KIA (BC) and 3 PWs. US casualties were 3 KHA and 63 WHA (26 of whom required evacuation). The division continued to sweep War Zone C during March, moving throughout the length and breadth of the War Zone destroying base camps and gathering vital information about the area. The next significant engagement occurred in the vicinity of LZ GEORGE at coordinates XT428847. The 1-26 Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into the area on 30 March. On the morning of 31 March 1967 the battalion provided security at LZ GEORGE for the air movement of the 1-2 Infantry. After landing, the 1-2 Infantry moved three kilometers to the southwest. At 1255 hours the reconnaissance platoon of the 1-26 Infantry made heavy contact north of the LZ with an unknown force of VC. Companies A and B reinforced the reconnaissance platoon and encountered heavy enemy resistance. Extensive air and artillery were placed on the VC until the end of the day when contact was broken. The 1-26 Infantry then consolidated its perimeter and prepared for an attack on the enemy force the next morning. The 1-16 Infantry (-) had been helilifted into the area by 1730 hours to reinforce the 1-26 Infantry. At 0500 hours on 1 April a well coordinated enemy mortar barrage began to fall simultaneously on the 1-26 Infantry, 1-16 Infantry (-), and Fire Support Base CHARLIE. The mortar attack lasted for 15 minutes. At 0522 hours enemy ground attacks were launched from the north and east against the 1-26 Infantry. US ground forces returned a heavy volume of small arms fire while artillery was massed on the east of the attacked position. When the cloud cover parted at about 0700 hours, airstrikes were placed on the enemy attacking from the north. The VC managed to penetrate the C/1-26 Infantry portion of the perimeter, but counter-attacking US forces forced a VC withdrawal. Immediate interrogation of a captured VC indicated that the enemy reassembly area was to the east of the battle site. Air and artillery were shifted to the area and were followed by an infantry exploitation employing the 1-2 Infantry and the 1-16 Infantry. Two B-52 strikes were placed on the enemy withdrawal route, northeast of the battle area, approximately three kilometers south of the Cambodian Border. Enemy losses during the two day battle near the village of AP GU were 609 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC PWs. US losses were 10 KHA and 64 WHA (23 of whom required evacuation). During the remainder of the division's participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY the 1st Brigade continued to secure Highway 13, Route 246, the bridge site at XT624815, and the AN LOC/QUAN LOI area. The 2d Brigade continued to conduct search and destroy operations in the eastern portion of War Zone C, and the 173d Airborne Brigade under 1st Division operational control conducted search and destroy operations in the southeastern portion of War Zone C. Base camps, VC headquarters areas, and tunnel complexes were found and destroyed. During Operation JUNCTION CITY I and II the 1st Infantry Division engaged in combat all four regiments of the 9th VC Division. The 101st North Vietnamese Regiment and the 271st, 272d, and 273d VC Main Force Regiments lost a combined total of 1,203 combat soldiers killed in four separate battles. The entire operation accounted for 1,809 VC soldiers killed or captured during phases I and II of Operation JUNCTION CITY. In supporting the operation, the 1st Engineer Battalion, constructed two new airfields in War Zone C and erected a class 45/55 Bailey bridge capable of carrying tanks across the SAIGON River into War Zone C. Highway 13 from SAIGON to QUAN LOI was held open for military traffic almost continuously for three months by mechanized/armored forces. During the operation there was a marked increase of VC mining incidents. Mines were found to be larger than those previously employed. They were also more difficult to detect, since in many cases they were non-metallic. VC landing zone (LZ) denial techniques were more sophisticated than those previously encountered. LZs were found with command detonated mines connected in series across and around the available landing space. The main objective of phase one, the capture or destruction of COSVN and Headquarters, 9th VC Division, was not achieved during

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Operation JUNCTION CITY. This can be attributed to the following factors: first, the close proximity of a privileged sanctuary; second, the extreme difficulty of gaining complete surprise as a result of the extensive repositioning of troops and logistical support prior to D day, inspite of efforts devoted to deception measures.

5. Operation HARVEST MOON: On 5 April 1967, the 1-16 Infantry began participation in support of Operation HARVEST MOON. This operation was a IIFTV directed operation at BUNARD (YT270888). The battalion's mission was to secure the engineer construction site at BUNARD. C Company, 168th Engineers was building a Special Forces-CIDG camp and an airfield capable of landing C-130 aircraft at that location. On 6 April, B Battery, 1-5 Artillery and Platoon C, Light Horse Airmobile Artillery (4.2" mortar) were airlifted to BUNARD to provide indirect fire support for 1-16 Infantry. No significant engagements with the Viet Cong occurred; however, the threat of a Viet Cong attack continued in the area. The operation continues. The operation is characterized by local patrolling which has found enemy base camps in the area.

6. Operation MANHATTAN: Operation MANHATTAN was officially initiated on 230641H April 1967 with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) (attached to 1st Division) and the 3d Brigade. The latter conducted air assaults into multiple landing zones within the area of operations. The general area of operations encompassed a strip extending northwest from the "Iron Triangle" to the Michelin Plantation between the SAIGON River and Highway 13. The purpose of the operation was to destroy the BINH DUONG Province Committee and elements of Military Region IV and VC/NVA installations. Intelligence indicated the Viet Cong has numerous logistical bases and installations in the area. Operation MANHATTAN was preceded on 22 April 1967 by Operation SENECA FALLS, a deception operation intended to establish the "Iron Triangle" as the next area of operations. Operation SENECA FALLS was conducted by the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division with Companies A and B, 2-16 Infantry conducting simulated air assault landings into two different LZs in the "Iron Triangle". No significant contact was made during the one day operation. Although no significant enemy contact was made on Operation MANHATTAN during April, the division has located and destroyed many VC base camps, installations, and supply caches. The operation continues.

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E. Training

1. For the period 1 February - 30 April 1967, the following is the breakdown of battalion days which units spent in training, troop movements, and operations:

	OPN LAM SON 67	OPN TUCSON	OPN JUNCTION CITY	OPN HARVEST MOON	OPN MANHATTAN	OTHER
FEB	51	39	54	0	0	119
MAR	54	0	269	0	0	0
APR	69	0	98	32	41	60
TOTAL	174	39	421	32	41	179

2. Listed below is the breakdown of battalion days by mission:

	CARE & MAINT	BASE SCTY	S&D OPS	ROAD SCTY	JUNGLE CLEARING	CONVOY ESCORT	EN ROUTE	S&S OPS
FEB	21	66	79	32	9	0	10	35
MAR	20	89	64	147	0	23	18	17
APR	12	129	69	68	0	0	12	10
TOTAL	53	284	212	247	9	23	40	62

3. The training posture of the division remained excellent throughout the reporting period. The division replacement training program was revised during April. The five major subordinate command's replacement training schools will implement a new training directive that establishes a 61 hour course of instruction for replacement personnel. Practical work consumes 75% of the course. Night instruction consumes 25% of the course. A minimum of 30% is conducted outside base camp areas.

4. A division Mobile Training Team is being organized to train junior leaders serving above grade as fire team leaders and squad leaders. The MTT will train at battalion locations in the field during periods of stand down or where the battalion's mission requires it to be in a semi-static posture. The course will emphasize five major points: ambush, weapons, defense, movement, and inspection as applicable to a junior leader's responsibility to his men, equipment, and missions.

5. The following number of people attended replacement training during the reporting period:

1st Brigade	723
2d Brigade	813
3d Brigade	838
SPT CMD	738
DIV ARTY	573
TOTAL	3,685

6. Personnel attended TDY schools in and out of Vietnam as listed below:

PACAF Jungle Survival School (Phillipines)	8
Helicopter engine and airframe maintenance (VUNG TAU)	20
MACV Recondo School (NHA TRANG)	14

7. The following numbers of individuals have been trained on new equipment as indicated:

Nightingale device	15
Anti-Intrusion Device	48

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F. Psychological Operations and Civic Action, Revolutionary Development Support

1. General. During the past quarter the Division G-5 section was completely reorganized. To support the merger of the Revolutionary Development Task Force and 2d Brigade the G-5 sent three officers, one NCO, and two enlisted men to the 2d Brigade. The Division printing press and supplies were also turned over to 2d Brigade along with the psychological warfare support building, the civil affairs warehouse, and all civil affairs commodities and supplies. The 2d Brigade is now responsible for all Division civic action support. G-5 will retain staff supervision of the civil affairs program. The responsibility for conducting psychological operations was decentralized to brigade level. G-5 will continue to exercise staff planning and supervision while brigade S-5's will be responsible for conducting psychological operations.

2. Psychological Operations.

a. During the past quarter the primary psychological efforts of the Division were focused on undermining the morale of VC and NVA forces; encouraging defection under the CHIEU HOI program; and assuring the civilian population of the ultimate success of the GVN and FVMAF while winning their support.

b. A total of over 19,000,000 leaflets were dropped, and over 350 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were flown during the quarter.

During February the Division had 228 ralliers; there were 65 ralliers in March, 31 in April, and a total of 324 ralliers during the quarter.

d. In addition to standard leaflets and tapes, G-5 developed over twenty special leaflets, many of which were the "quick reaction" type, and several special loudspeaker appeals to support tactical operations. These were primarily designed to exploit ralliers, prisoners, and recent victories.

e. Significant progress was made in integrating artillery leaflet shells into night destruction fires, and into fires whenever solid contact with enemy forces is established. Artillery leaflet shells are now being fired whenever feasible.

f. The Division also conducted an intensive psychological program in the village of CHANH LUU during TET. This program was directed at the PHU LOI Battalion, using face to face communications with their families and friends as the principal means of communications. The people generally received the visit with warmth and gratitude.

g. Approximately 450,000 TET greeting cards were also air dropped and hand distributed by the Division. These cards were directed at the PHU LOI Battalion, and at the people of BINH DUONG, and were signed by the Commanding General.

h. Operation JUNCTION CITY, the major tactical operation during this period, produced seven ralliers. The fact that there were few ralliers is attributed primarily to the fact that the operation was directed at main force VC and NVA units, and the fact that there is not a continuous, on-going, psychological operations program directed at the area this operation was conducted in.

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3. Civic Action.

a. During the past quarter the Division civil affairs support branch completed construction of the first warehouse and the office building. This enables storage of commodities for rapid reaction to brigade requirements and allows storage and resupply of larger quantities of supplies and more varied items.

b. In February the primary civic action effort was concentrated in the village of CHANH LUU. A Unicorn dance team from SAIGON presented a two-hour show which was well received. All people in the village were given TET gifts. These gifts included: toys, rice, sewing kits, cigarettes, T-shirts, balloons, money, and joss sticks. The 1st Engineer Battalion erected a playground set for the children.

c. All units in the Division made extensive distribution of gifts in their areas during the TET holiday.

d. Two new wells were dug at the BINH DUONG CHIEU HOI Center.

e. Over 7,000 people were given medical and dental treatment under the MEDCAP program. In addition eight classes on oral hygiene were held with over 2,200 people attending.

f. Over 100 tons of commodities consisting of canned goods, rice, wheat, milk, and cooking oil were distributed to Division sponsored orphanages and schools, to needy families, and in support of the hamlet festival program. Also distributed were 250 school kits, 1,000 bars of soap, 7,000 board feet of lumber, 2,000 pounds of cement, and 150 sheets of sheet metal.

g. Considerable damage was caused by artillery incidents in AN MY village and at St Joseph's leprosarium. Cement, roofing tile, lumber, and other necessary supplies were delivered for reconstruction of this damage.

4. Revolutionary Development.

a. (C) During the period from 1 Feb 67 to 30 April 1967 (with the exception of 17 Mar 67 to 17 Apr 67 when the 3d Bde assumed the responsibility), the 2d Bde continued Operation LAM SON II and its continuation, LAM SON 67. During the reporting period, the 2d Bde in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector, 18th ARVN Division and BIEN HOA Sector, Capitol Military District and GIA DINH Sector conducted tactical operations in designated area locating and destroying VC/NVA main force units, guerrilla units, and VC infrastructure; and continued, by constant application of combat fire power, to cause individual organizations to rally to GVN control and thus stimulate further Revolutionary Activities in these areas. Emphasis was continually placed on strengthening local defenses (insuring a secure environment) and in extending developmental projects. During the three month period the 2d Brigade's Revolutionary Development program included search and destroy operations, cordon and search operations, platoon-sized ambushes and saturation patrolling, providing security for engineer efforts, jungle and road clearing operations, providing security for designated village chiefs, conducting revolutionary development self-help projects, civic action programs, population control activities, and ground and psy ops operations.

b. (C) There were thirty cordon and search operations, some of which included hamlet festivals and/or population control

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activities conducted during the reporting period. Civic Affairs and Psychological Operations for the individual months were as follows:

(1) In February Civic Action projects within the Brigade TAOR continued with support of orphanages and schools by Brigade units, distribution of food stuffs and miscellaneous items to ARVN/RF/PF dependents, and assistance to District Advisors in LAI THIEU and DI AN District. The attitude of VN civilians in the southern portion of the AO continues to be quite favorable toward US troops. In the northern portion of the AO, the attitude seems to be one of watchful waiting. Personnel are unwilling to commit themselves until they see whether US troops will remain in the same area to protect them from VC activities. RDTF continues to support the BINH DUONG CHIEU HOI Center, while Brigade maintains liaison with the THU DUC/GIA DINH CHIEU HOI Center. MEDCAP II operations during the reporting period treated 1,122 personnel, with another 226 personnel receiving dental care. While on operations in support of the 2d Brigade, RDTF held hamlet festivals and fed and entertained an estimated 2,200 personnel. Items distributed were as follows: 75 cases of Keen, 2,000 lbs corn meal, 3 cases cooking oil, 30 cases oranges, 15,000 lbs polished rice, 600 lbs rolled wheat, 12 trash barrels, 2,250 calendars, 100,000 TET greeting cards, 60 bags cement, 200 lbs clothing, 7,000 children's TET gifts, 10 1/2 cases insecticide, 100 health kits, 7 carpenter's kits, 6 teacher's kits, 3,500 bd ft. lumber, 400 bars of soap, 200 T-shirts (Flag), 2 cases parachute flares, 19 frag grenades, 11 claymore mines, 2,150 sand bags, 1/2 case star clusters (red), 400 meters concertina wire. Psychological operations during the reporting period consisted of ground and aerial loudspeaker/leaflet missions in support of Brigade Tactical Maneuvers throughout the LAM SON area of operations. A total of 6,030,000 "Chieu Hoi" leaflets were dropped. Twenty-one (21) loudspeaker missions were flown, for a total of 120 hours of broadcast time. A total of 218 Hoi Chanhs were received at the BINH DUONG Chieu Hoi Center during the reporting period. Approximately 20 Hoi Chanhs came into the THU DUC center as a result, at least in part, of 2d Brigade Psy Ops missions in support of the District Advisory Group. Information received from HOI CHANH indicates that psychological operations throughout the area are well coordinated with tactical operations throughout the area, and that morale of VC units within the TAOR is sagging, as indicated by the increasing number of Hoi Chanhs received.

(2) For March Civic Action project included: The treatment of 200 persons by MEDCAP, 24,000 \$ VN ~~salutary~~ payments, 230,550 \$ VN voluntary contributions for education of orphans, swings and seesaws built in two playgrounds, and distribution of the following items: 11 cases insecticide, 21 bags cement, 20 trash barrels, 2800 lbs rice, 75 ft manila rope, 200 board feet scrap lumber, 60 health kits, 450 lbs clothing, 15 loads laterite, 11 bicycles, 111 asbestos prest sheets, lumber (6"x8"x16'), lumber (2"x4"x12'), 7 loads of sand and gravel, 150 packs Cambodian (captured), 300 calendars, 700 free south newspapers, 200-T-shirts, 200 bags of toys, 2 cases luncheon meat, 4 ping-pong sets, 160-1 kilo bags of rice, 4 cases dehydrated soap, 900 lbs powder milk, 10 cases cooking oil, 1500 lbs corn meal, 25 cases assorted canned food, 29 cases assorted individual cereal, 20 cases (120 gallon) canned milk. Operations supported during this time were LAM SON 67 and JUNCTION CITY II, with support of RDTF within Bde TAOR. During the reporting period 5,311,000 leaflets were dropped. The total amount of loudspeaker missions were 69, with a broadcast time of 150 hours.

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G. Aviation

1. The 1st Aviation Battalion furnished general aviation support to the 1st Infantry Division throughout the period cited. In essence, this general support can be further defined as: a. Planning, coordinating, and executing airmobile assaults with organic and nondivisional aviation assets; b. Furnishing organic aircraft to units within the division requesting aviation support (i.e. resupply and command and control (C&C) aircraft) on a daily basis; and c. Providing direct fire support in the form of gunships from the organic armed helicopter platoon.

2. During Operations TUCSON and JUNCTION CITY I and II, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Battalion initially furnished mostly its command and control group to plan, coordinate and execute the air assaults and extractions that took place. A and B Companies mostly furnished general support (i.e. command and control aircraft (C&C), and resupply aircraft). "The Rebels", the gunship platoon from A Company, and the Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon (ASTA) from B Company were noteworthy in their support furnished to the division. "The Rebels", furnished almost continual gunship coverage to the various fire support bases and base camps throughout the division area. The ASTA platoon provided photographic coverages, aside from their normal mission of electronic surveillance, of proposed landing sites and tactical areas of interest. A forward battalion tactical command post was provided to the division headquarters for aviation advice and technical guidance. Additionally the battalion furnished Pathfinder support whenever requested. Toward the end of JUNCTION CITY II, Company A did participate in some of the air assaults and a good part during the multiple extractions that took place in closing out Operation JUNCTION CITY.

3. In Operation MANHATTAN, the 1st Aviation Battalion continued to provide general support to the division as defined above.

a. Elements Affecting the Action

(1) Enemy information and prior reconnaissance proved to be extremely helpful in selecting landing zones for the air assaults. Sufficient time, prior to the air assaults for Operation JUNCTION CITY, allowed the aviation battalion commander adequate time to closely plan, with the Brigade commanders and infantry commanders involved, in selecting landing zones (LZ) for the air assaults. Available enemy information furnished by the "2" personnel at division and brigade level was analyzed and then verified by aerial reconnaissance as to where the touchdown spots should be to avoid enemy concentrations or suspected defensive positions. Enemy information furnished, and prior reconnaissance, was also effective in selecting flight routes and minimum safe altitudes to fly to avoid suspected VC gun positions capable of bringing fire against the airmobile task force. The enemy information furnished was also used by the air mission commanders in briefing the gun ships so as to set up effective LZ suppressive fire patterns.

(2) The nature of the terrain in some cases dictated the method in which the aircraft were brought into the LZ's. The operational areas during most of the time frame cited in this report, were for the most part open spots surrounded by high jungle. Compounding this were the surfaces of these areas—in many there was either grass of sufficient height to cover the surface so the pilots were unable to see the ground on which they were to land, or there was shrubbery high enough to cause damage to highly susceptible moving parts such as tail rotors.

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To handle the above problems, helicopters were loaded with only sufficient fuel to complete the required lifts leaving in some cases only marginal fuel reserve. This was considered as a tactical necessity and a better approach to the problem rather than cut down the amount of troops to be carried into battle. This reduced fuel load then gave the pilots flexibility in which to maneuver their helicopters in and out of these "confirmed" areas.

(3) The weather associated with the Northwest Monsoon Season is extremely dry and hot. This, added to the terrain problems mentioned above, further magnified the difficulties of getting helicopters safely into and out of LZ's. The vegetation in most of the LZ's was either tall dry elephant grass, just plain dry grass, or combinations of both, and shrubbery of varying heights. The dry season already mentioned made all this vegetation highly susceptible to burning if exposed to fire.

(a) To reduce the possibility of not being able to get into the cleared LZ (due to probable fires that could be caused by the air and artillery prep), just prior to JUNCTION CITY, any likely area for an LZ was burned by use of thermite grenades thrown out of helicopters. The Air Force FAC's also assisted in the burning by firing their white phosphorus marking rockets at likely LZ's. In all, prior to "D" Day JUNCTION CITY I, a good area of War Zone 'C' was burned by these methods.

(b) This proved to be effective in reducing the chances of having the LZ's catch fire. However, on D-Day another problem presented itself -- that of ash brought about by the burning. The first ten aircraft into one of the "pre-burned" LZ's were quickly obscured and surface visibility approached zero when the effect of their rotor down-wash raised clouds of ash and dust. This situation was immediately recognized as a serious threat to the entire lift, thereafter the remaining aircraft of the airmobile assault force were put into an orbit until much of the ash and dust had settled. Subsequently, aircraft were sent in only five at a time and in very loose formation. In departing the LZ, aircraft left one at a time and only after the aircraft in front of them had cleared the area. From this experience evolved the "dust landing formation". It proved to be successful in handling this problem of dust which was to plague most of the air assaults and extractions conducted during Operation JUNCTION CITY I and II.

(c) Other effects of weather, such as clouds, were not of any serious nature to cause the air assaults to be excessively delayed. In only one case was there a delay and it was only for one hour.

(4) Civilian reaction to battalion operations played no discernible role during this period.

b. The Action

(1) Mission: The missions of the 1st Aviation Battalion were as stated earlier in this report. The mission of general support was accomplished by daily meeting the requirements received from the Aviation Coordination Center (ACC) collocated with the division tactical operation center (DTC). Additionally, periodically the requirement was placed upon the battalion to provide a control group to plan, coordinate, and execute airmobile assaults or extractions throughout the time period of this report. This normally means the 1st Aviation Battalion utilizes aviation resources provided to the division from IIFFV assets. As indicated in previous paragraphs, concerning enemy information and terrain and weather, the operation plans and orders were published with sufficient flexibility to react to any sudden changes, which is normally the case when operating in a counterinsurgency environment.

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(2) Gunships throughout the period were provided to units within the division, as well as those attached, to cover convoy movements and mostly to act as rapid reaction force against enemy attack. Much of the gunship support was furnished by staging the helicopters at advanced bases nightly, ready to react whenever called upon.

(3) Decisions made by the 1st Aviation Battalion were generally recommendations to the supported unit. As example:

(a) The landing of only five aircraft at a time to reduce the hazardous conditions encountered going into extremely dusty areas. This of course required the ground commander concerned to pay particular attention to his supporting fires for at this slow rate of putting troops into an area the possibility of being "defeated in detail" was a major tactical problem to be considered.

(b) Ground commanders would of course want gunship support, especially at night, to be readily available. The argument of placing gunships on standby, say at an advanced base, where the probability of mortar attack was high and gunship reaction time is short goes without saying. The 1st Aviation Battalion's approach was to accept a 5-10 minute delay by placing the gunships in a more secure area less susceptible to enemy mortar attack. This was a constant problem to be wrestled with.

(c) C&C aircraft: Commanders naturally want to have these aircraft readily available, in case of enemy attacks or the like, in their areas of operation, for time is generally of the essence. Rapid decisions have to be made, guidance offered, etc. However, here again major points for consideration were aircraft vulnerability to enemy ground fires and that of extremely poor conditions to complete required maintenance. These considerations dictated the necessity for aircraft to be flown back to more secure and suitable areas where maintenance could be performed. Again, the decision of time versus "able to insure" aircraft safety and availability had to be made for each specific situation.

(4) Logistical support of the battalion was generally provided from the base camp. A good part (on those missions where distances were involved) of Class III A and Class V requirements were met by drawing from prepositioned stocks at LAI KHE, MINH THANH and QUAN LOI. Early in Operation JUNCTION CITY Class III A and V were also provided from SUOI DA. (Class V in this case refers to those 2.75 rockets and 7.62 ammunition used by the gunships).

(5) Combat efficiency of the battalion at the end of the reporting period is rated as excellent.

(6) Statistics on operations conducted during the period:

(a)	30	Combat assaults and/or extractions
(b)	8,458	Rotary wing combat hours flown
(c)	908	Fixed wing combat hours flown
(d)	17,470	Rotary wing sorties
(e)	2,183	Fixed wing sorties
(f)	31,233	Passengers moved
(g)	652	Tons of cargo moved

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4. Discussion and Recommendations:

a. Discussion:

(1) Operations were conducted during the Northeast Monsoon Season, an extremely dry period. The effect it had on aviation operations were quite evident by the amount of accidents that occurred during the period. A majority of the accidents were caused by landing or taking off in extremely dusty areas. To prevent these accidents, increased emphasis was placed upon pilot techniques in dusty conditions. Engineer support was requested to provide dust suppressants in those areas of likely take offs or landing. Commanders at all echelons were briefed as to exercising extreme care in selection of areas of helicopter operations; that is to keep to a minimum vehicular traffic or any other type of activity that would ruin the surface of helicopter landing or take off areas.

(2) Ground traffic around airfields continued to present problems during Operation JUNCTION CITY. The hazards of vehicles driving in close proximity to runways during landings and take-offs of aircraft is fairly self evident. Aircraft can communicate with one another or with a ground controller but in no way with vehicles that decide to cross runways. In too many cases vehicles were allowed to run hap-hazardly around the major airfield used, i.e., MINH THANH and QUAN LOI. The problem of MINH THANH was fairly well resolved by appointing a Pathfinder Lieutenant as Airfield Commander. The Military Police aided as well by "ticketing" any vehicle driven on the airfield. Barricades were also put up. QUAN LOI, however, remained a dangerous area.

(3) Associated with this is the damage continuous vehicular traffic does to the surface of an airfield. Example was MINH THANH, initially in the operation. The engineers covered much of the runway with pene-prime where helicopters were to land and take off. This proved to be quite effective, however, wheeled vehicles, and even in some cases tracked vehicles, destroyed all the dust suppressant cover in short order. On 7- by barricading and Military Police patrolling was the situation eventually brought under control. This was not the case at QUAN LOI.

(4) Better coordination must be effected by units providing air traffic facilities to airfields. The 12th Aviation Group provided air traffic control teams for the major fields as did the Air Force with their Combat Control Teams. These proved to be extremely helpful, however when time came for these teams to be moved the necessary coordination to advise people concerned with these matters was not always done. In one case a hurried call to USARV stopped one movement. The system of providing and removing air traffic controllers needs to be tightened up. Another result of this poor coordination was the convergence of more teams than was necessary on an airfield.

(5) One of the most pressing problems that presented itself during the reporting period was the question as to whether or not to burn LZs prior to conducting airmobile assaults into them.

(a) In addition to the problem of dust hazards encountered during this period, there was the continuous threat of LZs catching fire as a result of air and artillery prep fires. Most of the LZs used contained either tall grass or dried out shrubbery, highly susceptible to burning; therefore prior to conducting an airmobile assault into these LZs decisions had to be made prior to the air assault as to the possibility of "pre-burning" the LZ to preclude the chance of it burning at the planned time of landing.

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(b) If the decision was made to "pre-burn" the LZ the problem of "tipping one's hand" then presented itself. This was solved to some extent by setting fires to many possible LZs throughout the area. However, this was only feasible if time was available. In those cases where time was not available the necessity or requirement of having alternate LZs was then used.

(c) In essence advantages versus disadvantages had to be weighed. Those were as follows:

Advantages:

- (1) Removes the possibility of burning during "H-Hour".
- (2) By burning out the tall grass and clumps of shrubbery it gives the pilots a better view of the landing area; also exposes any areas where booby traps may have been laid; and in some cases detonates them.

Disadvantages:

- (1) The necessity for time prior to H-Hour to "pre-burn" likely areas to confuse the enemy as to the actual LZ.
- (2) The dust hazard caused by the charred material lying in the LZ must be planned for, i.e., aircraft must land in loose formation; not as many can land in the LZ at the same time; strict control must be maintained at all times.
- (3) The slow process of bringing in troops as described in item 2 above means that the ground commander does not get the chance, initially, to "drop" his troops in with sufficient force to meet the challenge if a strong enemy force is encountered within the LZ area.

b. Recommendations:

- (1) Engineers in bulldozing areas, must whenever possible attempt to only knock down trees and not scrape up any natural vegetation that might "knit" the soil together.
- (2) During the planning phase of tactical operations, and as soon as the fact is discovered that a requirement exists to operate for any length of time from an outlying airfield without air traffic controllers, action should be initiated to provide necessary controller personnel. This must be pursued and coordinated through both Army and Air Force channels to insure that adequate facilities will be available as well as to prevent duplication of effort.
- (3) A more positive approach by the commander responsible for an airfield must be taken to prevent what may be a costly accident in terms of lives and equipment. It is not sufficient to appoint only an airfield commander, he must be given assistance to perform this job, i.e., men and equipment.

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H. Logistics

1. General: During the reporting period the 1st Infantry Division Support Command provided division-wide combat service support to all divisional units and other units attached during operations. The logistical support operations were primarily for Operations: WILLISTON, 2-12 February; TUCSON DELTA, 14-21 February; and JUNCTION CITY, 22 February to 15 April 1967.

2. Logistical Situation: The location of subordinate battalions and the methods of support are outlined below for each operation.

a. Operation WILLISTON.

(1) General: The operation involved clearing and securing Route 13 for ARVN and US convoys. 1st Infantry Division units in conjunction with ARVN forces conducted the operation from 2-12 February.

(2) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion: The battalion provided timely and effective support of tactical units being staged at MINH THANH. A Temporary Forward Support Element, consisting of 1 officer and 15 enlisted men with necessary equipment, was established at MINH THANH. The element was capable of providing Class I, II & IV, III, and Graves Registration support. Supplies were transported to MINH THANH by air and by two convoys from DI AN. The 1st Logistical Command furnished two 600 cubic foot reefers with generators. However, these did not become fully operational until 19 February. The 1st Logistical Command also furnished a shower unit. The 1st Engineer Battalion provided a water purification unit.

(3) 1st Medical Battalion: This operation was supported by Company D, 1st Medical Battalion. Company D deployed a forward clearing station to MINH THANH which provided medical and dental treatment for elements of the 1st Brigade and other US forces operating in that area. One Air Ambulance was in direct support of the MINH THANH operational area and co-located with the forward clearing station. The forward clearing station remained in location at the termination of the operation. All other elements of the 1st Medical Battalion remained at their base camps.

(4) 701st Maintenance Battalion: Due to the small size of the single brigade task force involved, the maintenance support was proportionally small. A section-sized team under an NCO was dispatched to MINH THANH from the company normally supporting the 1st Brigade, D Company, 701st Maintenance Battalion. Normal back up support was furnished by the Maintenance Battalion.

(5) Division Ammunition Officer: Class V support was provided in the conventional manner. In addition to the LONG BINH Ammunition Depot, the 3d Ordnance Battalion operated a forward ASP at LAI KHE to support units in that area. Since WILLISTON was a localized, relatively small-scale operation, separate records were not maintained isolating ammunition issues in support thereof.

(6) Division Transportation Office: The DTO operated in two locations, LAI KHE and DI AN. In LAI KHE the Logistics Operations Coordination Center was the nerve center for all logistical support in the division. From the LOCC, the DTO controlled all convoy movement in the division and all fixed wing airlift. The DI AN echelon of the DTO was responsible for the operation of the DI AN airfield, to include supervision of all on-loading and off-loading facilities in order to expedite these functions. Airfield personnel under the direction of the airfield commander also insured that a continuous flow of replacements to the forward areas was maintained. All convoys going to the forward

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area originated at DI AN, which served as the control center for the organization and departure of these convoys. The Traffic Control Center at DI AN granted clearance to all units, including clearances through SAIGON. Assistance was rendered by SAIGON Support Command who provided truck support for movement of supplies to the forward areas. An Air Force liaison team, working in direct coordination with DTO at LAI KHE assisted in airlift control and in the solving of various problems.

b. Operation TUCSON DELTA:

(1) General: The 1st Infantry Division conducted operations in the vicinity of MINH THANH and Michelin Plantation to destroy VC/NVA forces and bases.

(2) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion: The Battalion supported tactical units in the vicinity of MINH THANH and Michelin Plantation, and prepositioned personnel, stocks and equipment for the support of Operation JUNCTION CITY at MINH THANH, SUOI DA, and DAU TIENG. At DAU TIENG, Class I support only (from 1st Infantry Division assets at DI AN) was provided by the battalion, while Class III support was the responsibility of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Support operations at DAU TIENG took place during the period 17-21 February. Class I, limited II & IV and GREG support was available at MINH THANH throughout the operation, and at SUOI DA from 17 February. Support facilities at MINH THANH, with the exception of 1st Logistical Command Shower facilities, were operated by the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion. At SUOI DA, they were operated jointly by the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion and commencing 21 February by the 1st Logistical Command. The 1st Supply and Transport Battalion element of the LOCC moved to MINH THANH from LAI KHE on 18 February. Only limited support was provided from 1st Supply and Transport Battalion forward support sections at QUIN LOI and LAI KHE.

(3) 1st Medical Battalion: Company B, 1st Medical Battalion supported the operation from their base camp at LAI KHE and Company D provided support with a forward clearing station at MINH THANH. These elements were in direct support of the 1st and 3rd Brigades. One air ambulance, controlled by Company D, was located at MINH THANH in area support for the operation.

(4) 701st Maintenance Battalion: The operations were supported by the 701st Maintenance Battalion in two spheres of support. The normal division complement was supported by the base camp concept. In addition, a platoon size team under an officer was established at MINH THANH from D Company, 701st Maintenance Battalion. Normal backup support was furnished by the Maintenance Battalion.

(5) Division Ammunition Officer: Class V support of Operation TUCSON DELTA was provided in a most unorthodox fashion. Units operating in the vicinity of MINH THANH were supported almost entirely by a small supply element operated by DAO personnel at MINH THANH. Ammunition was programmed in by air from LONG BINH by the Ammunition Supply Officer, operating from the LOCC. Some artillery ammunition was conveyed in by land LOC from the 1st Logistical Command ASP at LAI KHE. Class V operations were managed by the DAO from MINH THANH as a part of the Logistics Operations Coordination Center. The DAO also furnished personnel to receive and account for ammunition flown into MINH THANH and furnished representation at RIEN HOA Air Base and the LONG BINH Ammunition Depot to facilitate timely and efficient smoke grenades, were prestocked by the DAO at DI AN and delivered by helicopter to fill specific requirements. The LAI KHE ASP was available as a back-up capability but was rarely used.

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(6) Division Transportation Officer: The DTO used the same organization as during CEDAR FALLS and WILLISTON, a LAI KHE - MINH THANH contingent and a DI AN contingent. The DI AN contingent was responsible for operating the DI AN airfield, controlling and setting up convoys in the DI AN and SAIGON area and satisfying day-to-day movement requirements in and around the division base camp. Assistance was received from SAIGON Support Command in providing trucks for resupply runs to the forward area. An Air Force liaison team worked with the DTO element in the LOCC to handle problems which arose concerning fixed wing airlift.

6. Operation JUNCTION CITY

(1) General: The basic concept used, supply point distribution of high tonnage items from division supply points and 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Areas located as far forward in the tactical areas of operations as practicable. The impetus of supply was from the rear and focused on maintenance of adequate stockages at all forward supply locations to meet peak unit demands.

(2) Forward Command Post: The Support Command Forward Command Post was established at MINH THANH during Phase I, and LAI KHE during Phase II. It was co-located with the ACofS, G-4 element in the LOCC at Division Headquarters (Forward). A Support Command Coordinator was established at SUOI DA during Phase I to coordinate the activities of subordinate elements at that location.

(3) Method of direct support and resupply:

(a) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

(1) The battalion utilized existing base camps as logistical bases when they were accessible to the planned disposition of tactical units. When, for either time or distance factors, one of the base camps became inaccessible, a temporary forward support section or a POL "jump team" established was established to provide continuity of operations. During JUNCTION CITY, the permanent base camps at LAI KHE and QUAN LOI were used as logistical bases.

(2) Support locations utilized were:

DATES OPEN	LOCATION	SUPPORT	PERSONNEL
20 Feb - 13 Mar	SUOI DA	I II&IV III	1 Off 17 EM
22 Feb - 23 Mar	MINH THANH	I II&IV III GR	1 Off 22 EM
24 Mar - 15 Apr	MINH THANH	III	11 EM
25 Feb - 12 Mar	KATUM (XT3390)	III	1 Off 5 EM
21 Mar - 28 Mar	FSB "B" (XT6281)	III	1 Off 3 EM
28 Mar - 5 Apr	FSB "C" (XT5685)	III	1 Off 3 EM
5 Apr - 7 Apr	NUI B' R. (XT153072)	III	1 Off 3 EM

(3) A combination of area, task and unit support was used during this operation. Class I and II & IV supplies were normally provided on a unit basis. Class II supplies and GREG service were normally provided on an area basis. Although infrequent, task support was provided also.

(4) 701st Maintenance Battalion: Maintenance Contact Teams furnished support on an area basis and provided service to both divisional and non-divisional customers. Teams were established in initial positions, and then moved with their supported densities of equipment as the situation dictated. The chronological disposition of the teams is shown below:

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DATE	LOCATION	TEAM COMPOSITION	SUPPORTING
2 Feb - 16 Mar	MINH THANH	Co D - 14 men	1st Bde TF
14 Feb - 21 Feb	BEN CHI	Co C - 20 men	3rd Bde TF
21 Feb - 14 Mar	SUOI DA	Co C - 20 men	3rd Bde TF
22 Feb - 15 Mar	QUAN LOI	Co C - 12 men	TF Dixie
11 Mar - 7 Apr	FSB "B"	Co A - 10 men	Engr/Arty Bn's
19 Mar - 14 Apr	QUAN LOI	Co B - 25 men	2nd Bde TF, ARTY
7 Apr - 14 Apr	QUAN LOI	Co A - 13 men	Engr Bn

Additionally, technical assistance teams were operational for short periods at the following locations;

LOCATION	COMPOSITION	SUPPORTING
ARTY Base VI	Co D - 4 men	3rd Brigade
FSB "C"	Co B - 3 men	DIV ARTY
Obj Thrust	Co B - 3 men	DIV ARTY
PHU LOI	Co A - 12 men	DIV ARTY, 1-4 Cav
PHU LOI	Co B - 8 men	1-4 Cav, 2-2 Inf (Mech)

Repair parts requests were forwarded from each contact team to its parent unit. These requests were then filled by the parent unit or sent back to battalion headquarters for fill by Company A or backup support. Aircraft maintenance support was provided by Company E at PHU LOI, and contact teams were sent on request to on-site locations. 83 such visits were made during the period. One combat assault mission was escorted and emergency repairs made on one aircraft.

(3) 1st Medical Battalion: Forward Medical treatment and supply facilities provided area support to all organic and attached units of the division. The chronological disposition of teams is shown below:

DATE	LOCATION	UNIT
20 Feb - 14 Mar	SUOI DA	Co C (-)
20 Feb - 14 Mar	SUOI DA	Hq & Co A, Forward Medical Supply Point.
20 Feb - 5 Mar	MINH THANH	Co D, Clearing Plat Section - 4 Off, 23EM
6 Mar - 15 Apr	QUAN LOI	Co E, Clearing Plat Section
21 Mar - 15 Apr	QUAN LOI	Hq & Co A, Co C, Rapid Reaction Med Team
22 Feb - 15 Apr	LAI KHE	Co B

In addition to these forward medical treatment facilities, area support was furnished from base camps at DI AN, LAI KHE, and PHUOC VINH. A portion of the division medical supply was moved forward to SUOI DA. It was set up in proximity to "C" Company and provided medical supplies to all divisional units in the area plus the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 173d Airborne Brigade. Requests for resupply items were sent via landline or radio to the battalion S-4 from the forward depot. Supplies were shipped forward either by road or air. The S-4 had operational control over the depot. This was the first time the forward medical depot concept was utilized within the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam. On previous operations, "Dust Off" helicopters were used for transportation of personnel, equipment, and medical supplies from DI AN to the forward area. During this operation convoys and non-medical helicopters were used more than in the past.

(4) Division Transportation Office: The Division Transportation Office was organized into two sections, one forward and one rear. The forward element was concerned with direct transportation support to all units in the forward area. This included scheduling and controlling of all convoys from the forward area to other locations and scheduling and

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controlling or all fixed wing airlift, both tactical and logistical. The rear element handled the same convoy functions in the division rear. All convoys departing DI AN were controlled and coordinated from there. All convoys departing through SAIGON were cleared through the rear office. All C7A traffic out of DI AN was controlled from the DI AN Airfield. All units in the division desiring to move a convoy were required to obtain clearance through the DTO, either forward or rear. A clearance number was issued to the unit and this number, along with the time cleared for movement, given to the Military Police. LAI KHE was used as a coordination point for all convoys, both those originating in LAI KHE and those passing through from other areas. All convoys were stopped there, regrouped, rebriefed, and tied in with new security elements. All major convoys reported checkpoints to the Division Transportation Office Forward, and the Provost Marshall flew convoy control over all resupply convoys and some tactical convoys. While in the air, the PM representative was able to report the progress to the DTO by radio.

(e) Division Ammunition Office: During Phase I of Operation JUNCTION CITY, Class V support was provided through a 1st Logistical Command ASF located at SUOI DA for Artillery units and elements of the 3d Brigade and 1st Brigade operating north of SUOI DA to the Cambodian border. At the same time units of the 1st Brigade, whose trains were located at MINH THANH, were also supplied by a small supply point at MINH THANH operated by the Division Ammo Section. During Phase II of the operation, the main logistical base was shifted to QUAN LOI where the 1st Logistical Command again operated an /SP. Also included in the Class V support provided by the 1st Logistical Command was explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) service. A team from the 42d Detachment was stationed at MINH THANH during Phase I and at QUAN LOI during Phase II. The DAO section operated a supply point at MINH THANH with additional manpower assistance from DIV ARTY. Stockage of this supply point was coordinated by the DAO-LOCC and the LONG BINH DAO team. The DAO operated an office at both 1st Logistical Command ASF's, SUOI DA and QUAN LOI, in order to authenticate and approve transportation orders and to relay timely stockage data back to the DAO at the LOCC.

(6) General Support and Resupply Sources:

(a) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion: Requirements generated by supported units were routed to the Assistant Division Supply Officer at DI AN. For those items not available, or for future programmed requirements, a request was placed on the 506th Field Depot in SAIGON. The 1st Logistical Command provided a Forward Support Activity at SUOI DA from the 3d Ordnance Battalion. This FSA used a land LOC to bring forward all classes of supply. The 1st Logistical Command also provided an FSA at QUAN LOI from the 29th Group. This FSA used air and land LOC to provide Class I & III supplies.

(b) 1st Maintenance Battalion: The majority of parts were obtained from the normal supply source, 506th Field Depot in SAIGON, although some parts were obtained from the 185th, 725th, and 610th Maintenance Battalions.

(c) 1st Medical Battalion: The advanced platoon of the 32d Medical Depot provided medical resupply to the Division from its location in SAIGON. This support was excellent. Patients care was provided to the division by hospitals under the control of the 44th Medical Brigade. The 3rd Field Hospital in SAIGON, 93rd Evacuation Hospital and 24 Evacuation Hospital in LONG BINH, 3rd Surgical Hospital in Tay Ninh provided this care. Aeromedical evacuation was provided by the 283d Medical Detachment, 254th Medical Detachment, and 57th Medical Detachment from LONG BINH. Area

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aeromedical evacuation was provided by the Air Ambulance Company (Prov) by locating standby "Dust Offs" at SUOI DA, DAU TIENG, and MINH THANH.

(d) Division Transportation Office: Airfield operations were controlled by the US Air Force 8th Aerial Port, teams on location and by DTO personnel operating on the strip, during peak periods of activity. This became the case at MINH THANH and LAI KHE during the time when the division was located there.

(e) Division Ammunition Office: The LONG BINH Ammunition Depot, operated by the 3d Ordnance Battalion, was the backup source of all ammunition support for the operation.

(7) Unit resupply concepts: Supply point distribution was used approximately 95-98% of the time. Unit distribution was made for emergency requests and for a limited amount of perishable Class I supplies. Small parts and high priority items were delivered directly to field positions using the Support Command helicopter. Unit trains were located at SUOI DA, MINH THANH, and QUAN LOI. Units picked up supplies at the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion forward support sections situated at these locations. During Phase II, numerous thruput issues were made wherein ammunition was delivered by Logistical Command transportation to artillery units at Fire Support Base "Charlie", and to units along Highway 13 between CHONH THANH and AN LOC.

J. Supply

a. Supported strength: 24,156 average for period

b. Supply levels

(1) Class I - Adequate

(2) Class II & IV: Following is a list of the 11 critical items in short supply:

- (a) Armor, aircrew - 62 each
- (b) Generator set, PU532/FPS - 3 each
- (c) Loader, scoop - 2 each
- (d) Bridge, Armored Vehicle Launched - 1 each
- (e) Detecting sets, mine - 16 each
- (f) Mortar, 4.2 inch - 14 each
- (g) Carrier, Personnel, M113 and M13A1 - 5 each
- (h) Tank, M48A3 - 9 each
- (i) Truck, wrecker - 1 each
- (j) Forklift, 6000 lb - 3 each
- (k) Machinegun, M-60 - 102

(3) Class III: Adequate

(4) Class V - No supply levels within the division; following is a list of items in short supply:

- (a) 40mm HE cartridge
- (b) Green smoke grenades
- (c) M18A1 Claymore mines
- (d) White star illumination cluster
- (e) M82 percussion primers

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(5) During the reporting period, the 1st Infantry Division was issued 37,451.22 short tons of ammunition. This tonnage was issued in support of the following operations:

(a) WILLISTON	1357.66 s/t
(b) TUCSON DELTA	1274.95
(c) JUNCTION CITY	16243.60
(d) OTHER DIVISION SUPPORT	<u>18275.01</u>
	TOTAL 37,451.22

(6) Medical supply: The Division medical supply activity maintains a 45 day level of supply which includes over 2300 line items. Each company within the 1st Medical Battalion maintains a 15 day level of supply.

4. Evacuation of Casualties: Evacuation of patients was accomplished by ground and air. Difficulty was experienced during Operation JUNCTION CITY due to the heavy commitment of aeromedical airlift; therefore, it was necessary to utilize other types of aircraft to evacuate routine casualties from the forward areas to medical treatment facilities.

5. Transportation

a. Highway

(1) Supplies transported

(a) Class I: Tons shipped to:

1. DI AN	174710
2. 1st Bde	932.0
3. 2nd Bde	518.0
4. 3rd Bde	145513
5. DIV ARTY	522.0
6. QUAN LOI	76.0
7. Operation	6.0

(b) Class II & IV: Tons shipped to:

1. DI AN	28815
2. 1st Bde	618.3
3. 2nd Bde	138.9
4. 3rd Bde	948.6
5. DIV ARTY	216.1
6. QUAN LOI	206.3
7. Operation	11.4

(c) Class III

	1st Bde	QUAN LOI	3rd Bde	DIVARTY	DI AN	DI AN
Gallons shipped by road:						
Mogas:	56000	56265	387950	419000	494000	422527
Diesel:	39000	56148	317715	604000	573519	509519
Avgas:	13000	27535	53000	177500	66900	66386
JP-4:	37000	155000	395000	259000	260000	258741
Package POL:	83810		198652	108448	465296	408363

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(2) The following is a list of convoys consisting of ten or more vehicles in which 1st Supply and Transport Battalion participated:

DATE	VEHICLES	DESTINATION	UNIT SUPPORTED
1 Feb	11	LAI KHE	3d Bde
5 "	18	LAI KHE	3d Bde
7 "	29	QUAN LOI	Dixie North
8 "	23	LAI KHE	3d Bde
11 "	28	LAI KHE	3d Bde
11 "	25	QUAN LOI	Dixie North
11 "	23	MINH THANH	JUNCTION CITY
13 "	42	LAI KHE	3d Bde
16 "	16	MINH THANH	JUNCTION CITY
17 "	33	MINH THANH	JUNCTION CITY
20 "	11	SUOI DA	JUNCTION CITY
21 "	19	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
24 "	12	SUOI DA	JUNCTION CITY
25 "	30	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
3 Mar	10	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
6 "	14	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
10 "	25	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
12 "	18	QUAN LOI	JUNCTION CITY
14 "	12	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
16 "	12	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
18 "	20	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
21 "	13	QUAN LOI	JUNCTION CITY
23 "	31	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
25 "	12	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
28 "	47	PHUOC VINH	JUNCTION CITY
30 "	67	PHUOC VINH	JUNCTION CITY
31 "	20	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
2 Apr	13	QUAN LOI	JUNCTION CITY
2 "	11	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
4 "	20	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
6 "	15	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
8 "	10	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
11 "	15	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
12 "	11	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
15 "	18	LAI KHE	JUNCTION CITY
16 "	10	LAI KHE	3d Bde
18 "	11	LAI KHE	3d Bde
18 "	52	PHUOC VINH	1st Bde
20 "	26	PHUOC VINH	1st Bde
23 "	45	LAI KHE	3d Bde
24 "	10	LAI KHE	3d Bde
26 "	22	LAI KHE	3d Bde
29 "	35	LAI KHE	3d Bde
30 "	17	PHU LOI	DIV ARTY

(3) Extended dispatches of cargo vehicles during the reporting period from the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

DATES	VEHICLES	PURPOSE
1-28 Feb	6	Support of Operation CEDAR FALLS
21-27 Feb	3	Support of Company B Forward Support at SUOI DA
28 Feb	14	Support of Operation JUNCTION CITY
1-04 March	21	Support of Operation JUNCTION CITY
5-16 March	23	Support of Operation JUNCTION CITY
3-15 April	15	Support of Operation JUNCTION CITY
24-29 April	17	Support of Operation MANHATTAN

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(4) The following were recurring dispatches during the reporting period from the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

VEHICLES	PURPOSE	DESTINATION	
3	Temp hire personnel	THU DUC & DI AN	Mon - Sat
5	Perm hire personnel	SAIGON, THU DUC & DI AN	Mon - Sat
1	Bread Transport	LONG BINH	Mon - Sat
1	Ration Transport	PHU LOI	Mon - Sat
1	Ice Transport	SAIGON	Mon - Sat
1	POL Transport	DI AN Airstrip	Mon - Sat
1	Transport of R&R Personnel	TAN SON NHUT	Mon - Sat

(5) Rail Tons/Received at DI AN: Class I: 235.8
Class II & IV: 1403.1
1718.9

(6) Water - N/A

d. Air: Supplies transported:

(1) Class I: Tons shipped to:

(a) DI AN	0
(b) 1st Bde	635.1
(c) 2nd Bde	0
(d) 3rd Bde	667.6
(e) DIVARTY	0
(f) QUAN LOI	979.9
(g) Operations	617.5

(2) Class II & IV: Tons shipped to:

(a) DI AN	0
(b) 1st Bde	103.5
(c) 2nd Bde	0
(d) 3rd Bde	20.1
(e) DIVARTY	0
(f) QUAN LOI	226.5
(g) Operations	181.8

(3) Class III:

Gallons shipped by air:	1st Bde	QUAN LOI	3rd Bde
Mogas:	131500	93706	80565
Diesel:	181155	16900	26020
Avgas:	44600	27190	4500
JP-4:	191070	377645	118950
Package POL:		25823	

6. Service: Services rendered as part of the three operations were:

a. Operation WILLISTON

(1) Medical: 1st Medical Battalion treated the following patients at MINH THANH:

(a) ERHA	-8
(b) KRHA	-38
(c) NBI & Disease	-1,064
(d) Whole Blood (Units)	-21
(e) Medical Supplies (lbs)	-9,400

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(2) Maintenance: 701st Maintenance Battalion processed the following number of job orders at MINH THANH:

(a) Signal	53
(b) Small/arms	0
(c) Vehicle	18
(d) Artillery	0
(e) Engineer	7
(f) Svc/Evac	0
TOTAL	78

(3) Laundry and Bath: Non-operational

(4) Graves Registration: The 1st Supply and Transport Battalion processed two remains at MINH THANH:

b. Operation TUCSON DELTA

(1) Medical: The 1st Medical Battalion treated the following patients at MINH THANH:

(a) DRHA & DOW	-3
(b) IRHA	-60
(c) NBI & Disease	-631
(d) Vietnamese Civilians	-39
(e) Whole Blood (Units)	-43
(f) Medical Supplies (lbs)	-8,400

(2) Maintenance: 701st Maintenance Battalion processed the following job orders at MINH THANH:

(a) Artillery	7
(b) Track	6
(c) Wheel Vehicle	13
(d) Service	0
(e) Instruments	0
(f) Radio	55
(g) Wire	21
(h) Engineer	6
(i) Small Arms	0
TOTAL	108

c. Operation JUNCTION CITY

(1) Medical: The following statistics reflect only patients processed by elements of the 1st Medical Battalion, and do not reflect patients evacuated directly to general support medical facilities supporting the division:

PATIENTS TREATED	QUAN LOI	MINH THANH	PHUOC VINH	LAI KHE	SUDI DA	TOTAL
IRHA	361	8	Not directly involved in this operation	106	43	518
KRHA	43	4	for patient care in forward areas.	15	26	88
NBI & Disease	1365	126		2741	506	4738
VC	0	0		4	3	7
DOA - NBI	1	1		0	0	2
Whole Blood (unit)	124	34	30	85	36	309
Medical Supplies (lbs)	11950	8200	13497	17550	15150	66347

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CONTENT

4. The following are the names of the persons who have been

Job 11/10/1957	11/10/57
Job 11/11/1957	11/11/57
Average 11/12/1957	11/12/57
Average 11/13/1957	11/13/57
Average 11/14/1957	11/14/57
Average 11/15/1957	11/15/57
Average 11/16/1957	11/16/57
Average 11/17/1957	11/17/57
Average 11/18/1957	11/18/57
Average 11/19/1957	11/19/57
Average 11/20/1957	11/20/57
Average 11/21/1957	11/21/57
Average 11/22/1957	11/22/57
Average 11/23/1957	11/23/57
Average 11/24/1957	11/24/57
Average 11/25/1957	11/25/57
Average 11/26/1957	11/26/57
Average 11/27/1957	11/27/57
Average 11/28/1957	11/28/57
Average 11/29/1957	11/29/57
Average 11/30/1957	11/30/57
Average 12/1/1957	12/1/57
Average 12/2/1957	12/2/57
Average 12/3/1957	12/3/57
Average 12/4/1957	12/4/57
Average 12/5/1957	12/5/57
Average 12/6/1957	12/6/57
Average 12/7/1957	12/7/57
Average 12/8/1957	12/8/57
Average 12/9/1957	12/9/57
Average 12/10/1957	12/10/57
Average 12/11/1957	12/11/57
Average 12/12/1957	12/12/57
Average 12/13/1957	12/13/57
Average 12/14/1957	12/14/57
Average 12/15/1957	12/15/57
Average 12/16/1957	12/16/57
Average 12/17/1957	12/17/57
Average 12/18/1957	12/18/57
Average 12/19/1957	12/19/57
Average 12/20/1957	12/20/57
Average 12/21/1957	12/21/57
Average 12/22/1957	12/22/57
Average 12/23/1957	12/23/57
Average 12/24/1957	12/24/57
Average 12/25/1957	12/25/57
Average 12/26/1957	12/26/57
Average 12/27/1957	12/27/57
Average 12/28/1957	12/28/57
Average 12/29/1957	12/29/57
Average 12/30/1957	12/30/57
Average 12/31/1957	12/31/57

3. Summary of the case history of the patient.

[illegible]

CZ AND TOTAL 3,154 job orders completed

(c) Sufficient Maintenance Services Summary:

1. The self-propelled, 155mm Howitzer, M109 was introduced into the Division during the operation, replacing the 155mm Howitzer batteries of the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery were given orientation training on proper operation and maintenance procedures. Personnel from 701st Maintenance Battalion also received instruction from the Technical Representatives. Parts for stockage of the M109 ASL/PLL have been on requisition since October 1966, but a satisfactory level of parts on hand was not available. In order to alleviate this situation, a master list of zero balance items was submitted to the 506th Field Depot. These items the depot could not provide were referred to the Director of Maintenance, 1st Logistical Command for expedited action.

2. Two M-110, 8" SP replacement chassis were received, inspected, and guns were mounted during the first week of March for D Battery, 8-6 Artillery.

3. A maintenance stand-down was conducted to assist the 1-4 Cav and the 2-2 Mech Infantry. In a four day period, an average of four engines or transmissions were changed every day.

4. During the operation, two officers of the 701st Maintenance Battalion flew to CAM RANH BAY Support Command to look for critically needed parts to repair bulldozers, M48A3 tanks, and signal items. They arranged for the transfer to the division of over 2,000 M48A3 track blocks, 20 repair parts for bulldozers, and 250 signal repair parts which removed 50 end items from deadline.

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5. A potential equipment problem was avoided when the 2-2 Mech Infantry discovered an apparent fault in a blower drive shaft on M113A-1s. The faulty shafts were breaking, apparently because of a structural weakness caused by a hollow shaft. Solid replacement shafts were located at 1st Logistical Command and replacements were furnished to the 2-2 Mech. Stockage quantities were also obtained as back-up within the 701st Maintenance Battalion.

6. A special air-courier system, using the Support Command helicopter, has been devised to expedite the handling of "Red Ball" requisitions. Requisitions are picked up at special "Red Ball" helipads. This is done on a daily basis, and allows "Red Ball" requests to be in 506th Field Depot hands within 24 hours.

(d) Laundry and Bath

1. Locations supporting operations

	<u>QUAN LOI</u>	<u>MINH THANH</u>	<u>LAI KHE</u>	<u>SUOI DA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Number of shower heads	8	8	8	8	32
Number of washers	3		2	3	8

(e) Graves Registration

1. Locations supporting operations

	<u>QUAN LOI</u>	<u>MINH THANH</u>	<u>LAI KHE</u>	<u>SUOI DA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Remains processed	35	6	15	27	83

(f) Salvage Collection

1. Locations supporting operations

	<u>MINH THANH</u>	<u>SUOI DA</u>	<u>QUAN LOI</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Turn-in documents processed	7	25	46	78

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I. Personnel and Administration

1. Personnel:

a.

	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
Authorized:	947	165	14341	15453
1 February:	1101	112	16183	17396
30 April:	1032	131	15796	16959
PDY 30 April:	1001	128	15619	16748

b. Gains, Qualifications and Status:

(1) There were 5386 replacements received during the period.

(2) There were 1575 persons returned to duty during the period.

(3) Qualifications: A significant number of replacements are being received in grades lower than those requisitioned and lack the experience required to fill positions at advanced skill levels.

(4) The replacement status in the lower grades is good, but there is a definite shortage of company grade infantry officers, company grade artillery officers and infantry NCOs.

c. Losses:

(1) There were 4140 losses during the period due to assignments within Vietnam, rotation, ETS and board actions.

(2) Casualties (by Month):

(a) February:

	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
KHA	4	0	44	48
WHA	24	1	260	285
MHA	0	0	0	0
NBD	1	0	15	16
NEM	4	1	63	68

(b) March:

KHA	2	0	27	29
WHA	16	2	371	389
MHA	0	0	0	0
NBD	2	0	7	9
NEM	5	0	85	90

(c) April:

KHA	1	0	38	39
WHA	32	0	361	393
MHA	0	0	0	0
NDB	0	0	14	14
NEM	0	0	54	54

2. Discipline, Law and Order

a. The discipline in the Division has been excellent the past quarter. There were no stragglers apprehended. There were 16 serious incidents and 54 AWOLs reported during the period.

b. There were 8 General Courts-Martial tried during the quarter, 84 records of trial for Special Courts-Martial and 56 records of trial for Summary Courts-Martial were received for review.

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c. The Division IG handled 117 requests for assistance and 13 complaints, 3 of which were justified.

3. Graves Registration: During the quarter the Graves Registration Platoon processed and evacuated 147 remains.

4. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

a. Finance: A liaison NCO has been attached to the 1st and 3d Brigades to facilitate the handling of pay problems.

b. Chaplain: During the quarter there were 1585 religious services conducted, (all faiths), with a total attendance of 48,262.

c. Special Services: During the quarter the Division utilized 3218 out of country R&R allocations and 836 in country R&R allocations. There were 11 USO Shows that performed in the Division area during the quarter.

d. Awards and Decorations:

Distinguished Service Cross	2
Distinguished Service Medal	0
Legion of Merit	12
Silver Star	57
Soldier's Medal	27
Distinguished Flying Cross	82
Bronze Star Medal - V	475
Bronze Star Medal - M	1787
Air Medal - V	76
Air Medal - M	1002
Army Commendation Medal - V	264
Army Commendation Medal - M	2331
Purple Heart	741
TOTAL	6856

5. Civilian Personnel:

a. At the end of the quarter the Division employed 1012 temporary hire local nationals.

b. There were 1647 permanent hire local nationals employed at the end of the quarter.

J. Chemical Operations:

1. Listed below are the activities of the Division Chemical Section during the reporting period 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967.

a. On 2 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN heliped via CH-47 helicopter loaded with thirty (30) fifty five (55) gallon drums of CS-1 for a target located on a line between coordinates XT 619373 and XT 615385. While airborne, the Division G-3 assigned another target on a line between coordinates XT 669377 and XT 667391. The team dropped sixteen (16) drums on the initial target and fourteen (14) on the second target. Mission completed, the drop team returned to DI AN Base Camp.

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b. On 2 February 1967, the Tunnel Team departed DI AN Base Camp and linked up with the 1-18 Infantry just north of the DI AN perimeter to investigate and destroy a reported tunnel complex. Upon arrival it was disclosed that there were no tunnels but merely a series of bunkers. The team returned to DI AN Base Camp after assisting in the destruction of the bunker system.

c. On 4 February 1967, the Division Chemical Officer departed LAI KHE helipad via UH-1D aircraft carrying incendiary grenades for the purpose of burning landing zones (LZs). One grenade was dropped from an altitude of 500 feet on the upwind side of each target LZ. With a surface wind of five (5) knots, an area of 100 meters by 50 meters was cleared of grass in approximately 30 minutes.

d. On 5 February 1967, the Division Chemical Officer departed the LAI KHE helipad and burned four (4) landing zones in the same manner and with the same results described above.

e. On 6 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section conducted a CS drop utilizing the E-159 experimental clusters mounted on a UH-1D gunship. The target was a VC Base Camp located in the vicinity of coordinates XT 695345.

f. On 6 February 1967, the Division Chemical Officer departed LAI KHE helipad and linked up with the 2-2 Infantry, vicinity of coordinates XT 867266, to advise on the disposition of a 55 gal drum of CS found by the unit. This was a drum that failed to function during a drop conducted in the area on 27 December 1966. The area where other drums had detonated was still heavily contaminated.

g. On 7 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via two (2) CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty (30) 55 gallon drums of CS-1 each. The 60 drums were dropped on a line between coordinates XT 660380 and XT 649404. One CH-47 received AV fire but was not hit. The aircraft returned the fire with unknown results.

h. On 7 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team conducted a CS drop with one (1) CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty (30) 55 gal drums of CS-1 on a line between coordinates XT 714320 and XT 705334.

i. On 8 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team attempted its first drop during the hours of darkness. Two (2) CH-47 aircraft each loaded with 30 drums of CS-1 departed DI AN helipad for the target area which was located on a line between coordinates XT 595335 and XT 580335. Illumination of the area was provided by aerial flare ships but this was insufficient to penetrate the extreme ground fog making visual spotting of the target area impossible. After thirty (30) minutes of orbiting on station the mission had to be abandoned to clear the area for preplanned air strikes.

j. On 8 February 1967, the Division Chemical Officer departed DI AN helipad via UH-1D and burned four (4) landing zones with incendiary grenades and returned to DI AN Base Camp upon completion of the mission.

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k. On 12 February 1967, the Chemical Section was assigned three (3) targets within the same general vicinity to contaminate with CS. The Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via four (4) CH-47 aircraft flying in a box formation; 104 drums were dropped simultaneously from coordinates XT 641379 to XT 650402 at 0830 hours. The team returned to DI AN helipad, reloaded the aircraft, and departed for target #2 located on a line between coordinates XT 719389 and XT 708408. With the four (4) aircraft flying in a box formation, 104 drums were dropped simultaneously at 1000 hours. The team again returned to DI AN helipad to prepare for target #3 located on a line between XT 7000455 and XT 690475. At 1120 hours 104 drums were placed on target from the box formation. Mission completed, the team returned to DI AN helipad at 1210 hours. The three (3) drops combined constitute the largest known use of Riot Control Agent to date against an armed enemy. The combined total of Riot Control Agent used was 24,960 pounds, or approximately 12.5 tons.

l. On 18 February 1967, the Rice Destruction/Denial Team departed DI AN helipad via UH-1D aircraft and proceeded to assist the 1-2 Infantry (located vicinity of coordinates XT 5856) in the denial of rice. A total of 600, 100-pound bags of polished rice were destroyed and contaminated with CS-1.

m. On 18 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one (1) CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty (30) drums of CS-1. Fifteen (15) drums of CS-1 were placed on a target between coordinates XT 520580 and XT 528590, and another fifteen (15) drums on a target between coordinates XT 518582 and XT 525592.

n. On 19 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with twenty drums of CS-1. One of the helicopters dropped their drums on a target between coordinates XT 605555 and XT 594566, and the other helicopter between coordinates XT 600570 and 600580.

o. On 20 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty drums of CS-1. Each aircraft dropped 15 drums on a target between coordinates XT 683530 and XT 670540, and the remaining fifteen drums on a target between coordinates XT 652520 and XT 640530.

p. On 20 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section conducted an experiment to evaluate three types of captured VC protective masks. CS-1 agent was dispersed by use of an E23 CS disperser. The masks were found to offer little protection against agent CS-1; also the E23 CS disperser did not operate properly due to insufficient pressure.

q. On 23 February 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed DI AN Base Camp for coordinates XT 892187 to assist the 2d Brigade in the exploration and destruction of a reported tunnel complex. The team found two tunnels, one of which was partially destroyed by APCs and bulldozers. The other tunnel, 100 meters in length, was explored and found to contain three 40 pound cratering charges which had been previously placed by the engineers but failed to activate. They were destroyed along with the tunnel.

r. On 27 February 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed DI AN via C7-A for MINH THANH. From there they were flown by UH-1D to Company A, 2-28 Infantry, where they explored three wells with small tunnels off their sides. A bag of documents was found in one tunnel and the others were empty. After destruction of the tunnels the team returned to DI AN.

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s. On 3 March 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed DI AN Base Camp to assist the ARVN Advisory Team #1 in the exploration of a tunnel in their area. Two shafts approximately 20 meters deep with rooms at the bottom were examined. One room contained a VC body that had been there approximately one week. The second room was empty. Both rooms were contaminated with CS-26 and destroyed with 43 pound cratering charges.

t. On 9 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad (early morning) in two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. With the two aircraft flying side by side, they simultaneously dropped their loads on a target between coordinates XT 610377 and XT 625368.

u. On 9 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad (early morning) in two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. With the two aircraft flying side by side, they simultaneously dropped their loads on a target between coordinates XT 614337 and XT 626350.

v. On 10 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad with two CH-47 aircraft, each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1, and dropped on a target between coordinates YT 060410 and YT 050425 at 1730 hours. Significantly this resulted in "gasing" BIEN HOA, PHU LOI, and DI AN, which are about 40 Kms downwind of the target, about an hour after the drop. Calls were received from SAIGON indicating that traces of the "gas" reached that city 56 Kms downwind of the target. The surface winds of the target were from 010° at 10 knots, and at 1000 feet were from 030° at 10 knots with gusts to 20 knots.

w. On 12 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a target on a line between coordinates YT 072425 and YT 080428. Two passes were made over the target dropping fifteen drums on each pass.

x. On 13 March, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gallon drums of CS-1 for a target on a line between coordinates YT 055430 and YT 050435. Two passes were made over the target dropping fifteen drums on each pass.

y. On 14 March 1967, LTC Hylton returned from Division Forward and SFC Bullard left DI AN for Division Forward to assist SFC Wilson in the CP movement to LAI KHE.

z. On 16 March 1967, the Chemical Section Forward displaced with the 1st Infantry Division CP from MINH THANH arriving at LAI KHE re-establishing the Division Chemical Section Forward.

aa. On 17 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN helipad in one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a point target located at coordinates YT 057326. This target was a suspected meeting place of the provincial mortar conference. Two (2) passes were on the target and fifteen (15) drums were dropped on each pass forming an X. The following is a complete agent report regarding the drop: "Twice during the middle of the night of 17 March and once during the early morning of 18 March air attacks were conducted near the site of conference on mortar techniques attended by military leaders of BINH DUONG Province from 16-18 March. The bombs missed the conference site by about 200 meters. Six guards were killed and four wounded. The bombs seemed to explode in series: 'Boom-boom-boom-boom.' The people of the area also suffered choking, vomiting,

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itching skin and a flow of tears. These symptoms lasted one or two days for most people, as long as a week for the old and infirm. Source did not know what caused these symptoms; the Viet Cong said it was one of the effects of the bombing. None of the people in the area, including the leaders, had any means of defence against these symptoms. After the attacks, the site of the conference was moved to XOM NUOC TRONG (XT 972372), PHU GIAO District. Source reported that some installations of the BINH DUONG Provincial Committee in the vicinity of the conference also suffered from airstrikes and artillery at the same time, but he did not know the results. Source said that the Viet Cong in TAN UYEN had ordered their security and military intelligence organizations to watch the people closely. Eight villagers (source did not say of which village) were imprisoned and two administrative cadre of VINH TRUONG (vic XT 866 173) and TAN HIEP (vic XT887216) were arrested by the Viet Cong on suspicion of betrayal."

bb. On 19 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one (1) CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty (30) 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a target located on a line between coordinates XT 566990 and XT 571981. Two passes were made on the target and fifteen (15) drums were dropped on each pass. The mission originally called for two (2) CH-47 aircraft, however one (1) developed mechanical trouble at DI AN helipad and could not take off.

cc. On 21 March 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed DI AN Base Camp for A Company, 2-2 Infantry, located at coordinates XT 885111. One (1) tunnel fifty (50) meters long was found and explored with negative results.

dd. On 21 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one (1) CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty (30) 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a target located on a line between coordinates XT 997397 and XT 997387. Two passes were made on the target and fifteen drums were dropped on each pass.

ee. On 23 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a target located on a line between coordinates XT 980330 and XT 990337. Two passes were made on the target and fifteen drums were dropped on each pass.

ff. On 30 March 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed DI AN Base Camp in APCs with A Company, 2-2 Infantry, for a tunnel located at coordinates XT 895145. The tunnel had been partially destroyed previously by the tunnel team. It was not destroyed but left for experimental CS contamination studies. The team then departed for two wells located at coordinates XT 905180. Enroute, the lead APC hit a pressure type mine, resulting in heavy damage to the APC and two MHA. The team transferred to another APC and proceeded to the location of the wells, explored them with negative results and contaminated them with CS.

gg. On 31 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a target at coordinates XT 972372. Two passes were made over the target dropping fifteen drums on each pass forming an X pattern.

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hh. On 1 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. One aircraft dropped on a line between coordinates XT 626517 and XT 637528, and the other dropped on a line between coordinates XT 661524 and XT 681531. On both targets, FAC reported excellent coverage.

ii. On 2 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team supported the 2-28 Infantry in exploration of a tunnel just north of DI AN Base Camp. The tunnel team found the following enemy items of equipment: 3 bags of documents, 1 French 7.5mm MG M 1924/29 with 4 magazines (excellent condition); 1 French MAT 49 9mm SMG with 3 magazines (excellent condition); 15 rifles including US 03 Springfield, German Kar 98K, CHICOM 7.62 (very poor condition), 1 US 12 gauge shotgun (poor condition), 1 US PRC-25 radio (set on frequency 46.60), 3 US Grenades, 1 US burner-type stove, 2 VC Claymores, 1 VC flag, 3 portable typewriters (fair condition), 1500 rounds of assorted ammunition, small amounts of web gear, 6 rusted magazines and 300 lbs of rice. Equipment was turned over to 2d Bn, 28th Inf. The team returned 3 April for further exploration.

jj. On 3 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team again explored a tunnel found by the 2-28 Inf north of DI AN Base Camp. Approximately 100 meters of tunnel was investigated without finding any material of military value.

kk. On 4 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. One aircraft dropped fifteen drums on a line between coordinates XT 610974 and XT 616977, and then moved with the second aircraft to a linear target between coordinates XT 596730 and XT 575945. Both ships dropped on this target resulting in 45 drums on target. The FAC reported excellent coverage.

ll. On 6 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. All drums were dropped on a line between coordinates XT 592935 and XT 876569.

mm. On 8 April 1967, the Division Chemical Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. All drums were dropped on a line between coordinates XT 865575 and XT 876569.

nn. On 10 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1 and dropped on a target between coordinates XT 879548 and XT 862550. The FAC reported all drums on target and excellent coverage.

oo. On 11 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1 and dropped on a target between coordinates XT 858527 and XT 872520 resulting in excellent target coverage.

pp. On 13 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed for a tunnel complex discovered by the 1-16 Infantry. Two tunnels were explored and the bodies of two VC who had been killed by the infantry were removed.

qq. On 14 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed DI AN Base Camp for a mission with the DI AN District Advisor northeast of DI AN. Three small tunnels were found and one German P-38 pistol and one US Cal .30 carbine were captured. The tunnels were destroyed with 43 pound cratering charges resulting in two VC KIA.

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rr. On 15 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN Base Camp via CH-47 aircraft with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1 and dropped on a line between coordinates XT628523 and XT648526. The team returned to LAI KHE, reloaded thirty drums and dropped on the same target resulting in excellent coverage with sixty drums of CS-1.

ss. On 18 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team supported the DI AN Advisory Group in the exploration of four tunnels, each approximately thirty meters long. Two VC bodies were removed from one tunnel and the remaining three were empty.

tt. On 19 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team again explored three small tunnels for the DI AN Advisory Group. One bag of documents, one bag of magazines, two pair of wire cutters and three homemade grenades were captured.

uu. On 21 April 1967, The Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN Base Camp via two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. One ship dropped its drums on a line between coordinates XT488822 and XT500888, and the second aircraft dropped on a line between coordinates XT520869 and XT530869. Both aircraft returned to QUAN LOI and each reloaded with thirty drums of CS-1 and dropped on a target between coordinates XT485845 and XT469860 simultaneously.

vv. On 21 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN Base Camp via one (1) CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty (30) 55 gal drums of Riot Control Agent CS-1. Ten (10) drums were dropped in the vicinity of coordinates XT9221 and the remaining twenty (20) drums were dropped ten (10) at a time forming an "X" pattern on coordinates YTO32331.

ww. On 22 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team explored one (1) 300 meter tunnel in support of the 1-26 Infantry. Six (6) eight inch Howitzer rounds wired for command detonation were found and turned over to the infantry for destruction.

xx. On 29 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team explored 400 meters of tunnel in the vicinity of coordinates XT805265 while in support of 1-28 Infantry. Nothing of military significance was found.

3. (C) Listed below are the activities in support of the Division Chemical Section, of the 242d Chemical Detachment during the reporting period 1 February to 30 April 1967.

a. During the entire reporting period, the 242d Chemical Detachment was commanded by IIT Charles P. Barber who led his "tunnel rats" on all tunnel exploration missions in support of the 1st Infantry Division and in many cases in support of IIFV units.

b. The 242d Chemical Detachment maintained the status of all defoliation requests and progress of 1st Infantry Division defoliation projects and also those of III Corps which lie within the 1st Infantry Division Area of Responsibility.

c. The detachment provided crew personnel acting as tail-gaters and pushers in CS-1 drum drops conducted by the 1st Infantry Division Chemical Section.

d. The 242d Chemical Detachment provided a team which travelled to Divisional units performing hydrostatic tests on all organizational flamethrowers.

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e. Members of the 242d Chemical Detachment assisted the Edgewood Arsenal CS Test Team currently in Vietnam studying the persistency of various types of CS.

4. Listed below are the activities of the 266 Chemical Platoon (DS) commanded by 1LT Charles Auslander during the reporting period 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967 in support of the Division Chemical Section.

a. The Chemical Platoon has had maintenance contact teams at 1st and 3d Brigades of the 1st Infantry Division during the entire reporting period. They have provided the Brigades with chemical maintenance, assistance in CS operations, ground based defoliation and insect control.

b. The Chemical Platoon has served as the Division Base Camp Area Rapid Reaction Force and also conducted reconnaissance and ambush patrols in the areas of the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters Base Camp, DI AN, RVN. On several occasions, the platoon has had to extract patrols that have come under fire or become lost. This has always been accomplished without incident.

c. The Chemical Platoon has provided personnel for tunnel operations with the Division Chemical Section Tunnel Team whenever additional personnel have been needed. They have also checked out many reports of tunnel systems reported around the DI AN Base Camp. Many of these reports turned out to be old wells and have no connection with tunnel complexes. On several occasions the platoon has provided security for the Division Chemical Section Tunnel Team while operating in the vicinity of DI AN Base Camp.

d. The Chemical Platoon has held an active part in all CS aerial drops conducted by the 1st Infantry Division during this reporting period. They have maintained a supply of CS drums ready for aerial delivery. These drums are requisitioned, prepared, and held in the platoon storage area for all missions. The platoon also provided the Division Chemical Section with personnel to participate in aerial CS drops on enemy targets.

e. The Chemical Platoon modified the M-4 Burstier by removing the incendiary mix substituting Composition C-3 in its place. This improved the reliability of proper functioning and reduced the amount of CS-1 that is "burned off" when the standard incendiary mix is used.

f. On 3 January, the Chemical Platoon began a persistency test of Riot Control Agent CS-1. Several methods of bursting 55 gal drums of CS and several different jungle conditions were selected for conduct of the test. After dissemination of the CS a periodical check was made on its persistency. The results appear as Observations in paragraph II. A. (Lessons Learned).

g. The Chemical Platoon has provided personnel, equipment, and materials for defoliation missions of all 1st Infantry Division Base Camps during the entire reporting period.

h. The Chemical Platoon has assisted in providing needed items in a civic action project. They have provided fire wood, school supplies, food stuffs, and toys to the children at the Salesian Sisters Self Help School located in THU DUC, RVN. Many of the items were gifts from friends and families of the platoon in the United States.

i. Members of the 266 Chemical Platoon assisted the Edgewood Arsenal CS Test Team currently in Vietnam studying the persistency of various types of CS.

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II. Commander's Observations and Recommendations

A. OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS

ITEM: Personnel with physical profiles precluding utilization in combat elements are being assigned to the Division.

DISCUSSION: Hq, USARV, has authorized immediate reassignment of such individuals, but the administrative excess and loss of man-days is significant. A limited number of profiled personnel can be used within base camps in support type activities.

OBSERVATION: A thorough screening of personnel records at transfer stations and processing centers for physical profiles prior to assignment will preclude the assignment of such individuals to the Division.

CHAPLAIN

ITEM: Full Sunday religious coverage during intensive operations is possible.

DISCUSSION: On Easter Sunday (26 March 1967) the entire Division was at the height of activity in Operation JUNCTION CITY. In addition to services which should be held for combat units in the field, the large number of support personnel at base camps required full programming. The challenge was to conduct Easter Sunday services for all troops. The cooperation of the Aviation section and the efforts of all chaplains to move from place to place rapidly resulted in services for Protestants and Catholics at all Division locations except one, where sporadic VC mortaring made the gathering of men inadvisable.

OBSERVATION: While the regular practice of holding services on week days instead of Sunday is advisable in some instances, it is possible to program Sunday services for all even in the midst of extensive operations.

PAYROLLS

ITEM: To expedite the returns of military payrolls to the Division Finance Office.

DISCUSSION: The requirement for Class A Agent Officers to return their payrolls to the Division Finance Office frequently resulted in delayed returns because of non-availability of transportation from the Agent Officer's location to DI AN. Payroll turnback teams were established and sent out to the three forward base camps for the purpose of taking the payroll returns.

OBSERVATION: This procedure proved to be quite satisfactory in expediting returns of the payrolls. This permitted the Finance Office to hasten the transmittal of the payrolls to the servicing accounts office and to make prompt payments to hospitalized personnel and personnel in the stockade. Earlier receipt of the payrolls has also permitted the office to begin the payroll cycle for the current month much earlier than before.

FINANCIAL INQUIRIES

ITEM: To better coordinate finance matters at base camps and to insure that expeditious action is taken on finance inquiries.

DISCUSSION: Since finance service is so important to the morale of the troops it was determined that an NCO with considerable finance experience should be attached to the base camps at LAI KHE and PHUOC VINH. This NCO could provide more personal attention to the financial problems of the troops.

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OBSERVATION: Both NCOs were attached for the specific purpose of providing finance service, thereby freeing them to provide more extensive service than the unit PSNCOs. The liaison NCOs made frequent trips to forward unit locations and reported their findings directly to the Finance Office so that corrective action and follow-up action could be taken. The processing of allotments, pay change data, and copies of the morning reports were expedited by being routed through the liaison NCO directly to the Finance Office. Some unit rosters were also obtained by the NCOs, which aided in insuring that all personnel assigned to the units were on the proper payrolls. The overall quality of the payrolls has been significantly improved by the utilization of the Finance Liaison NCO.

AB-216 TOWER

ITEM: Erection of AB-216 tower at Division Forward CP.

DISCUSSION: One of the major accomplishments of the 121st Signal Battalion during this period was the strategic use of an AB-216 tower in a tactical situation. The signal battalion demonstrated its versatility and capability during Operation JUNCTION CITY. The tower was airlifted by Chinook from DI AN to MINH THANH, where the division would establish its CP, and in less than 24 hours the tower was completely erected to a height of 120 ft. This clearly demonstrated the versatility of the tower, the ease with which it could be erected and most importantly, the short length of time it required.

OBSERVATION: By means of the tower, the signal battalion was able to establish all the VHF systems necessary to tie in the division and non-divisional units which otherwise would either have been marginal or inoperative in terms of effective communications.

TRC-24 TRANSMITTER

ITEM: Minimum Voltage on TRC-24's.

DISCUSSION: A policy put into effect during this reporting period was the method of reducing the heat and power consumption on the TRC-24 Transmitter. By tuning up for maximum signal strength at the receiver end, the distant transmitter would cut back on his 750 Voltage until the strength at the distant receiver just starts to fall off. At this point, the 750V adjust is set for minimum power at maximum signal strength.

OBSERVATION: The decrease in high voltage, while still maintaining a maximum signal level, has cut down on the number of power units and transmitters being dead-lined for overheating and overloading.

CIRCUITS

ITEM: Priority Circuits.

DISCUSSION: When moving circuits while the Division Forward CP displaces, practice has been to place a priority on those circuits to be re-established. Common practice was to give a high priority to the teletype circuits serving the Division Comm Center; however, all of the teletype circuits are speech-plus, and the voice side was a lower priority. This resulted in confusion and, in many instances required the patch to be broken and later the voice side added again.

OBSERVATION: Priority circuits in the future will be established with the voice side on, therefore, alleviating any confusion and breakdown of speech-plus patches. Instruction will be issued to this effect.

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ANTENNAS

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ITEM: RC-292 Antennas.

DISCUSSION: It was noted that by placing RC-292 antennas on top of the AB-216 tower, the range of the RT-524 radio set was greatly increased. At the same time, however, the long coaxial cables sometimes tended to act as antennas themselves and frequently caused spurious radiation that interfered with adjacent radios. By utilizing the PP-2953 power supply, the RT-524 could be mounted on top of the tower along with the matching unit and antenna, and removed from this location as well as from the base of the tower.

OBSERVATION: In so placing the radio on top of the tower, better range was achieved, no loss of power resulted from excessively long antenna cables, and spurious radiation was eliminated.

R-417 RECEIVER

ITEM: B+ Setting on R-417 Receiver.

DISCUSSION: At the beginning of the reporting period, the VHF systems were found to have crackling and popping noises on the receiver which was carried over to the channels. It was determined that the cause of this was the setting of the B+ on the receiver in conjunction with the extreme climatic heat. If the B+ was set at 30 or more, excessive voltage on the plates of the tubes plus the heat in the rigs caused saturation and consequently built up a space charge which was amplified and fed onto the channels with the carrier.

OBSERVATION: By reducing the B+ setting slightly below the 30 mark, the tubes will not overconduct and the noises from the receiver are eliminated.

ARTILLERY COMMUNICATIONS

ITEM: VHF Communications for the GS Artillery Battalion.

DISCUSSION: VHF communications for the general support artillery battalion headquarters is essential to the efficient control of its widely dispersed batteries. VHF use includes coordination for ammunition resupply, maintenance and logistics support, unit movement, target clearance, met. data, and other administrative traffic. Whereas direct support artillery battalions are generally in a position to tie into a brigade signal center, the GS battalion frequently is not.

OBSERVATION: The $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck and trailer mounted VHF terminal set is ideally suited for employment with the general support artillery battalion.

DETECTION OF MINES

ITEM: Detection of Newly Placed Mines.

DISCUSSION: Experience from Operations TUCSON and JUNCTION CITY indicates that jungle clearing should continue as long as the road is open and the area is secured. Jungle clearing must be preplanned and integrated into the security plan for the route being opened. While clearing jungle along side of roads the detection of mines is facilitated.

OBSERVATION: Clearing of jungle from both sides of a route which has been secure is essential for detection of newly emplaced mines.

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FOXHOLE DIGGING

ITEM: Hard Ground Foxhole Digging.

DISCUSSION: During a recent operation, the 1st Engineer Battalion learned that two man foxholes could be dug in extremely hard soil in one hour by two men. First, dig a hole the diameter of the shovel and 1½ to 2 feet deep, place one pound of C-4 with a foot of time fuse at the bottom, and backfill the hole. After the explosion the ground is soft and easily removed. Depending on the foxhole size desired, emplace successively two pound charges at the same depth and about 1½ feet from the foxhole which has been dug. This second detonation will enlarge the foxhole for two or three more personnel.

OBSERVATION: The shape and depth of foxhole are limited only by the ingenuity of the personnel digging them. Normal demolition safety procedures will be used.

JUNGLE CLEARING

ITEM: Jungle Clearing Operations.

DISCUSSION: Jungle clearing techniques were refined during a clearing operation, 2-13 April, near PHU LOI. Windrowing was eliminated; cutting of jungle was emphasized. This increased the acreage/dozer/day from about 8 to 47. Allowing the vegetation to lie for two or three days following clearing permitted it to dry sufficiently for numerous small fires to effectively destroy this waste material. During clearing operations, the dozer and plow teams should have a 250 cfm air compressor, and a sufficient supply of oil, transmission fluid, oil filters, and blade sharpeners. For proper maintenance, blades should be sharpened once during the two hours of concentrated maintenance which should be conducted each evening while in the field.

OBSERVATION: The only time windrowing should be used is when clearing fields of fire. Proper utilization of the two hour maintenance period will increase work time and prevent unnecessary delays.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

ITEM: Continuous Psychological Operation Campaigns.

DISCUSSION: During Operation JUNCTION CITY it was confirmed that main force VC and NVA units are not susceptible to intensive short-term PSYOPS campaigns, even when these campaigns are combined with large scale military operations. To establish the required credibility and to influence effectively an individual's mind it is necessary to conduct continuous PSYOPS.

OBSERVATION: Continuous PSYOPS programs are required to influence effectively a target audience. Even continuous programs will not be effective unless the proper environment is established by effective US/FWVF combat actions.

CHIEU HOI

ITEM: Chieu Hoi Appeals to NVA.

DISCUSSION: It appears that soldiers and cadre of NVA units are not influenced by the normal Chieu Hoi appeals directed at VC units. A primary selling point of these appeals is that by rallying, individuals have the opportunity to return home to their families and friends. This does not apply to soldiers from North Vietnam.

OBSERVATION: Special attention must be devoted to developing new, attractive appeals if we are to convince members of the NVA to rally.

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SCHOOL TRAINED PSYOPS PERSONNEL

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ITEM: Requirement for School Trained PSYOPS Personnel.

DISCUSSION: With the decentralization of the psychological operations program within the Division, necessitated by loss of key personnel, Brigade S-5's have assumed increased responsibility for conducting PSYOPS. The division currently has only two PSYOPS school trained personnel. The lack of training, particularly at brigade level, is certain to have a temporarily adverse effect on the quality and effectiveness of the division psychological operations program.

OBSERVATION: School trained PSYWAR staff officers are needed at all levels of command within the division.

USE OF HOI CHANH

ITEM: Use of Hoi Chanh (former VC who rally under the Chieu Hoi Program).

DISCUSSION: During Operation MANHATTAN the value of Hoi Chanh personnel employed by the Division G-5 Section was highlighted when one of these ralliers led division elements to a large weapons cache.

OBSERVATION: Some ralliers have detailed knowledge of VC methods, beliefs, and operations. They can, in many instances, furnish valuable intelligence information or help on tactical operations.

CHEMICAL

Burning Landing Zones

ITEM: Landing Zone (LZ) Clearing.

DISCUSSION: A requirement exists for an adequate means to clear an unoccupied LZ of grasses and shrubs to facilitate heliborne assaults. Several methods were employed, only one which is feasible, and simple: starting fires with incendiary grenades dropped from aircraft.

OBSERVATION: One incendiary grenade dropped from a helicopter flying 500 feet above the ground is sufficient to burn grassy areas 100 meters by 50 meters in a 5 knot wind within approximately 30 minutes during the dry season.

Aircraft Mounted E-63

ITEM: Aircraft Mounted E-63 Manpack Personnel Detector (Chemical).

DISCUSSION: Upon learning of recent success by other units in the employment of the E-63 Manpack Personnel Detector installed in army aircraft, the Division Chemical Section initiated an airborne personnel detection program. To date, the program has furnished the following results:

a. With some modifications, the detector can be operated from either the UH-1D or OH-13 helicopter. Power can be furnished to the detector by the aircraft's electrical system instead of by the rechargeable nickel-cadmium batteries furnished with the instrument. This type power supply allows the machine to operate for longer periods and cuts down on instrument weight--an important factor in OH-13 operations.

b. The instrument has detected personnel on a number of tests. These tests were usually conducted during high speed, tree-top level flights in either UH-1D or OH-13 aircraft. These tests have indicated that the detector appears to have a high potential for successful operations in remote jungle areas which are uninhabited except for enemy troops utilizing the cover of the jungle canopy. Tests have also indicated that successful operation of the detector is more difficult during periods of cool weather, or during the hours of darkness.

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OBSERVATION: Tests reveal that personnel hiding under a jungle canopy can be detected by electrical-chemical means such as the E-63 Personnel Detector mounted in aircraft.

ITEM: CS Persistency Test.

DISCUSSION: The results of the persistency test referred to in the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period 1 November - 31 January 1967 have been completed.

OBSERVATION: During the 1st Infantry Division CS Persistency Tests (January - April 1967) five separate areas in the jungle southwest of DI AN, RVN were contaminated with chemical agent CS-1. These areas, indicated below, were then examined daily periodically between 1330 and 1430 hours to determine the degree of CS Persistency: Area 1 - 80 lbs CS-1 in 55 gal drums was detonated with an M-4 incendiary burster under the jungle canopy.

Area 2 - Same type of drum and agent, detonated on the forest floor.

Area 3 - As in Area 1 above, except that the CS drum was detonated with Composition C-3.

Area 4 - As in Area 2 above, except that the CS drum was detonated with Composition C-3.

Area 5 - Ten 8 lb bags of CS-1 were bursted on the ground with detonator cord. The degree of CS contamination (persistency) in each of the five test areas was designated as follows:

**** = heavy contamination (cannot walk through the area).

*** = moderate contamination (cannot camp or work in the area).

** = light contamination (can work in the area, but mask required).

* = slight contamination (can camp or work in the area without mask, but still some irritation).

- = no contamination.

Results of these tests are indicated in the following tables:

AREA 1

Days Following Initial Contamination	Degree of Persistency	RH	Surface Temp °F	Remarks
2	****	79	85	Trace of rain previous night
4	****	86	89	Trace of rain previous night
8	***	81	87	Trace of rain 6th night
13	***	74	63+	Trace of rain 8th night
19	**	78	85	0.9" rain since 15th day
23	**	96	84	1.7" rain 21st day
26	***	88	85	no precipitation
32	***	78	85	no precipitation
40	***	74	85	no precipitation
47	*	70	83	0.1" rain 43d and 46th days respectively
54	**	77	84	no precipitation
60	**	76	84	0.05 " rain in late afternoon 60th day
70	*	64	88	no precipitation
75	**	62	90	no precipitation
90	*	52	88+	no precipitation

+ Area examined in AM

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AREA 2

<u>Days Following Initial Contamination</u>	<u>Degree of Persistency</u>	<u>RH</u>	<u>Surface Temp °F</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
2	****	79	85	See remarks for Area 1
4	****	86	89	"
8	****	81	87	"
13	***	74	63+	"
19	***	78	85	"
23	***	96	84	"
26	***	88	85	"
32	***	78	85	"
40	***	74	85	"
47	**	70	83	"
54	**	77	84	"
60	**	76	84	"
70	*	64	88	"
75	**	62	90	"
90	*	52	88+	"

AREA 3

<u>Days Following Initial Contamination</u>	<u>Degree of Persistency</u>	<u>RH</u>	<u>Surface by °F</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
4	****	82	88	Trace of rain 1st night
9	****	75	65+	Trace of rain 4th night
14	****	78	86	0.9" rain previous two nights
22	***	74	85	1.7" rain 20th day
28	***	88	85	no precipitation
34	***	78	86	no precipitation
41	***	74	85	
48	***	70	85	0.1" rain on 45th and 47th days respectively
54	**	76	83	0.05" rain in late afternoon 54th day
64	**	64	88	no precipitation
70	**	62	91	no precipitation
90	-	52	88+	no precipitation

AREA 4

<u>Days Following Initial Contamination</u>	<u>Degree of Persistency</u>	<u>RH</u>	<u>Surface Temp °F</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
4	****	82	87	See Remarks Area 3
9	****	75	65+	"
14	****	78	86	"
22	***	94	85	"
28	***	88	85	"
34	***	78	85	"
41	**	74	85	"
48	**	70	84	"
54	**	76	83	"
64	*	84	88	"
90	*	53	88+	"

+ Area examined in AM

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AREA 5

Days Following Initial Contamination	Degree of Persistence	RH	Surface Temp °F	Remarks
4	***	82	87	See Remarks Area 3
9	**	75	64+	"
14	**	78	85	"
22	***	93	85	"
28	***	88	85	"
34	***	77	85	"
41	**	74	84	"
48	**	70	84	"
54	**	74	84	"
64	**	64	88	"
70	*	63	92	"
90	*	53	88+	"

+ Area examined in A.N.

AMMUNITION RESUPPLY

ITEM: Heavy Drop of Artillery Ammunition.

DISCUSSION: During Operation JUNCTION CITY, some ammunition resupply was accomplished by means of heavy air drop. Ammunition (105mm) so delivered was in jungle pack containers and was un-fuzed. Fuzes were dropped separately. This resulted in the components becoming widely scattered over the drop zone, creating difficulty in recovering complete rounds of ammunition. Additionally, the use of jungle packs created a considerable "back haul" problem for the firing units.

OBSERVATION: A method for dropping fuzed ammunition in palletized fiber containers would greatly expedite recovery of completed rounds and would virtually eliminate back-haul problems. This is particularly important when the firing unit is in an airborne configuration with little or no ground transportation capabilities.

TRANSPORT OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

ITEM: Transport of 155/8" ammunition.

DISCUSSION: 155mm How/8" How batteries are required by tactical necessity to carry more ammunition than their organic transportation will allow. Thus, when displacing a battery, or for the purpose of resupply, vehicles from several batteries may have to be pooled in order to move or resupply one battery. This seriously impairs mobility of the 155H/8" H battalion as a whole since batteries may be unable to react quickly to a requirement to displace because of nonavailability of transport.

OBSERVATION: Medium and heavy artillery units in Vietnam should be authorized additional 5 ton trucks for the purpose of hauling ammunition. A 50% increase would be sufficient.

AIRCRAFT RON

ITEM: RON of aircraft in field locations.

DISCUSSION: During Operation JUNCTION CITY, an OH-13 aircraft remained overnight at FSB "C" (XT5685). The purpose was to provide a means whereby an air observer could be airborne immediately if the base came under mortar or ground attack. On one occasion where the base came under such attack, the aircraft was damaged before it could become airborne.

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OBSERVATION: Aircraft should not RON at threatened bases if a better alternative is available. If possible, they should be on standby-alert at a nearby location which combines a higher degree of safety with adequate response time.

VT ARTILLERY

ITEM: Firing of VT fuze artillery on roads to prevent laying of mines.

DISCUSSION: The technique of firing VT fuze artillery on roads during hours of darkness is effective; however, the fragments imbedded in the road surface create an almost insurmountable obstacle to mine detection during the following day.

OBSERVATION: When a supported unit requests VT fire on roads, the artillery unit should apprise them of the fact that their road clearing operation will be hampered by fragments the following day.

MORTAR ATTACKS

ITEM: Vehicle damage during mortar attacks.

DISCUSSION: Recent experiences have indicated that the predominant vehicular damage sustained during mortar attacks is damaged tires.

OBSERVATION: Tires should be sandbagged on a priority basis upon occupation of positions. During the dry season, a better solution is to dig vehicles in to the top of the tires; however, with the advent of the monsoon rains, this is unsatisfactory. Vehicles must be sandbagged.

MP MANPOWER

ITEM: Unit Strength.

DISCUSSION: Even though the 1st Military Police Company is presently overstrength, the company has been decreasing in manpower for the last three quarters. This has adversely affected the number of missions which the company is able to perform. The TO&E is not adequate to support the division in the manner in which it is presently deployed with widely separated bases connected by unsecured roads. The company must maintain personnel in six separate locations performing both garrison and combat service support functions on a twenty-four hour basis.

OBSERVATION: Either of two courses must be taken in order to continue the effectiveness of military police support. The strength of the company could be kept at the level of previous quarters. This would require additional replacements above the current losses. Alternatively, the company could be augmented on a semi-permanent basis by additional platoons from the 18th Military Police Brigade, their number dependent upon the stabilized strength of the company.

TIMBER TRUSTLE BENT

ITEM: Timber Trustle Bent Unplacement in Mud.

DISCUSSION: During JUNCTION CITY, C company, 1st Engineer Battalion, constructed footings for Timber Trustle Bents in soft mud. Five foot sections of creosoted 3" X 12" lumber were driven vertically into the ground with an 85 pound air hammer. These five foot sections formed a crib which was bound with 5/8" cable. The mud was removed and replaced with rock and laterite which was tamped in place to form 100 square feet of hard surface. This should be adequate in all but the most extensive conditions.

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OBSERVATION: This technique could be used not only in soft stream beds, but also where there is a possibility of erosion.

LOGISTICS

ITEM: Failure to Coordinate Changes in Airlift Cargo.

DISCUSSION: When a unit's airlift request reaches the Air Force, aircraft are "fragged" according to the amount of cargo and passengers to be moved. If the requesting unit makes no changes to its request before the day of the lift, it is assumed that the cargo brought to the airstrip is the same as that which is on the airlift request. Units will sometimes make changes without informing the DTO. This delays the established airlift schedule. It is not usually difficult to change an airlift request, provided the changes are requested in sufficient time to alert the Air Force.

OBSERVATION: Unit planners must make an effort to determine exactly what equipment is to be moved with their unit and to insure that changes, if they occur, are promptly reflected in amended requests for airlift.

AIRLIFT REQUESTS

ITEM: Excessive Delay in Submitting Airlift Requests.

DISCUSSION: At times during Operation JUNCTION CITY there was a considerable delay between the time a unit received notification of a planned move and the time at which it submitted its requirements for airlift. Requests for airlift must be submitted a minimum of 72 hours prior to the required delivery date of the unit at its destination. If this 72 hour lead time is not met it becomes necessary for the priority on the lift to be raised to a CE (combat essential). This disrupts airlift scheduling and often results in a delay of other division lifts of lower priority.

OBSERVATION: Units must submit their requirements immediately upon notifications of a future move. Careful prior planning will allow much of the required information to be readily available.

DISPOSITION OF UNSERVICEABLE AMMUNITION

ITEM: Disposition of Unserviceable Ammunition During and After Operations.

DISCUSSION: Ammunition supply doctrine presently directs that unserviceable ammunition be documented by using units and turned in to the nearest ASP. However, on more than one occasion, after closure of Log Command operated ASPs at QUAN LOI, all unserviceable ammunition has been left to be disposed of by the division. This presents problems in obtaining backhaul transportation and it also leads to the destruction of much unserviceable ammunition which could be renovated if it were evacuated to the Ammunition Depot.

OBSERVATION: After each operation a period of time should be set aside for the Logistical Command to clean up the ASP and to evacuate or destroy all unserviceable Class V material.

FORWARD SUPPLY POINTS

ITEM: Evacuation and Back Haul from Forward Supply Points.

DISCUSSION: During Operation JUNCTION CITY the movement of unserviceable vehicles, ammunition residue, salvage, and supplies from SGOI DA by the 1st Logistical Command presented several coordination problems:

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a. Unserviceable Vehicles: Items collected at 1st Supply and Transport Battalion Salvage Collection Points were processed for turn-in to the 1st Logistical Command for further evacuation to the LON BINH/SAIGON area. Initially, 1st Logistical Command did not feel it was their responsibility. This was resolved and arrangements were made to obtain transportation from 1st Logistical Command sources. Loading and tie-down were accomplished by Support Command. Planning for this evacuation was complicated when it took the Highway Traffic Center four days to determine that there was a height obstruction on the road, and to designate another usable route.

b. Ammunition Residue: Great quantities of howitzer cartridges and packing material were at this position. When the 1st Logistical Command vehicles arrived to back-haul these items there were no side panels on the trailers. This required expedient methods using wooden pallets which prove to be less than satisfactory.

c. On Hand Supplies: The evacuation of SUOI DA at the termination of Phase I was made difficult by the lack of prior knowledge of the termination date. Supplies were still being hauled into the base when, in effect, back-haul operations were required. When the termination date was moved up, 1st Logistical Command was left with a large stock on the ground. Eventually this location remained open to support elements of the 25th Infantry Division.

OBSERVATION:


a. That operations plans include specific responsibilities for evacuation, to include units supporting the division.

b. That division procedures be developed to ascertain highway height obstacles when information is not available from normal sources.

c. That particular arrangements be made to insure that trailers selected to back haul ammunition residue be specifically equipped with necessary side panels which can readily be picked up at the point of origin.

B. Recommendations: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


J. C. PENNINGTON
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: Special

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AVFBC-H

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Infantry Division,
30 April 67 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 30 JUN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Section II, Pg 45, Item - Heavy Drop of Artillery Ammunition: Air Force regulations prohibit the transportation of explosives and their fuzing devices in the same airplane unless the item is normally shipped assembled and considered safe for shipment. The Air Force will accept for air drop C443 (105mm HE w/fuze MTSQ) and C444 (105mm HE w/fuze PD). C445 is 105mm HE round without fuze. Almost 90 percent of the 105mm received in-country during this period was C445. There was a production stoppage of the M557 fuze which prevented the mating of the fuze at the projectile production line. Within CX67 the percentage of fused ammunition should increase, and the use of the jungle pack should decrease.

b. Reference Section II, Pg 45, Item - Transport of 155/8" Ammunition: The requested vehicles have been received.

c. Reference Section II, Pg 47, Item - Disposition of Unserviceable Ammunition During and After Operations: Concur in observation, provided adequate division security forces remain in place to protect the ASP personnel during the "cleanup" operation.

d. Reference Section II, Pg 47, Item - Evacuation and Back Haul from Forward Supply Points: Concur in observation. This problem will receive specific attention in future logistical planning conferences preceding large-scale operations.


3. (U) Concur with the other comments, recommendations and actions taken.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

1 Incl
nc

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JAMES A. ULVENES
CPT, AGC
Asst AC

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AVHGC-DST (6 Jun 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning need for school trained PSYWAR staff officers, section II, part I, page 42: This headquarters has no record of authorization for PSYWAR staff officers within the unit. If a change in personnel authorization is required to add PSYWAR staff officers, MTOE must be submitted IAW AR 310-31. If the MTOE reflect an overall increase in spaces, the availability of trade-off spaces should be addressed at each level of command. Unit will be informed of procedure via the routine indorsement which returns the report to the unit from this headquarters.

b. Reference item concerning MP unit strength, page 47: Nonconcur that the strength of the MP Company should be left at the level of previous quarters. The unit is being used in part to perform non-military police missions normally assigned to combat elements, and a review and realignment of missions must be accomplished in accordance with the anticipated over-strength reduction announced in Confidential USARV message AVHCS 49010 dated 14 July 1967. It is recognized that the Division MP Company TOE, 19-27G, is not adequate to provide military police support as outlined in FM 19-1 under conditions requiring multiple base camps and extended combat operations by all brigades. Both paragraphs 5b(1) and 20c of FM 19-1, Military Police Support, Army Division and Separate Brigades, in addition to paragraph 4-31a(4), FM 61-100, The Division, reflect that it will often be necessary to rely on backup support from non-divisional MP resources or augmentation teams from TOE 19-500 under such conditions. Since MTOE augmentation is not feasible under the current space moratorium, support must be sought from non-divisional MP resources. Division units have been temporarily augmented for major operations by platoon sized units from the 18th MP Brigade and full consideration will continue to be given 1st Division requests.

c. Reference item concerning heavy drop of artillery ammunition, section II, part I, page 45 and paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement: Concur with 1st Indorsement comments. This headquarters has requested a larger quantity of fuzed 105mm HE ammunition be included in future USARV shipments. Until this requirement is met, ammunition could be fuzed prior to air drop by either the rigging crew or ammunition personnel. The jungle pack container will no longer be utilized once present in-country stocks are exhausted.

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DD DLR 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

d. Reference item concerning backhaul from FSA, section II, part I, page 46 and paragraph 2d, 1st Indorsement: Concur. If properly coordinated, the utilization of 1st Logistical Command vehicles for the movement of retrograde cargo results in efficient use of transportation. In most cases vehicles used for resupply return to the Saigon/Cholon area empty. Local arrangements will have to be made to insure that trailers are configured with side boards, as they are not normally used due to the high percentage of palletized cargo being transported.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

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GPOP-DT (6 Jun 67) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
from HQ, 1st Infantry Division (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 17 OCT 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.


2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning reorganization of Division G5
Section, Section I, page 9: The assignment of the responsibility for
all division civic action support to a brigade instead of to SUPCOM is
a new approach. The G5 will retain staff supervision of the civil
affairs program evidently without controlling any resources. This
headquarters will make this organization an item of interest on the next
scheduled visit to USARV.

b. Reference item concerning establishment of a civic action
commodity storage facility, Section I, page 9: the 1st Infantry Division
is the second division to establish a civic action commodity storage
facility. The 25th Infantry Division established the initial one with
their Helping Hand warehouse. By establishing a warehouse and civic
action supply point, a unit can insure that those items which have a
high usage factor are restocked from the International Voluntary agencies
and USAID. With this large storage capability, the units will be able to
react rapidly to civic action requirements. In a conflict such as
Vietnam, the civic action supply requirements are so great that the
establishment of civic action commodity storage point is a necessity.
From the division standpoint, the civic action supply requirement
necessitates the establishment of another class of supply.

c. Reference item concerning Hamlet Festival, para 9b(7),
page 7 of Inclosure 3, 1st Infantry Division Revolutionary Development
Support: The term "Hamlet Festival" is used for a county fair type
operation in villages that are not Viet Cong controlled. Units in the
II FFV area of operations have found that county fair operations as
conducted by the Marines tend to alienate the people of neutral or pro-
government villages; therefore, a Hamlet Festival was devised which did
not completely disrupt the daily lives of these villagers.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


R. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
ASST AG

1 Incl
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Incl 1 to Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Key Officer Personnel

Following is a roster of key officer personnel in the 1st Infantry Division during the reporting period, 1 February 1967 - 30 April 1967.

UNIT	POSITION	NAME, GRADE, SN	DATES
Hq, 1st Inf Div	CG	DEPUY, WILLIAM E. MG, 024710	1 Feb 67 - 10 Feb 67
		HAY, J. H. MG, 025290	10 Feb 67 - 16 Mar 67
		HOLLINGSWORTH, JAMES F. BG, 034155	16 Mar 67 - 20 Mar 67
		HAY, J. H. MG, 025290	20 Mar 67
Hq, 1st Inf Div ADC-A		HOLLINGSWORTH, JAMES F. BG, 034155	1 Feb 67
Hq, 1st Inf Div ADC-B		ROGERS, BERNARD W. BG, 025867	1 Feb 67
Hq, 1st Inf Div CofS		KITCHENS, EDWARD B. JR. COL, 040351	1 Feb 67
Hq, 1st Inf Div ACofS, G1		STARR ROBERT N. LTC, 060551	1 Feb 67 - 28 Apr 67
		HINTON, WILLIAM S. LTC, 078881	28 Apr 67
Hq, 1st Inf Div ACofS, G2		LEGROW, WILLIAM E. JR. LTC, 067837	1 Feb 67 - 6 Mar 67
		SEELY, THEODORF A. LTC, 062379	6 Mar 67
Hq, 1st Inf Div ACofS, G3		GORMAN, PAUL F. LTC, 062379	1 Feb 67 - 26 Apr 67
		PENDLETON, ELMER D. LTC, 064073	26 Apr 67
Hq, 1st Inf Div ACofS, G4		SNYDER, IRA W. JR. LTC, 050759	1 Feb 67 - 13 Mar 67
		STIGALL, ARTHUR D. LTC, 069805	13 Mar 67
Hq, 1st Inf Div ACofS, G5		SCHWEITZER, ROBERT L. LTC, 077192	1 Feb 67 - 17 Apr 67
		GONSALVES, GEORGE JR. MAJ, 0F106621	17 Apr 67
Support Command	CO	GRAMLING, FREDDIE W. COL, 062115	1 Feb 67 - 4 Feb 67
		NEWMAN, GEORGE E. COL, 026015	4 Feb 67
1st S & T Bn	CO	INGALLS, ROBERT E. LTC, 061803	1 Feb 67
701st Maint Bn	CO	POTTLE, ARTHUR F. JR. LTC, 079031	1 Feb 67 - 21 Feb 67
		GARDNER, BERNARD J. LTC, 050779	21 Feb 67
1st Med Bn	CO	HUYCKE, EDWARD J. LTC, 075214	1 Feb 67
1st Avn Bn	CO	HAWKINS ALGIN S. LTC, 084623	1 Feb 67
Hq, 1-4 Cav	CO	FIFE, THOMAS W. LTC, 062388	1 Feb 67
Hq, 1st Engr Bn	CO	KIERNAN, JOSEPH M. JR. LTC, 057075	1 Feb 67
121 Signal Bn	CO	ROCKWELL, JAMES M. LTC, 064171	1 Feb 67

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UNIT	POSITION	NAME, GRADE, SN	DATES
Hq, 1st Bde	CO	BERRY, SIDNEY B. JR. COL, 057233	1 Feb 67 - 3 Feb 67
		CALDWELL, WILLIAM B. COL, 057280	3 Feb 67
Hq, 1-2 Inf Bn	CO	SIMPSON, WILLIAM C. S. LTC, 028381	1 Feb 67
Hq, 1-26 Inf Bn	CO	HAIG, ALEXANDER M. JR. LTC, 050790	1 Feb 67 - 1 Apr 67
		HOFFMAN, JOSEPH H. JR. LTC, 027923	1 Apr 67
Hq, 1-28 Inf Bn	CO	WHITTED, JACK G. LTC, 028187	1 Feb 67 - 5 Feb 67
		KUICK, STANLEY J. LTC, 066422	5 Feb 67
Hq, 2d Bde	CO	GRIMSLEY, JAMES H. JR. LTC, 060632	1 Feb 67 - 1 Apr 67
		HAIG, ALEXANDER M. JR. LTC, 050796	1 Apr 67
Hq, 2-16 Inf Bn	CO	WALLACE, BRUCE E. LTC, 065610	1 Feb 67 - 8 Feb 67
		VLATOSKI, JOSEPH R. LTC, 062224	8 Feb 67
Hq, 1-18 Inf Bn	CO	DENTON, EARLE L. LTC, 075173	1 Feb 67 - 30 Mar 67
		CAVAZOS, RICHARD E. LTC, 064593	30 Mar 67
Hq, 2-18 Inf Bn	CO	BAUMAN, LEWIS R. LTC, 064593	1 Feb 67
Hq, 3d Bde	CO	MARKS, SIDNEY R. COL, 036977	1 Feb 67
Hq, 2-2 Inf Bn	CO	COLLINS, EDWARD J. LTC, 01300454	1 Feb 67
Hq, 1-16 Inf Bn	CO	LAZZEL, RUFUS C. LTC, 064634	1 Feb 67
Hq, 2-28 Inf Bn	CO	PENDLETON, ELMER D. JR. LTC, 064073	1 Feb 67 - 15 Mar 67
		EDWARDS, JERRY S. LTC, 073323	15 Mar 67
1st Div Arty	CO	CAROTHERS, LAWRENCE H. JR. COL, 024896	1 Feb 67
1-5 Arty	CO	DINNIS, THOMAS F. LTC, 01686815	1 Feb 67 - 12 Feb 67
		DEFEW, WILLIAM L. LTC, 064174	12 Feb 67
8-6 Arty	CO	SAFAR, BENJAMIN B. LTC, 060331	1 Feb 67
1-7 Arty	CO	MCFADDEN, GEORGE L. JR. LTC, 060722	1 Feb 67
2-33 Arty	CO	DANIEL, CHARLES D. JR. LTC, 028258	1 Feb 67

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T

20 March 1967

SUBJECT: 1st Infantry Division's Revolutionary Development Support

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) The following report concerns a search and seal operation of the village of TAN BINH XT 855360, South Vietnam conducted by the 1st Infantry Division in support of Revolutionary Development on 26-27 December 1966. The requirement for this report was MACRDS.

2. (C) Background: TAN BINH XT 855360 is a village in North Central BINH DUONG Province located on the margin of US-GVN influence. On 23 February 1966 the Viet Cong 272d Regiment reinforced the BINH DUONG guerrilla units for an assault on elements of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division who were securing the road through TAN BINH. Since then the village has been a focus of VC mining incidents on Route 16, and a link between main force and/or guerrilla units and the peasants of the area. The populace of TAN BINH was early established as an objective of Operation LAMSON, The BINH DUONG Revolutionary Development Campaign supported by 1st Infantry Division; however, the village's remoteness and vulnerability precluded other than infrequent forays until the last quarter of 1966. By then Operation LAMSON had progressed sufficiently in organization and area of influence to contemplate a systematic attack on VC control over TAN BINH. One should note that the unique organizational arrangements and sophisticated operational techniques that were implemented on the 26-27 December 1966 period, here described, are still evolving.

3. (C) ORGANIZATION: To provide a clutch and gear mechanism to match the speed and power of the 1st Infantry Division to the slow, arduous pace of Revolutionary Development, the Commanding General created the the Revolutionary Development Task Force (RDTF), with the primary mission of planning and executing LAMSON. The RDTF consists of a commander and staff equivalent to that of an infantry battalion in grade experience, and responsibility, plus a modest complement of communicators, intelligence specialists, drivers, and other mission essential personnel. RDTF strength in late December 1966 was Officers--15; EM--32; it possessed 12 trucks, 1/4 ton; 2 trucks, 2 1/2 ton; miscellaneous small arms and 11 radios. Personnel spaces for the RDTF were drawn in part from the Division Headquarters, Division Artillery, TO&E units, but mainly from the division overstrength resources. Some members of the RDTF are Vietnamese language trained; others are drawn from the division's trained intelligence and psywar assets; most, however, possess no particular qualifications for their task. The equipment is hand receipted from diverse sources. The RDTF functions as a staff to plan and coordinate operations, providing the division with a corporate memory of the minutiae of BINH DUONG Province which our brigade and battalion staffs, moving from mission to mission, are unable to develop. RDTF functions also as a headquarters to establish liaison with and to obtain cooperation from the ARVN Provincial and other Vietnamese units, in conjunction with which our LAMSON operations are usually conducted. During an operation RDTF is attached to one of the TO&E brigades or battalions thereby augmenting the tactical commander's capacity to know and understand the BINH DUONG situation, and to dovetail his efforts to those of GVN units.

4. (C) SITUATION: 26 December 1966, RDTF maintained a continual watch in the BINH DUONG CHIEU HOI (Open Arms) Camp in an effort to gain intelligence from ralliers undergoing rehabilitation training. One of the HOI CHANN

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(Ralliers) who was selected for a special interview in December was an ex-VC Recondo from the village of TAN BINH. During his interview he stated that there were VC in his village and that they controlled the people. According to his statement, the Viet Cong re-entered the village at approximately 1700 hours daily along with the local farmers leaving their fields at the end of the working day. The VC would eat supper and occasionally conduct propaganda meetings in the village. Having been shown an aerial photo, the rallier pointed out some of the houses belonging to the VC and some of their favorite meeting places. The rallier verified that there were no tactical defensive positions within the village, only a few foxholes in a rubber plantation which bordered the village. He further pinpointed the escape routes which the VC intended to use in cases of attack by US or ARVN forces. The ralliers further indicated that the VC normally departed the village at 2400 hours.

5. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION: 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division was assigned the mission of executing a seal and search of TAN BINH immediately after the Christmas truce. The RDTF, two infantry battalions, one cavalry troop (reinf) and one artillery battalion were attached to the 1st Brigade for the operation. 40 UH-1D helicopters and three CH-47 helicopters were placed in support. RDTF arranged for the participation of the local district intelligence platoon augmented by the 10th National Police (aggregate strength 55) and the 5th Reconnaissance Company of the 5th ARVN Division (strength of 60). RDTF furnished these units communications, transportation, and liaison with US units. As had been its practice, the 1st Brigade further organized into (a) Seal Force and (b) Search Force.

a. Seal Forces: The two US infantry battalions (1-26 and 1-28 Inf) and the cavalry troop were assigned to surround the town. This external positioning put US firepower and mobility where it would do the most good against VC and the least harm to the peasant's property or lives. US troops are readily trained for this role, which is only slightly different from other military operations.

b. Search Forces: The RDTF and the GVN forces were assigned to search the village. Use of Vietnamese for the task offered important advantages. First, the Vietnamese are familiar with local customs and culture and are readily able to detect matters out of the ordinary. Such as hidden items located in wells, latrines, furniture, manure heaps, storage areas, or other common place facilities. They have proven to be indispensable in uncovering hidden weapons, equipment, and personnel. Secondly, the presence of Vietnamese Forces projects an image of GVN efficiency, professionalism, and self-sufficiency. Thirdly, the practice of the Vietnamese searching the homes of Vietnamese avoids for the US the stigma of "foreigners" imposing their power and might on the people.

6. (C) CONCEPT: Colonel S.B. Berry, CO, 1st Brigade recognized that surprise was central to the success of his plan. This plan provided that the infantry seal forces would be introduced into the area by simultaneous heliborne assaults into four LZs directly from the 1st Brigade's base camp at PHUOC VINH XG 9649. Cavalry forces would move overland from their base at PHU LOI XT 8116, arriving at H-hour to reinforce the infantry battalions. H-hour would be 1800H 26 December 1966. Both the selected hour and date were significant. The Christmas Truce period ended at 0700H that day and it was believed that the Viet Cong least expected the initiation of a major US operation between the Christmas and the New Years "Truces." The H-hour of 1800H was selected to allow the Viet Cong to enter the village as they normally did at the end of the day. The search plan was based on the population, size, and physical layout of the huts within the village. Photo reconnaissance established that a thorough search could be accomplished by using the search forces initially, each force responsible for a zone within the village. Search forces would

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be committed simultaneously with seal forces to allow an immediate search of selected houses before the VC could take evasive action. All males aged 15-45 would be assembled and evacuated. Additional search forces would be employed on order. Flares dropped by Air Force aircraft and tank search lights would be employed throughout the night to enable search forces to continue an effective search during the hours of darkness. Additionally the illumination would deny the VC freedom to move undetected around the village throughout the night.

7. (C) DECEPTION: Previous experience had indicated that seal and search plans were often compromised. Therefore, deception measures were made an integrated part of the plan. The operations order cited NUOC VANG, XT 9951, 20 km from TAN BINH, as the objective. This plan was then coordinated with local ARVN and GVN forces. Even US troops were not informed of the actual objective area, and all orders were issued on diagrams rather than on maps. It was not until a few hours before the operation was to begin that the actual target, TAN BINH, was announced, and troops were informed only at the latest feasible time.

8. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Seal: The seal forces landed on all four landing zones at precisely 1800 hours. Two aerial rifle platoons gave an added degree of airmobile reaction to the troops on the ground by conducting "eagle flights" designed to pounce on VC fleeing the village while ground forces tightened the seal and completed their link-up. Search forces were airlifted by CH-47 helicopters and were landed outside of the village between the groups of seal forces. The seal of the village was completed at 1829 hours.

b. Search: The search forces entered the village at 1915H. All males between the ages of 15 and 45 were instructed to report to the village school-house for screening. At this location all males were screened by a rallier from the village in an attempt to identify known VC. Three US and Vietnamese IPW teams interrogated the males at the school-house, and names were compared with a prepared black list. Five 1/2-ton vehicles were airlifted in with the search forces. Three of the vehicles were used as command vehicles. One of the command vehicles remained stationary at the search force command post while the other two vehicles were used to move detainees found by the search forces. The two remaining vehicles were gun jeeps used to provide security and to man check points within the village. Ralliers were used with all of the search teams. Some of these ralliers were from the renowned Viet Cong PHU LOI Battalion and were especially useful since TAN BINH was an old PHU LOI Battalion refuge. The rallier who had furnished most of the intelligence for the operation accompanied RDTF and GVN personnel on raids of VC houses he had identified earlier. Prepared speeches were made by other ralliers to the villagers. They cited reasons why they had returned to the side of the government, the warm welcome and kind treatment that they had received when they were accepted back with open arms under the CHIEU HOI program. A US officer and radio operator of RDTF accompanied each search force. In conjunction with the US advisors to participate ARVN forces, these RDTF people monitored the activities and rendered progress reports to the RDTF tactical command post within the village. Another liaison party remained at the US 1st Brigade command post to keep the brigade commander abreast of the internal search and to advise the RDTF command post of the seal force's activities. Because of the late initial search on the evening of 26 December 1966, a fresh search force was introduced on the morning of 27 December 1966. Two platoons from the

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BINH LONG Province intelligence company accompanied the new search forces. Two mobile interview teams roamed throughout the village interviewing approximately 40 persons. Through their questioning they acquired information on VC forces operating in the area and on VC tax collection activity. It was learned that taxes are collected on a monthly basis and range from 5 to 35 piasters per person. Homes of known VC were visited and the inhabitants questioned as to why their relatives had joined the VC. Few of the persons interviewed showed any signs of fear and many talked openly. The usual answer was that their sons had refused to obey parental authority and thus had joined the VC. Many of the families expressed their desire to be reunited with their relatives who had been recruited or drafted by the Viet Cong. Answers such as these led into discussions of the CHIEU HOI program.

c. Psychological Operations: As the village was sealed, a PsyOps helicopter equipped with loudspeakers made its initial broadcast by informing the villagers that they were surrounded and warning them that anyone trying to escape would be considered as Viet Cong and would be engaged by fire. Upon introduction of search forces, an intensive PsyOps program was directed toward the villagers by using a platoon of 20 ralliers from the BINH DUONG Province CHIEU HOI center. These individuals were separated into two groups to accompany the search forces through the two search zones. The ralliers moved through the village distributing leaflets and a safe conduct pass to each of the inhabitants. The people were questioned by the ralliers in regard to VC activities in the area and were told of the CHIEU HOI program and all its benefits. After the 24 February 1966 attack, the village males had been rounded up and the women had rioted in protest against their removal. To preclude a recurrence of this disorder, a PsyOps team broadcasted a message by helicopter reassuring the women that the men would be returned to the village within two days. It further warned that if the women protested or demonstrated, the men would be detained longer. Subsequent PsyOps messages were delivered as the operation progressed. Messages were aimed at enhancing control of the populace and issuing warnings of the consequences for harboring Viet Cong forces or allowing guerrillas to use the village as a staging area for harassing US and GVN forces.

d. Evacuation: CH-47s were utilized to evacuate detainees gathered by the search forces. National Police provided security during the flight to the Province Headquarters. At the National Police Headquarters all detainees underwent a thorough interrogation to identify VC and VC sympathizers and to build the police dossier on each inhabitant of TAN BINH.

e. Results: The TAN BINH seal and search terminated at 1100 hours on 27 December 1966 with the following results:

- 4 VC KIA (Killed attempting to escape the seal)
- 9 PW (captured by the search force)
- 6 Draft Evaders (turned over to GVN)
- 1 ARVN Deserter (turned over to ARVN)
- 201 Detainees (turned over to the National Police for further questioning)

9. (C) ASSESSMENT: The results of the TAN BINH undertaking when measured against the body-count of certain two-battalion operations are most unspectacular. However, the seal and search and Operation LAM SON of which it was a part, must be evaluated in a larger context.

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a. Strategy: The Division Commander interpreted his mission as necessitating two differing coincident campaigns: one campaign against the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Main Force units and a second campaign aimed at wresting control over the people of BINH DUONG Province from the VC local guerrillas and cadre. He conceived these campaigns as interrelated, interacting military operations. A systematic offensive against the Viet Cong 9th Division and the Viet Cong BINH DUONG Province Battalion served to drive these units back from the centers of population, depriving the local VC guerrillas of military support, and permitting our use of smaller, less well armed forces in the inhabited areas. Simultaneously, a campaign of attrition aimed at the local irregulars and cadre acted to deprive main force units of guides, communication and liaison and sources of money, food, women and other comforts of civilization. The latter campaign, named LAM SON, consisted not only of seal/search operations in hamlets, but of systematic reduction of the Viet Cong's nearby jungle redoubts. Thus, the TAN BINH operation of December 1966, took place after three successive BIG RED ONE victories over the VC 272d Regiment and two victories over the PHU LOI Battalion, all in the period since the 24 February 1966 Battle of TAN BINH. Moreover, during the same eight month period the BONG TRANG Jungle lying immediately north and west of TAN BINH had been subjected to an intensive, scheduled destruction program which integrated B-52 strikes, tactical air and artillery with troop search and destroy operations. Two very large base camps therein had been destroyed, as well as nine smaller ones. The forest had been defoliated chemically and torn by fire to the point that aerial surveillance over its entirety was possible. Gravel mines were periodically laid on the trails of the BONG TRANG Jungle, and were still active during late December 1966. PeyWar of the division stressed the futility of living like a monkey in the jungle, and pointed out each successful VC kill or capture in BINH DUONG hamlets to convey the reality of no refuge for the Viet Cong, and to urge them therefore to rally to the GVN. TAN BINH, 26 December 1966, was one small part of this larger design. Some statistical comparisons between the two campaigns for the last ten weeks of 1966 follow:

	Ops Against Main Force	Revolutionary Development Ops	Total
US KHA	82	58	140
US WHA	392	288	680
VC KIA (BC)	968	518	1,486
VC PW	57	58	115
CHIEU HOI*	23	102	125
DETAINÉES	38	535	573
DRAFT DODGERS	0	67	67
DESERTERS	0	4	4
MANEUVER BN-DAYS**	212	271	483

NOTE: (*) * Rallyers in 1st Infantry Division TACR

** Battalion-days of active operations in field; does not include training or preparation for operations.

As one can see from this experience, Revolutionary Development operations have a smaller amount of carnage than do main force operations, and are less rewarding in terms of VC kills per maneuver battalion-day, but experience shows that such as in the one breeds progress in the other. VC losses for the subsequent five week period of early 1967 amounted to 1,246, as follows:

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	<u>Main Force Ops</u>	<u>Rev Dev Ops</u>	<u>Total</u>
VC KIA (PC)	389		465
VC PW	180		235
CHUNG HO:	471		576
		
		TOTAL	1,276

b. Tactics and Techniques

(1) Intelligence: Sound intelligence for targetting is SINE QUA NON; its acquisition is a cumulative and localizing process, underlining the necessity for an agency to provide a continuity of the intelligence effort for the target area. Use of ralliers and VC PWs in the collection effort has proven invaluable. Tactical maps, even the 1/25,000 picto-map, lack the detail for planning house-to-house, police actions, and aerial photos are especially important. One result of the December 1966 raid is a set of aerial photos on which are marked each VC house in the village, now being used to plan a new seal and search. An important intelligence task is to fix the optimum time for the seal, aiming at minimizing the number of VC inside of the seal. Another important intelligence task is to identify VC routes to the target, and to the nearby base camps.

(2) PsyWar: Seal and search operations require strong PsyOps support, particularly of aerial loudspeakers. It is especially important to announce to villagers early in the operation that their town is sealed, and to instruct them how to behave. Promptly and properly delivered, that early message simplifies greatly the rules of engagement. The entire operation should be conceived as an opportunity to indoctrinate the villagers politically and should be conducted accordingly.

(3) Coordination: By their nature, seal and search operations involve the province, district, and the ARVN Division in whose TAOR the village lies, as well as all the in-province VC agencies and units. One persistent problem is motivating Vietnamese participation without involving them intimately in the planning and accepting the consequent risk of compromise. That motivation can be sustained only in the presence of a great deal of Vietnamese trust, patently not reciprocated, which can be created only through demonstrated overall US good faith and repeated success.

(4) Surprise and Deception: The VC intelligence net must be respected. Measures to confuse the enemy and to deprive him of the advantage of warning are an important part of all operations. Guile is important, but a high pace of operations is no less so.

(5) Training: US line troops readily adapt to the seal role in seal and search operations, but they must be instructed that their demeanor is critical to the success of the mission and that they are required to maintain an attitude of professional detachment and efficiency. They should be friendly but not patronizing, holding themselves apart from the people without evidencing hostility or disdain. The RDTF personnel, of course, are cast in quite a different role and may behave accordingly. Their missions of cooperation and intelligence warrant an involvement with the populace and a latitude not permissible for the tactical troops: the latter should be respected by the people, and not necessarily liked. The most critical training problem is presented by tactical commanders who fail to grasp the utility of the RDTF and to exploit its capabilities.

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(6) Combined Operations: Seal and search operations offer a rare opportunity for US-GVN cooperation with the US cast in an auxiliary role to GVN searchers. They provide a village-level demonstration of the vacuity of the VC's "puppet" characterization of ARVN forces. Moreover, in our experiences these operations have done much to build respect among American soldiers for their Vietnamese comrades in arms--more than any other operation we conduct. Finally, they contribute directly to the training of GVN forces in the sort of operations essential for long-term policing of the countryside.

(7) Hamlet Festival: The TAN BINH operation of 26-27 December 1966 did not include a "Hamlet Festival", but since these are usually a part of the RDTF techniques, it should be noted that in less hostile, more GVN-controlled villages, RDTF normally provides entertainment which includes bands, clowns, and parades. The "Festival" eases tensions, keeps the populace occupied while the search is in progress, and facilitates identification-paper checks and intelligence collection among the villagers.

c. Personnel: It is an unusual US Army officer who can adapt readily to RDTF assignments. Each officer's personality must be carefully evaluated and his background and inclinations considered before he is selected for an RDTF slot. LAM SON pivots around the initiative, imagination, intelligence, goodwill, and zeal of the RDTF commanders, and it depends heavily on the same qualities in many of his subordinates, officers and enlisted men. The 1st Infantry Division is preparing a table of distribution and allowances proposed for bringing this activity within the recognized structure of the division. Such an entity is probably essential for any division conducting revolutionary development type operations anywhere in the world.

d. Equipment: Even the very modest equipment of the RDTF suffers from its irregular maintenance support. The TDA submissions will seek to obtain an austere kind and amount of equipment, together with a complement of maintenance personnel and an appropriate PLL.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. J. Heacock
E. J. HEACOCK
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION: Special

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
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Incl 4 to Operational Report - Lessons Learned

MORTAR ATTACKS 1 DECEMBER 1966 - 30 APRIL 1967



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS

1ST BRIGADE, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AMP-SP-O

3 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (RCS) CSPGO-2

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AMDB-T
APO San Francisco 96345

1. (C) INTRODUCTION.

a. During the previous reporting period, 1 Nov 66 to 31 Jan 67, the 1st Bde participated in six brigade- and one division-level operation. Highlights of that period were Operation BATTLE CREEK (OPORD 42-66), a multi-brigade operation in TAY NINH Province north and west of DAU TIENG which terminated in the middle of November. The brigade closed the reporting period with Operation SARATOGA (OPORD 3-67). SARATOGA culminated the Brigade's activities for the period with a series of three seal and search operations (BINH MY, CAU DAT, and CHANH LUU) while conducting search and destroy operations in conjunction with the 3d Bde in the BONG TRANG jungle, followed by the opening of Route 16 for resupply of PHUOC VINH.

b. Principal headquarters and commanders of the task force during this reporting period were:

(1) Operation WILLISTON (OPORD 4-67), Headquarters, 1st Brigade, Colonel Sidney F. Perry, Jr., 1 Feb 67 to 3 Feb 67; Colonel William B. Caldwell, III, 3 Feb 67 to 13 Feb 67.

(a) 1st Bn, 2d Inf, LTC William C. Simpson, 1 Feb 67 to 13 Feb 67.

(b) 1st Bn, 28th Inf, LTC Jack G. Whitted, 1 Feb 67 to 5 Feb 67; LTC Stanley J. Kuick, 5 Feb 67 to 13 Feb 67.

(c) 1st Sqdn, 14th AGR, LTC Martin D. Howell, 2 Feb 67 to 12 Feb 67.

(d) 1st Bn, 5th Arty, LTC Thomas A. Dinnis, 1 Feb 67 to 12 Feb 67; LTC William L. Depew, 12 Feb 67 to 13 Feb 67.

(e) Co A, 1st Engr Bn, CPT Wayne L. Lucas, 2 Feb 67 to 13 Feb 67.

(2) Operation TUCSON-DELTA (OPORD 5-67), Headquarters, 1st Brigade, Colonel William B. Caldwell, III, 14 Feb 67 to 21 Feb 67.

(a) 1st Bn, 2d Inf, LTC William C. Simpson, 14 Feb 67 to 21 Feb 67.

(b) 1st Bn, 28th Inf, LTC Stanley J. Kuick, 14 Feb 67 to 21 Feb 67.

(c) 2d Bn, 2d Inf, LTC Edward J. Collins, 14 Feb 67 to 17 Feb 67.

(d) 2d Bn, 18th Inf, LTC Lewis R. Bauman, 14 Feb 67 to 21 Feb 67.

(e) 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav, LTC Thomas W. Fife, 14 Feb 67 to 17 Feb 67.

(f) 1st Bn, 9th Arty, LTC William L. Depew, 14 Feb 67 to 21 Feb 67.

(g) A Co, 1st Engr Bn, CPT Wayne L. Lucas, 14 Feb 67 to 17 Feb 67.

(h) C Co, 1st Engr Bn, CPT Larry A. Blair, 14 Feb 67 to 17 Feb 67.

(3) Operation JUNCTION CITY-1 (OPORD 6-67), Headquarters 1st Brigade,

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Colonel William B. Caldwell, III, 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67.

(a) 1st Bn, 2d Inf, LTC William C. Simpson, 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67.

(b) 1st Bn, 26th Inf, LTC Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67.

(c) 1st Bn, 28th Inf, LTC Stanley J. Kuick, 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67.

(d) 2d Bn, 18th Inf, LTC Lewis R. Bauman, 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67.

(e) 1st Bn, 5th Arty, LTC William L. Depew, 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67.

(4) Operation JUNCTION CITY-2 (OPORD 7-67), Headquarters, 1st Brigade, Colonel William F. Caldwell, III, 7 Mar 67 to 15 Apr 67.

(a) 1st Bn, 2d Inf, LTC William C. Simpson, 7 Mar 67 to 27 Mar 67.

(b) 1st Bn, 16th Inf, LTC Rufus C. Lazzell, 4 Mar 67 to 15 Apr 67.

(c) 1st Bn, 18th Inf, LTC Earle L. Denton, 2 Apr 67 to 5 Apr 67, and 13 Apr 67 to 15 Apr 67.

(d) 1st Bn, 26th Inf, LTC Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 7 Mar 67 to 21 Mar 67; LTC Joseph F. Hoffman, 2 Apr 67 to 15 Apr 67.

(e) 1st Bn, 28th Inf, LTC Stanley J. Kuick, 7 Mar 67 to 6 Apr 67, and 13 Apr 67 to 15 Apr 67.

(f) 2d Bn, 18th Inf, LTC Lewis R. Bauman, 7 Mar 67 to 21 Mar 67, 1 Apr 67 to 6 Apr 67, and 13 Apr 67 to 15 Apr 67.

(g) 1st Sdn, 4th Cav, LTC Thomas W. Fife, 18 Mar 67 to 12 Apr 67.

(5) Operation HARVEST MOON, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, LTC Rufus C. Lazzell, 8 Apr 67 to 26 Apr 67; 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, LTC Joseph R. Ulatoski, 26 Apr 67 to 30 Apr 67.

2. (C) TACTICAL OPERATIONS.

a. Elements Affecting the Operation.

(1) Effectiveness of Intelligence: Defoliation and aviators' familiarity with the area resulted in increased effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance in the Ede TAOR and the JUNCTION CITY area of operations. SLAR and RED HAZE returns were successfully used for target acquisition and indicators of enemy activity in both areas. No contact was made with VC/NVA main force units that were expected in the JUNCTION CITY AO. Local force units encountered proved well armed and trained and adept at evasive sniping and ambush operations. Intelligence prior to JUNCTION CITY indicated elements of COSVN and the 9th VC Div headquarters were in the Division AO in northern TAY NINH Province. No contact was made with the headquarters or security elements of either headquarters. Numerous captured documents indicated elements of COSVN headquarters were in the area as late as Jan 67.

(2) Nature of Terrain: In northern TAY NINH Province, the terrain was a mixture of primary and secondary jungle growth and large rice paddies. The TONLE CHAM/CU AN LOI area of JUNCTION CITY-2 contained a mixture of heavy primary and secondary growth and extensive rubber plantations. There were relatively few open, clear areas that could be used as landing zones. Jungle areas provided excellent concealment for both friendly and enemy units, but restricted movement, fields of fire, observation, resupply, and evacuation. February and March were very dry months ground trafficability was excellent. Light rains in early April did not seriously affect the trafficability.

(3) Weather: There was no precipitation in February and March. In early April there were occasional light showers. Daily light to heavy rain showers predominated the last half of April. The showers did not affect ground operations. The temperature ranged from 65° to 100°; the relative humidity ranged from 40% to 65%. Although extremely uncomfortable, the weather did not affect the operations of ground units.

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3 May 67

SUIJ: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (RCS) CSGO-2

(4) Attitude of the Civilian Population: Based on civic action operations in the AN LOC/QUAN LOI area and in PHUOC VINH during the quarter, the attitude of the people has been most receptive, cordial, and warm.

b. Combat Actions: Operations during the period consisted of:

(1) Operation WILKINSON, OFORD 4-67, a brigade-size, road clearing and search and destroy operation along Route 13 south of AN LOC and Route 245 between AN LOC and MINH THANH.

(a) The mission stated in the order was to clear and secure Rte 13 north of CHANH THANH to AN LOC, clear and secure Rte 246 from AN LOC to MINH THANH, while securing the logistical bases at QUAN LOI. The Brigade was to conduct search and destroy operations in the MINH THANH area 2-12 Feb 67.

(b) The operation was divided into two phases:

1. Phase I (2-6 Feb 67): 1st Bde was to airlift 2/16 Inf to QUAN LOI, 1/11 Inf to MINH THANH, clear and secure Rte 13 from XT767674 to XT767800, employing TF LION (1/28 Inf with attached cavalry elements), clear and secure Rte 245 from MINH THANH to vic XT7684, employing 1/11 Cav(-), and 1/26 Inf was to conduct search and destroy operations in PHUOC VINH.

2. Phase II (7-12 Feb 67): 1st Bde was to secure Rte 13 from CHON THANH to QUAN LOI, employing TF LION; was to secure Rte 245 vic XT7684 with 1/11 Cav(-); was to continue security of QUAN LOI and MINH THANH log bases; was to secure engineer work parties in AO, and conduct search and destroy operations in the MINH THANH area.

(c) Upon completion of Operation SARATOGA, the brigade stood down for two days, then moved to MINH THANH on 1 Feb 67 in preparation for Operation WILKINSON, which started on 2 Feb 67. 1/2 Inf moved by fixed-wing aircraft on 1 Feb to MINH THANH and assumed defense of the log base and Ede CP at that location. 1/28 Inf helilifted from QUAN LOI on 2 Feb and assumed its road security mission on Rte 13 between CHON THANH and AN LOC. 1/11 ACR joined the Brigade on 2 Feb, securing LZ 1 along Rte 13 for 1/28 Inf as it moved to its NDF vic the intersection of Rte 245 and Rte 13. 1/2 Inf remained in the MINH THANH area during the entire operation providing security and local patrols. 1/28 Inf secured Rte 13 from XT765800 to XT767614 2-10 Feb. On 10 Feb 67, 1/28 was relieved in place by 2/16 Inf. 1/28 moved A1/11 Cav and A/1 Engr by vehicle to QUAN LOI. 2/16 Inf secured the sector of Rte 13 from XT765800 to XT767614. 2/16 Inf reverted to 3d Bde control on 12 Feb and moved to LAI KHE on the southbound resupply convoy. 1/11 ACR, in addition to securing a portion of Rte 13 from XT766700 to XT765800, secured Rte 245 from AN LOC to MINH THANH. The 1/11 ACR also conducted search and destroy operations in the following areas on the dates indicated: AO FLUE (vic grid square XT6685) on 4-5 Feb; recon in force to XT605764 on 5 Feb; Objective RAT (vic XT601584) on 6 Feb; Objective SCIRREL (vic XT6258) on 7 Feb; and AO ELACK (vic XT7297) on 8 Feb. Thunder runs were used extensively by all units on the road. Operation was terminated on 12 February 1967 with the move of 1/11 ACR down Rte 13 to LAI KHE; 1/11 ACR escorted the southbound convoy, picked up 2/16 Inf and returned them to LAI KHE.

(d) Results.

1. Friendly Losses.

a. Personnel: 6 KIA;

b. Equipment: 1 2 1/2 T truck, 1 engr front loader destroyed.

2. Enemy.

a. Personnel: Unknown.

b. Equipment Destroyed: 3 booby-trapped grenades, 1 200-lb bomb, 1 20-lb AT mine, 25 bunkers. 1 AP mine, 600 CEU bomblets, 3 lbs TNT.

c. Equipment Captured: numerous documents.

(e) The operation was supported by 1/5 Arty(+) in direct support.

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C2/35 Arty, A6/27 Arty, B8/6 Arty, and F2/33 Arty were in a GSR role. The artillery was used primarily for specified targets and H&I fires. The Air Force flew 15 pre-planned, 6 immediate, and 5 diverted airstrikes in support of the operation. The 62 Air Force sorties in support of the operation resulted in 8 bunkers destroyed, 225 meters of trench discovered and destroyed, and 12 fighting positions uncovered and destroyed.

(2) Operation TUCSON DELTA, JORD 5-67, was conducted from 13 Feb to 21 Feb 67. This was a division-directed, multi-brigade operation between the MINH THANH and MICHELIN rubber plantations.

(a) The 1st Brigade's mission was to conduct search and destroy operations in the jungle area north of the MICHELIN plantation bordered by Route 245 on the west and Routes 13, 242, and 239 on the east. A secondary mission was the seal and search of the villages in the northwest portion of the MICHELIN rubber plantation.

(b) The operation was initially conceived with armored cavalry units establishing blocking positions along Route 245 (Axis X-RAY) on the west and Routes 13, 242, and 239 (Axis YOKE) on the east. Two infantry battalions were then to sweep the jungle from south of the MINH THANH rubber plantation with the blocking positions established by the cavalry being used as boundaries. After securing Axis X-RAY, the cavalry unit on that axis was to search and seal the villages in the northwest section of the MICHELIN plantation. Change 1 to the OFORD resulted in 2/2 Inf (M) assuming the cav mission along Axis X-RAY.

(c) The operation was initiated on 140547H Feb 67. 1/4 Cav occupied blocking positions along Axis YOKE by the afternoon of the 14th. 2/2 Inf occupied its blocking positions along Axis X-RAY by early evening of the 14th. Both units found their respective axes heavily mined with pressure-type mines. Arty bases were established on both axes via XT565580 and XT662578. 1/2 Inf and 2/18 Inf started their sweeps of the area bordered by Axes YOKE and X-RAY during the late morning of the 14th. On the 15th, as the 1/2 Inf and the 2/18 Inf continued their sweep south toward the MICHELIN plantation, the 2/2 Inf sealed and searched the villages in the northwest section of the MICHELIN plantation in preparation for movement of elements of the division from MINH THANH to DAU TIENG. The only significant contact of the operation was the ambush of a small resupply convoy from 1/4 Cav. The encounter resulted in 5 VC KIA (EC), 1 KIA (Prob) and several weapons captured. On 17 Feb, 2/18 Inf completed sweep of its assigned sector and was helilifted to MINH THANH. 1/4 Cav and 2/2 Inf moved from field locations along Axis X-RAY escorting arty and engr units to DAU TIENG. On the afternoon of the 17th, the 1/28 Inf, having been relieved of the security of MINH THANH by 2/18 Inf, was helilifted into the 1/2 Inf assigned sector of responsibility to assist in the search of a large base camp uncovered by 1/2 Inf. The resulting search yielded a large quantity of rice, some of which was evacuated. The search of the base camp and area north of the MICHELIN plantation was completed on 19 Feb 67, and both infantry battalions were helilifted to MINH THANH, where local patrols and preparations for Operation JUNCTION CITY were conducted until 21 Feb 67.

(d) Results.

1. US Losses.

a. Personnel: 29 WHA.

b. Equipment Destroyed: 2 2 1/2 T trucks, 2 APC (M-113).

c. Equipment Damaged: 1 2 1/2 T truck, 1 3/4 T trailer, 2 M-42 dusters, 4 M-48 tanks, 7 M-113 APC's, 1 5T truck.

2. Enemy Losses.

a. Personnel: 8 VC KIA (BC).

b. Equipment Captured: 1 US M-1 carbine, 2 SKS carbines, 75 rds SA ammo, 3 entrenching tools, 1 IMG, 1 RPG launcher, 9000 vials of medicine, 1 PRC-10 radio, 135.3 tons of rice (2.5 tons extracted), and miscellaneous documents.

c. Equipment Destroyed: 1 81mm mortar rd, 63 CIU's, 21 AT mines, 10 AP mines, 5 booby traps, 302 Chicom grenades, 149 bunkers, 1 boat, 5 desks, 10 chairs, 3 dispensaries, 1 hospital, 22 huts, 10 ducks, 45 chickens, 131.2 tons of rice, 40 gals of cooking oil, 10 cases of condensed milk, 6 55-gal drums of ter, 5 gals of sodium glutamate, 1 training area, 3 classrooms, and miscellaneous clothing.

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(e) Supporting Forces: 1/5 Arty provided direct support for the Brigade and its attachments. 2/33 Arty, L&C8, 6 Arty, and C2/35 Arty supported the Brigade in a GSR role. 1/5 Arty fired 18,796 rounds of 105mm on preplanned, on-call, and H&I targets. The Air Force supported the Brigade with 76 preplanned, 6 immediate and 7 diverted sorties. EDA included 55 bunkers destroyed, 18 fighting positions destroyed, 95C meters of trench destroyed, and one raft sunk.

(5) Operation JUNCTION CITY was a two-phase operation: OPORD 6-67 was published for Operation JUNCTION CITY-1 and OPORD 7-67 with frag orders for Operation JUNCTION CITY-2. Phase 1 was conducted from 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67. Phase 2 was conducted from 7 Mar until 15 Apr 67.

(a) The mission for the operation was:

1. Phase I: the conduct of search and destroy operations while occupying blocking positions along the Cambodian border in northern TAY NINH Province (War Zone C).

2. Phase II: the opening of Rte 246 and security of construction parties building a bridge, the CIDG camp and airfield (vic XT6281) west of AN LOC.

(b) Concept of the Operation.

1. Phase I: 1st Bde would conduct an airmobile assault with 1/2, 1/26, and 1/28 Inf, landing in multiple LZ's in northern TAY NINH Province along the Cambodian border. From these LZ's the Brigade was to block in zone, conduct search and destroy operations to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, and secure engineer work parties, where applicable.

2. Phase II: The Brigade was to secure Rte 246 from AN LOC to the bridge site vic XT624815; employing TF 1/2, secure landing zones vic XT625815 for airlanding of 1/26 Inf; provide security for engineer work parties, conduct search and destroy operations vic of Rte 246 and secure Fire Support Base HIAVO on order. TF 1/2 was to be employed to the east and 1/2 Inf to the west of the SAIGON River, with 1/28 Inf, Div RRF, at MINH THANH until Mar 67.

(c) Operation Summary.

1. Phase I: This phase of the operation found 1/2, 1/26, and 1/28 Inf in blocking positions along the Cambodian border. Brigade TAC CP was located in 1/28 Inf and 1/5 Arty NDP. 1/2, 1/26, and 1/28 Inf occupied blocking positions and conducted search and destroy operations in their respective sectors. This phase of the operation was characterized by daily scouting and mining incidents conducted by elements of COSVN rear security elements. 1/2 Inf was relieved from its LZ on 2 Mar, followed by 1/26 Inf on 3 Mar and 1/28 Inf and 1st Bde TAC CP on 4 Mar. 1/2 Inf assisted in the security of CJAN LOI upon closing from LZ on the 2d of March and prepared for Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY. 1/26, 1/28 and 1st Bde TAC CP displaced to MINH THANH and prepared for Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY.

2. Phase II: The Brigade provided security for the Special Forces camp and bridge that was constructed vic XT624815. The Brigade also secured the LLOC between the artillery bases west of AN LOC and AN LOC, as well as Rte 13 from AN LOC south to XT765825. Contact for units attached to the Brigade could best be classified as harassing. Attacking forces were squad-size, with the enemy employing numerous pressure-type mines and very limited mortar attacks. During this operation, the Brigade's ability to attach and detach divisional and non-divisional elements resulted in a flexibility that increased the Brigade's ability to successfully accomplish its mission.

(e) Results.

1. Phase I.

a. US Personnel Losses: 101KHA, 33 WHA.

b. US Equipment Damaged: 2 M-48 tanks, 1 M-113 APC, 1

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LT truck (all light damage).

c. Enemy Personnel Losses: 29 VC KIA (EC), 9 VC KBA, 4

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d. Enemy Equipment Captured: 12 Chicom rifles, 1 Soviet carbine, 3 US carbines, 4 Chicom SIG, 1 LMG (Chicom manufacture), 1 .50 cal MG (anti-aircraft), 32 radios, 1 tape recorder, 1 Philco portable radio, 1 Jhp Briggs and Stratton generator, 1 walkie-talkie, 1 rifle grenade launcher, 1 PRC-10 radio, 1 M-60 MG barrel, 1 MG barrel 12.7mm.

e. Enemy Equipment Destroyed: 86.8 tons of rice, 3300 lbs of salt, 17 frag grenades, 248 rifle grenades, 7 81mm mortar rds, 1 60mm mortar, 3 concussion grenades, 4 mines, 5 claymotes, 4 RPG AT rds, 800 lbs of dynamite, 1600 ft of detonating cord, 217 tires with tubes, 57 bicycles, 34 cans of condensed milk, 12,725 lbs of dried fish and rice, 700 lbs of dried beans, 200 lbs of peanuts, 12 pigs, 78 chickens, 200 lbs of cloth, 355 gals of fuel oil, 1 machete, 4520 meters of wire, 100 entrenching tools, 3900 pr of HO CHI MINH sandals, 5074 BA-30 batteries, 2 axes, 70 reams of writing paper, 10 reams of carbon paper, 500 ball-point pens, 10 pencils, 1750 erasers, 80 oil lamps, 78 sheets of tin, 6 million units of pencils.

2. Phase II.

a. US Personnel Losses: 4 KHA, 83 WHA.

b. US Equipment Destroyed: 1 LT truck, 2 M-113 APC's.

c. US Equipment Damaged: 4 M-113 APC's, 5 M-48 tanks, 1 VTR, 1 tank dozer.

d. Enemy Personnel Losses: 21 VC KIA (EC), 7 VC KIA.

e. Enemy Equipment Captured: 2 bridge frames (42'x12'), 2 AK-47 rifles, 2 claymotes, 140 M-16 rds, 1 M-16, 13,000 plasters, 1 Mauser Model 98 rifle, 1 AK-50 rifle, 1 P-38 pistol, 2 US carbines, 2 bayonets, 1 2-lb block of TNT, 15 lbs of medical supplies, 25 lbs of clothing.

f. Enemy Equipment Destroyed: 30 huts, 33 bunkers, 5 large buildings, 8 grenades, 20 AT mines, 14 AP mines, 2 claymotes, 1 155mm rd, 2000 lbs of unpolished rice, 1200 lbs of polished rice.

(c) Supporting Forces: 1/5 Arty supported the 1st rde in both phases of JUNCTION CITY. The battalion fired 113,000 rds of 105mm in direct support of Brigade operations. General Support and GSR units in support of the 1/5 Arty fired 13,000 rds of 4.2" mortar, 2900 rds of 155mm, 736 rds of 8", and 96 rds of 75mm. Air Force support during the period consisted of 141 preplanned, 83 immediate, and 25 diverted airstrikes with a total of 611 sorties. Bomb damage assessment included:

	Uncovered	Destroyed	Damaged
Bunkers:	109	67	20
Buildings:	21	18	3
Fighting pens:	105	81	
Trenches:	570 meters	50 meters	10 meters

Airstrikes also resulted in 17 KBA, 1 WHA, 6 secondary fires, and destruction of one foot bridge.

(4) Operation HARVEST MOON, Frag 0 6 to OPORD 7-67 (Operation JUNCTION CITY-2).

(a) By the mission stated in the frag order, 1/16 Inf was to secure US Army elements, including artillery positions, 1/5 Arty, and engineer work parties of C/168 Engr, in support of construction at the USSF camp at BUNARD (YT2788) until relieved by another unit or the termination of the operation.

(b) The operation was conducted using extensive small unit patrolling in the area of operation. No major contact was made in the area. Many small

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base camps and rice caches were discovered in the area. 1/16 Inf was replaced by 2/16 Inf on 25 Apr 67.

(c) Results.

1. US Losses.

a. Personnel: 1 KHA, 6 WHA.

b. Equipment Damaged: None.

2. Enemy Losses.

a. Personnel: 2 VC KFA (PC), 1 KFA, 5 Detainees.

b. Equipment Destroyed: 17,200 lbs of unpolished rice, 300 lbs of polished rice, 26 huts, 4 bunkers, 9 55-gal drums of rice, 2 bicycles, 20 Chicom grenades, numerous cooking utensils.

c. Combat Efficiency: The Brigade and attached units accomplished each of their missions during the reporting period with an increasing degree of efficiency and professional pride. Operation JUNCTION CITY-2 was the culmination of the reporting period, with the Brigade attaching and detaching units two and three times with a high degree of efficiency. Helicopter assaults, armed helicopters, and tactical air support were employed in all operations with utmost proficiency. The Brigade continued to effectively coordinate the moves of assigned and attached units by Army and Air Force aircraft.

d. Results throughout the Period.

(1) 1st Bde demonstrated its ability to conduct sustained operations in the field. Brigade moved to the field at the start of Operation WILLISTON, 2 Feb 67, and did not return from the field until the termination of JUNCTION CITY, 15 Apr 67.

(2) Although enemy contact during the period was squad size or smaller information obtained from enemy installations provided significant intelligence and yielded a large number of rice caches as well as medical storage areas.

(3) Care must be exercised when preparing to enter an area for an operation. A case in point is the large number of pressure-type mines found along Axes X-RAY and Yoke during Operation TUCSON DELTA, 14-22 Feb 67. The 6 Feb reconnaissance in force by elements of 1/11 ACR on Operation WILLISTON along Axis Yoke may have provided an indication to VC in the area that the route would be used for future operations, hence the large number of mining incidents, which resulted in numerous casualties the first two days of Operation TUCSON DELTA.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE.

a. The major operation of this period, JUNCTION CITY-1, was conducted in the northern TAY NINH Province against COSVN headquarters and the 9th VC Division headquarters. The 70th Security Guard Regt and the 101 NVA Regt were reported in this area and could be immediately employed to cover the withdrawal of the two above mentioned headquarters. Order of battle information on the 70th Guard Regt was relatively scarce. The 101st NVA Regt was estimated below strength with about 10% sick with malaria and other diseases. JUNCTION CITY-2, conducted around QUAN LOI in BINH LONG Province, was primarily a security operation: clearing roads, securing fire support bases, and securing engineer work sites. Only VC local forces were carried by the order of battle in this area.

b. During both phases of Operation JUNCTION CITY, very little contact was made with VC units above squad size and VC units avoided contact whenever possible. A large number of base camps, ranging from squad to battalion size, were uncovered. These camps yielded large numbers of documents, supplies, and equipment. One large rice cache and a large number of smaller rice caches yielded over 150 tons of rice. The documents captured identified administrative and logistical units of COSVN headquarters, 9th VC Div HQ in northern TAY NINH Province. The 70th Guard Regt and the 101 NVA Regt were not located, contacted, or identified. Enemy initiated actions

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consisted primarily of 82mm and 60mm mortar and SA fire on NDP's, AT rounds fired on escort vehicles of convoys, and AT mines placed on the roads during the night.

c. The VC very seldom defended from fortified positions. They primarily used the dense undergrowth to conceal their locations and cover their withdrawals when breaking contact. The VC employed booby traps, usually grenades, around their base camps. Sweeps of roads became a daily operation because of AT mines emplaced each night.

d. The majority of enemy documents, POW's, and equipment were captured by platoon-size units on search and destroy missions in inaccessible terrain, creating problems in expediting the intelligence to higher headquarters. The unit cannot discontinue the search and destroy mission to return the captured intelligence. This problem was partially solved by utilizing command LOH's to extract the captured intelligence to resupply areas. Commanders, however, were reluctant to release their craft for this mission. Once removed one step to the rear, captured intelligence was transported primarily by resupply aircraft. This usually involved diverting a resupply craft. Evacuation of captured intelligence in the Brigade's operational area is dependent upon the availability of aircraft.

4. (C) PERSONNEL.

a. Strength:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
February	4329	4499
March	4329	4631
April	4329	4432

b. Replacements Received.

(1) February: 257; March: 469; April: 266.

(2) Replacements continue to arrive well trained, but needing an area orientation and introduction in combat techniques peculiar to the Ede and Div TAOR. The replacements received in the 1st Ede must complete a five-day course on techniques and procedures mentioned above. This quarter, 837 replacements were trained in the 1st Ede Jungle Devil School. During this reporting period, there has been a drop in the lieutenant, and junior and senior NCO strengths.

c. Discipline: This is no problem; there have been less than two curfew violations per week this quarter.

d. Enemy Personnel Captured and/or Detained.

- (1) POW's: 1.
- (2) Civil Defenders: None.
- (3) Detainees: 28.
- (4) Draft Dodgers: 5.
- (5) Deserters: 1.

e. Burial and Graves Registration: There have been no separate burials for members of the 1st Ede.

f. Civil Assistance.

(1) Under the MEDCAP II program a total of 6361 RVN patients were treated by medical personnel of the 1st Pde. This includes all patients treated at the PHUOC VINH dispensary, Co-D; 1st Med Bn, and unit dispensaries in the PHUOC VINH area. This total figure also reflects those patients treated on MEDCAP's in QUAN LOI, CHON THANH, POA MY, NUOC VANG, VINH HOA, AN LINH IV, BO MUA, and LE TRANG.

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(2) The following relief commodities were distributed during the reporting period: 12,000 lbs of rice, 20,375 lbs of Bulgar wheat, 4,200 lbs of rolled wheat, 117 cases of powdered milk, 178 cases of cooking oil, 36 cases of fresh milk, 400 cans of whole milk, 1150 pairs of shower shoes, 850 school kits, 1275 T-shirts, 1225 shorts, 1200 bars of soap, 3350 balloons, 17 sewing kits, 34 GVN flags, clothes for 600 people, and 200 bags of cement.

(3) 1st Ede S-5 Section.

(a) A total of 13,700 local national day laborers were hired during the reporting period. 13,823 local nationals were hired under Division-approved funds.

(b) 1st Ede participated in TET celebrations hosted by the District Chief and attended by the 5th ARVN Div Commander, the Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Div, and numerous American guests from the PHUOC VINH community. The District Chief gave gifts of rice, Bulgar wheat, cooking oil, toys, and candies, to 618 needy families in the PHUOC VINH community. All items were provided by the Ede S-5 Section.

(c) The Ede S-5 coordinated with the Special Forces A Detachment in MINH THANH reference control of civilian personnel moving and working outside the MINH THANH rubber plantation. Visits were paid to all hamlet chiefs with an appeal to the leaders to control their people and keep them within the confines of the plantation during daylight hours. This was done to minimize casualties resulting from US operations during February and March.

(d) The RF/PF post in the village of NUOC VANG was completed on 20 Mar 67. Supplies were provided by the Brigade S-5 and the 6/27 Arty.

(e) A dispensary is in the process of being built in the village of NUOC VANG. The dispensary is approximately two-thirds complete. Supplies for this dispensary have been provided by the Brigade S-5 and the 6/27 Arty. Dispensary operation will be supervised by the 6/27 surgeon and will be staffed with a trained public health worker.

(4) Psychological Operations.

(a) Psychological operations by the 1st Ede in BINH LONG Province appear to have little or no effect on VC or NVA forces. These elements appear to be well disciplined, thoroughly indoctrinated, and not receptive to the CHIEU HOI appeal. In direct contrast, the Brigade has enjoyed excellent results in PHU GIAO and TAN UYEN Districts of BINH LONG Province. Local force VC units operating in those districts are much more receptive to psychological operations as indicated by the number of CHIEU HOIS credited to psychological operations during the late calendar year of 1966 and in January 1967.

(b) A total of 2,263,000 leaflets were dropped over the Ede TAOH and in forward areas of operation.

(c) On 19 Apr 67, the 1st Ede commenced delivering leaflets into selected target areas, using artillery leaflet shells. These fires are part of the 1/5 Arty ADP. A total of 48 rounds have been fired in the Ede TAOH.

(5) Revolutionary Development Support.

(a) PHU GIAO District, BINH DUONG Province, is not a major priority area as far as revolutionary development is concerned: little or no support is provided to the district for civic action, and little or no voluntary support is received from civilian agencies to include USAID. The Revolutionary Development Program of the PHU GIAO District is jointly sponsored and executed by the 1st Ede and the MACV Advisory Team. It consists of a MEDCAP II program, operation of a Vietnamese dispensary, and the building of a second, the training of Vietnamese nationals as health workers, the employment of over 500 nationals, to include those hired by PA&E, the building and maintenance of schools and churches, improvement of drainage and sanitation conditions, and the improvement of existing road networks. Considering the proximity of over 90% of the district's population to PHUOC VINH, the Revolutionary Development Program now in progress has done much to improve the standards of living of the people and made them loyal to the government of South Vietnam.

(b) 1st Ede, 1st Inf Div, has operated extensively during the calendar year of 1967 in BINH LONG Province. Although not a major priority area as far

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as the Revolutionary Development Program is concerned, the province does possess an excellent program. This program consists of the employment of Revolutionary Development cadre teams, a well organized preventative medicine program, training of national health workers, the operation of a 60-bed hospital, distribution of relief commodities as required, maintenance of routes of communications, and the running of a CHIEUHOI center. 1st Ede has enjoyed considerable success in execution of joint ARVN and US civic action projects. The attitude of the people toward the increased presence of US troops in the area can be best described as most friendly and warm.

g. Morale and Personal Services.

(1) Morale is high in the 1st Ede. Factors responsible for this are:

- (a) Outstanding leadership at all levels.
- (b) USO shows.
- (c) Active Service Club program.
- (d) Outstanding training.
- (e) Outstanding personnel management.

(2) Personal Services: 1st Division Finance Officer has attached a contract NCO in PHUOC VINH. This NCO answers many pay questions and handles most pay complaints, thus eliminating the need for supplemental pay officers.

(3) Problem Area: Lack of lieutenants and junior and senior NCO's.

5. (C) CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS.

- a. Operation WILLISTON: 2-13 February 1967.
- b. Operation TUCSON DELTA: 14-21 February 1967.
- c. Operation JUNCTION CITY.
- (1) Phase I: 22 February to 6 March 1967.
- (2) Phase II: 7 March to 15 April 1967.
- d. Operation HARVEST MOON: 5-30 April 1967.

6. (C) LOGISTICS.

- a. Logistics Situation: Not used.
- b. Supply.

(1) Class I.

- (a) E-rations: authorized-15 days, on hand-30 days.
- (b) C-rations: authorized-5 days in unit basic load and 5 days in Brigade trains, on hand-6 days in Brigade trains.
- (c) During the quarter, the best available rations were on hand in the operational area. This apparently was done to the detriment of the PHUOC VINH base camp. During most of the time the Brigade was in the field, personnel at PHUOC VINH subsisted on a reduced quality of rations.

(2) Class II and IV Items in Short Supply.

- (a) Headsets and handsets for PRC-25 radios.
- (b) Lensatic compasses.
- (c) Antennae for PRC-25.
- (d) Cleaning rods for M-16.

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(e) Sandbags were still in short supply.

(3) Class III.

(a) Mogas stockage objective: 30,000 gals; on hand: 49,283 gals.

(b) Diesel stockage objective: 30,000 gals; on hand: 45,000 gals

(c) JP-4 stockage objective: 50,000 gals; on hand 41,162 gals.

(d) Avgas stockage objective: 10,000 gals; on hand 12,642 gals.

(e) During the last operation in this quarter, stocks of Class III are not adequate to meet all demands at forward locations. Further requirements place stocks of Class III at a forward location seemed beyond the capabilities of support elements to handle. The product in most cases was available, however, pumping equipment, hoses, connectors, and trained operators were not available. As a result, the Brigade S-4 Section, which is not staffed for such an operation, was forced to personally load, off load and pump large quantities of Class III at the forward location. Recommend that all requirements to maintain POL points in the forward area be thoroughly staffed to determine if the S&T Bn can provide all support necessary. If it is impossible for the S&T Bn to do this, then support from an outside agency should be requested.

(f) PHUOC VINH is still faced with the problem of double handling of POL in 55-gal drums. Most problems in this area could be reduced if the drums were palletized at the loading point, or delivered in 500-gal bladders.

(4) Class V: Colored smoke and trip flares were short during the quarter.

c. Local Procurement: 1000 loaves of French bread are purchased daily for distribution to units at PHUOC VINH.

d. Evacuation: Support rendered by the medical units during the quarter was excellent. Three problems in this field are still prevalent.

(1) Initial requests for dustoff often claimed to have a priority of urgent, although in many cases the nature of the wound was minor. Medically trained personnel, if available, should be the ones to determine the priority of a dustoff request.

(2) Slick aircraft often beat a dustoff aircraft to the scene of a pick-up. In most cases, the dustoff is never more than 10 minutes behind and the results of a wounded man being moved by untrained personnel and being deprived of the emergency medical treatment available aboard dustoff aircraft could be fatal.

(3) Weapons, web gear, and personal equipment should be left with parent unit and not accompany the casualty being evacuated. This equipment sometimes becomes lost despite the effort of the medical companies to return it to the proper unit.

c. Transportation.

(1) Routes 1A, 2A, 7E, and 13 were used as the MSP for the 1st Rde.

(2) Supplies transported during the quarter totaled 9706 tons in all classes of supply.

d. Miscellaneous: The QM shower/laundry point personnel at PHUOC VINH have morale problems during the quarter. Supervisors from their parent unit, 266th Supply and Service Battalion, visit too infrequently. As a result, they have no one to turn to for mail, promotions, and other such administrative matters. Maintenance of the obsolete equipment at this location is left to the ingenuity of the NCOIC of the 483d Field Service Laundry Detachment. It is only through the aid of D Co, 701st Maint Bn, that the laundry detachment is capable of keeping the equipment operating for adequate laundry service. It is recommended that if the 266th Supply and Service Battalion, which has ignored previous correspondence and inquiries, cannot exercise its responsibility, that this detachment be attached to the S&T Bn, 1st Inf Div, for

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all matters, to include promotions.

7. (C) DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Contact teams from Division Finance and Division PSD are beneficial for close and continued liaison with units in field locations. These teams must remain at the field locations more than one day to be of value.

b. USO shows are a definite morale booster. The show does not have to be comprised of well known stars, but the entertainers must want to be with the troops. The one experience where the female entertainers voluntarily visited the troops in the field provided a definite uplift in troop morale. More USO shows are needed for the troops.

c. Service Clubs definitely enhance troop morale, offering a place for troops to get away from the military routine. The Service Club in PHUOC VINH now offers Vietnamese and karate lessons. Over 800 troops have visited the Service Club this past quarter.

d. Reenlistment in the 1st Lde has been the best in the 1st Division for the months of February, March, and April. This is due to active support at all levels of command.

e. Training in the Jungle Devil School instills confidence in the replacement and enables him to be a "veteran" when he formally joins his unit in the field.

f. Personnel management at unit level is improving daily. The primary goal is to alleviate as many problems for the troops as possible. This enables soldiers to perform at maximum potential at all times.

g. The operational efficiency of small units is affected by a lack of junior officers and NCO's. This reporting period has illustrated a serious drop in lieutenant and non-commissioned officer replacement.

h. Lessons Learned.

(1) The use of a finance NCO attached to Brigade HQ provides more personal service to the men. Moreover, he must be attached for rations and quarters. This enables him to have a base of operations from which he can move to the units in their field locations.

(2) Units conducting operations near a boundary or adjacent to another unit must try to maintain a 1000-meter zone around their operational area to facilitate the immediate employment of artillery and close air support in the event of enemy contact. It was learned on Operation JUNCTION CITY-1 that when units were too close together, the response time for artillery and close air support was lengthened because of the longer time period necessary to identify and locate friendly units in or adjacent to the target area.

(3) The employment of the 4.2" mortar greatly reduced the problem of minimum range artillery limitations on Operations JUNCTION CITY-1 and -2, and permitted great flexibility between mutually supporting fire support bases.

(4) To accomplish rapid, yet effective, minesweeping of the road on a road clearing operation, minesweeping teams should start at as many points along the road as permitted by route security. This could best be accomplished by lifting elements and minesweeping teams by helicopter, provided such transportation is available.

(5) During Operation JUNCTION CITY-2, patrolling along routes to be cleared often times proved more effective than outposting. However, due to the resources available, experience on JUNCTION CITY indicated that the 1st Lde could best achieve its mission by a combination of patrolling and outposting. Moreover, thunder runs at night along routes secured during the day aided in effectively reducing mines emplaced during the night along the route.

(6) Clearing of jungle from both sides of a route which has been secured is essential for the detection of newly emplaced mines. Experience on Operations TIGER and JUNCTION CITY indicates that jungle clearing should continue as long as the road is open and the area secured. Jungle clearing must be preplanned and integrated into the security plan for the route to be opened.

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(7) Areas previously occupied by US combat vehicles are likely to be heavily mined. During Operation TUCSON DELTA, numerous mines were located in the vicinity of Arty Base III (XT6658). Such areas should be thoroughly swept by mine detector teams and should be completely traversed by tanks prior to being traversed by other vehicles. In addition, several casualties (arty personnel) were sustained as a result of personnel gathering together too close to the vehicles moving through the area. A mine detonated by a passing tank injured five arty officers standing in a group nearby. The particular mine was the third or fourth that exploded within the immediate area during a one-hour period.

(8) Small groups of vehicles travelling without an armored escort invites an ambush.

(9) Repeated use of an entrance or exit to a main road invites mining of the area. If the main road must be paralleled due to damage or other causes, the bypass must be mineswept.

(10) The technique of moving arty fire units secured by armor and infantry to a forward firing position for the purpose of striking areas beyond the normal artillery fan has been very effective.

(11) A sheep's-foot roller mounted in front of a VTR was employed during the April convoy resupply and road security operation to detonate mines placed in the road. This principle is sound and should result in an effective means of locating mines. No mines were detected in the road area covered by the sheep's-foot roller during the April operation.

(12) If troop resources for route clearing and security operations are limited, a satisfactory method for added security is the use of artillery down both sides of the route being secured. Constantly shifting artillery fire 1000 meters on either side of the road moving just ahead of the resupply convoy proved very effective in reducing VC initiated convoy harassing actions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

William S. Tucker
WILLIAM S. TUCKERMAN
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO U.S. FORCES 96345

AVDB-AMT

6 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CGG FO-25 (RI)(U)

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO U.S. Forces 96345

1. (C) Part I. INTRODUCTION:

a. Background: During the preceding period 1 February 67 - 30 April 67, 2d Brigade participated in one division size operation, six brigade operations and five battalion operations. The Division operation in which the Brigade was committed was Opn JUNCTION CITY II (21 March 67 - 14 April 67). All six Brigade operations were part of Opn LAM SON II and Opn LAM SON 67. The Battalion operations controlled by the 2d Bde were Opn UNIONTOWN, NORTH FLAT and three LAM SON 67 operations: Search and seal operations at VINH TRUONG (XT868175) on 4 Mar 67, HOA NHUT (XT883176) on 5 Mar 67 and at Old BUNG DIA (XT805215) on 27 Apr 67. The reporting period began with 2d Bde participating in LAM SON and UNIONTOWN. Opn LAM SON II terminated on 8 Feb 67. From 8 Feb 67 and through part of March the Brigade continued LAM SON 67, LAUREL, SUITLAND, and CUMBERLAND. On 17 Mar 67, 2d Bde terminated participation in LAM SON 67 (the 3d Bde assumed the responsibility) and prepared for Opn JUNCTION CITY II. The 2d Bde moved by road from DI AN to QUAN LOI (XT821903) on 18 Mar 67 and moved from QUAN LOI to FSB CHARLIE (XT568851) by CH-47 on 20 Mar 67. Opn JUNCTION CITY II was initiated by the 2d Bde on 21 Mar 67 and was terminated on 14 Apr 67. On 17 Apr 67, the 2d Bde assumed Opn LAM SON 67 from 3d Bde. The 2d Bde continues Opn LAM SON 67. During the reporting period, at varying times, the following battalions participated in 2d Bde operations: 2-16 Inf, 1-18 Inf, 2-18 Inf, 1-26 Inf, 2-2 Inf, 1-2 Inf, 1-16 Inf, 1-28 Inf. The 1-7 Artillery was in direct support of the Brigade throughout the reporting period.

b. Brigade Organization: (Units and Commanding Officers)

(1) 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division:

(a) Col James A. Grimsley: 1 Feb - 1 Apr 67

(b) LTC Alexander M. Haig: 1 Apr - 30 Apr 67

(2) 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry:

(a) LTC Bruce E. Wallace: 1 Feb - 9 Mar 67

(b) LTC Joseph R. Ulatoski: 9 Mar - 30 Apr 67

(3) 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry:

(a) LTC Earle L. Denton: 1 Feb - 29 Mar 67

(b) LTC Richard E. Cavazos: 30 Mar - 30 Apr 67

(4) 2d Battalion, 18 Infantry:

(a) LTC Lewis R. Baumann: 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

(5) 1st Battalion, 7 Artillery:

(a) LTC George L. McFadden, Jr.: 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

(6) Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade:

(a) Cpt Sherwood D. Goldberg: 1 Feb - 15 Apr 67

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(b) Cpt Gerald E. Tilleux: 16 Apr - 30 Apr 67

(7) Co B, 1st Engineer Battalion:

(a) Cpt Robert C. Lee: 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

(8) Co C, 1st Medical Battalion:

(a) Cpt Shelton R. Baker: 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

(9) Co B, 701st Maintenance:

(a) Cpt Andrew J. Seremeth: 1 Feb - 9 Apr 67

(c) Cpt Michael F. Gander: 10 Apr - 30 Apr 67

2. (C) Part II Tactical Operations:

a. During the reporting period the Brigade participated in one Division operation, JUNCTION CITY II; the LAM SON II and LAM SON 67 operations: Brigade-size operations included LAUREL, SUITLAND, CUELAND and seal and search operations with population control activities at BINH TRI (XT920090) 22-23 Apr 67 and at DONG HOA (XT947045) 25-26 Apr 67: Battalion-sized operations included Opn NORTH FLAT and search and seal operations at VINH TRUONG (XT868175) on 4 Mar 67, HOA NHUT (XT883176) on 5 Mar 67 and Old BUNG DIA (XT805215) on 27 Apr 67; and Opn UNIONTOWN.

b. Chronology of Tactical Operations:

(1) Operation LAM SON II 1-8 Feb 67

Continuing Opn LAM SON II, the 2d Bde in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector, 18th ARVN Division and BIEN HOA Sector, Capital Military District and GIA DINH Sector, conducted tactical operations in designated areas to locate and destroy VC/NVA main force units, guerrilla units, and VC infrastructure, continued, by constant application of combat fire power, to cause individual members of these VC organizations to rally to GVN control in order to stimulate further Revolutionary Development Activities in these areas. Operation LAM SON II continued placing emphasis on strengthening local defenses insuring a secure environment and extending development projects. At the beginning of the reporting period, 1-18 Inf, 2-18 Inf, 2-2 Mech with B 2-34 Armor attached and an Engr TF were conducting LAM SON II operations under Brigade control. Operation LAM SON II terminated on 8 Feb 1967.

(2) LAM SON 67 8 Feb - 17 Mar 67.

Opn LAM SON 67 was a continuation of Opn LAM SON II. Opn LAM SON 67 began on 8 Feb 67 with 1-28 Inf, 2-18 Inf, 2-2 Mech with B 2-34 Armor attached, and an Engr TF conducting LAM SON 67 operations under 2d Brigade control. From 8 Feb 67 to 17 Mar 67, elements of the Brigade: conducted search and destroy operations, seal and search operations, platoon & squad size ambushes and saturation patrolling; provided security at Rock Quarry; secured and cleared roads and forward support areas, provided security for designated village chief; conducted revolutionary development projects; civic action programs, population control activities and ground and air Psy Ops operations; and directed airstrikes and conducted artillery concentrations on VC base camps, supply areas, suspected VC locations and ADP Targets. All operations were accomplished in close cooperation and coordination with elements of 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector, 18th ARVN Division and BIEN HOA Sector and Capital Military District and GIA DINH Sector respectively.

(3) Operation UNIONTOWN

The Brigade continued Opn UNIONTOWN (which began on 28 Jan 67) employing 2-28 Inf to secure and defend the BIEN HOA Air Base, LONG BINH Post and the NUI CHUA CHANH Relay Site (YT602100). The operation consisted of extensive patrolling, the establishment of LP's and OP's and the conduct of ambushes and "Eagle Flights". This operation involved detailed coordination with the following agencies: G-3, II FFV, the LONG BINH Post Operations

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Center, Co and FSC in the DONG NAI Sensitive Area and the 53rd Signal Bn. On 8 Feb 67, the 2-28 Inf terminated its participation in Opn UNICONTOWN (which was assumed by 2-60 Inf, 9th Div) and was airlifted from BIEN HOA to LAI KHE reverting to 3d Bde control.

(4) Operation LAUREL (Opn LAM SON 67)

The mission of Operation LAUREL (as part of Opn LAM SON 67) was to seal and search the village of TAN PHOUK KHANH (XT884167) and HOA NHUT (XT882177) and to position battalions for future LAM SON 67. The operation was conducted in two phases. Phase I: On 16 Feb 67, 1-18 Inf marched at night to a phase line at 162000H Feb 67 and effected seal of assigned sector. At the same time, 2-16 Inf assembled in wooded area south of TAN PHOUK KHANH, marched at night to a phase line at 162030H Feb 67 and effected seal of assigned sector. TAN PHOUK KHANH and HOA NHUT were successfully sealed at 162311H Feb 67. Phase II commenced at first light on 17 Feb 67 when RDTF with search forces from 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector entered and deployed in the two villages. The 1-18 Inf and 2-16 Inf maintained the seal throughout the day while RDTF with element from 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector searched the village, assembled and screened all males, ages 15-45 years, and interrogated the detainees. A total of 499 males, aged 15-45, were screened and 297 were evacuated to National Police BINH DUONG HQ, for further interrogation. The seal was lifted at 171200H Feb 67, thus terminating the operation.

(5) Operation SUITLAND (Opn LAM SON 67)

In Operation SUITLAND the 2d Bde: in conjunction with RDTF and forces from 18th ARVN Division, BIEN HOA and DONG NAI Sensitive Zone conducted a seal and search operation with population control activities at TAN HIEP (XT921098); conducted combat recon patrols in sector, conducted search and destroy operations in eastern portion of the CO LIT Jungle (XT9112); and conducted jungle clearing operations in the woods west of TAN HIEP. The operation was conducted in two phases. Phase I had 2-16 Inf assembled in field locations vic XT8910 and moved by foot to seal in sector the west of TAN HIEP. The 52d ARVN Ranger Bn moved by foot from assembly area, XT9208 to seal in sector the east of TAN HIEP. 2-16 Inf in conjunction with 52d ARVN Ranger Bn cordoned TAN HIEP by 1910. 2-16 Inf maintained the seal throughout the night. The Recon Plat 2-16 under Bde control, conducted Eagle Flights, vic TAN HIEP from 191600H Feb 67 to 0324H. Phase II: The Seal remained in place on 20 Feb 67 while RDTF with Search Forces from BINH HOA Sector conducted an extensive search from south to north. The search forces entered and deployed at 200845H Feb 67, searched the village, assembled and screened all males, ages 15 to 45 years, and interrogated the detainees. A total of 121 males, ages 15-45 years, were screened and 18 were evacuated to National Police HQ for further interrogation. The search was terminated at 1330H. The seal was broken at 1345H. 2-16 Inf conducted combat recon patrols in sector and provided security for platoon for jungle clearing operation in AO BROWN. The operation was terminated at 201606H Feb 67.

(6) Seal and Search at VINH TRUONG (Opn LAM SON 67): 2d Bde in conjunction with RDTF and elements of BINH DUONG Sector conducted a seal and search operation at VINH TRUONG, vic XT886172. 2-16 Inf completely sealed VINH TRUONG by 040300H Mar 67 and RDTF with Search Forces from BINH DUONG Sector entered and deployed in the village at 040715H Mar 67. The 2-16 Inf maintained the seal while RDTF with elements from 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector searched the village, assembled and screened all males, ages 15-45 years, and interrogated the detainees. A total of 59 males, ages 14-45, were screened and 28 were evacuated to National Police HQ, BINH DUONG for further interrogation. The search terminated at 041000H Mar 67. The seal was broken at 041155H thus terminating the operation.

(7) Seal and Search of HOA NHUT (Opn LAM SON 67): 2d Bde in conjunction with RDTF and elements of 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector conducted a seal and search operation at HOA NHUT, vic XT885176. 2-16 Inf completely sealed HOA NHUT by 050400H Mar 67. RDTF with Search Forces from 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector entered and deployed in HOA NHUT at 050730H Mar 67. The 2-16 Inf maintained the seal while RDTF with elements from 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector searched the hamlet, assembled and screened all males, ages 15-45 years, and interrogated the detainees. A total of 175 males, 15-45 years,

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were screened and 88 detainees were evacuated to National Police HQ for further interrogation. The search was terminated at 051000H Mar 67. Co C 2-16 Inf conducted a sweep, researching the hamlet from 051010H Mar to 051130H Mar 67. The seal was broken at 051145H Mar 67 thus terminating the operation.

(8) Operation CUMBERLAND (LAM SON 67)

In Opn CUMBERLAND, the 2d Bde working in close coordination with 18th ARVN Division, BIEN HOA Sector and DONG NAI Sensitive Area conducted a seal and search operation with population control activities of TAN HIEP (XT924100) and BINH TRI (XT925090) and a systematic three-day search and destroy operations in eastern CO MI Jungle to deny area permanently for local guerrilla forces. The operation was conducted in three phases. In Phase I, 2-16 Inf conducted airmobile assaults into multiple LZ's NE of TAN HIEP/BINH TRI and sealed the east portion of TAN HIEP/BINH TRI. Concurrently, GVN Forces (58th RF Bn (-) and 35th ARVN Ranger Bn) moved to assembly areas vic DI AN and from there by truck and by foot to seal the west portion of TAN HIEP/BINH TRI. TAN HIEP/BINH TRI was sealed at 071830H and cordon was maintained throughout the night. D 1-4 Cav screened N & NW portion of the objective area between 071830H-071930H. Phase II: 2-16 Inf in conjunction with GVN Forces maintained the seal while RDTF with elements from BIEN HOA Sector and DONG NAI Sensitive Zone searched the village, conducted population control activities, assembled and screened all males (ages 15-45 years), and interrogated detainees. A total of 99 males, ages 15-45 years, were screened and 14 were evacuated to National Police HQ for further interrogation. The population control activities were terminated at 071430H Mar 67. At 071500H Mar 67, RDTF with elements of BIEN HOA and DONG NAI Sensitive Zone terminated their search. At 071500H Mar 67, the 2-16 Inf broke the seal and re-searched the hamlets and afterwards moved to position south of a phase line. During the search of TAN HIEP/BINH TRI, Tm BRAVO (B 1-4 Cav (-) and Plat C 5-2 Arty) and Tm CHARLIE (C 5-2 Arty (-) and Plat B 1-4 Cav (-)) screened along Route ORANGE and Route 313 in zone. Phase III: On 09 Mar 1967, 2-16 Inf commenced search and destroy operations in assigned zones of CO MI Jungle (East) until 11 Mar 67 after closing at PHU LOI. Tm BRAVO and Tm CHARLIE continued to screen Route ORANGE and road north of CO MI Jungle respectively until 11 Mar 67. Operation CUMBERLAND terminated at 111646H Mar 67.

(9) Operation NORTH FLAT (Opn LAM SON 67)

In Opn NORTH FLAT, the 2d Bde working in close coordination with 5th ARVN Division, BINH DUONG Sector, BIEN HOA Sector and DONG NAI Sensitive Zone conducted a seal and search of BINH CHANH (XT887142) and a seal and search operation with Hamlet Festival at TAN BA (XT953136). The operation was conducted in two phases. The 2-16 Inf at 121600H moved by wheel vehicles along Route GREEN to a release point and from there by foot and sealed BINH CHANH by 121823H Mar 67. 2-16 Inf maintained the cordon while RDTF (-) with elements from BINH DUONG Sector entered and deployed at 121630H Mar, searched the hamlet, assembled and screened all males, ages 15 to 45 years, and interrogated the detainees. A total of 94 males, 15-45 years, were screened, 40 of which were evacuated to National Police HQ for further interrogation. The search was terminated at 121730H Mar 67 and the seal was released at 121750H Mar 67. Phase II: At 1810H Mar 67, 2-16 Inf (-) moved by foot and sealed the west portion of TAN BA. GVN Forces (58th ARVN Bn, 57th ARVN Bn (-), Company 502 PF, and 2 Boat Patrol from DONG NAI S-2) moved by motor vehicle to a phase line and then by foot to seal the east portion of TAN BA. TAN BA was sealed by 122010H Mar 67 and the cordon was maintained throughout the hours of darkness. The cordon remained in place on 13 Mar 67 while RDTF with Search Forces from BIEN HOA Sector entered the hamlet and deployed at 130200H Mar 67, conducted an intensive search, assembled and screened all males, ages 15-45 years, and interrogated the detainees. A total of 267 males, 15-45 years, were screened with 15 detainees being evacuated to National Police HQ for further interrogation. The search was terminated at 131200H Mar 67. The seal was broken at 131230H Mar 67 and the operation terminated at 131402H when the 2-16 Inf closed PHU LOI.

(10) Operation JUNCTION CITY II

2d Bde initiated Opn JUNCTION CITY II at 210800H Mar 67 and the operation was terminated at 141344H Apr 67. This operation proved to be by far the most singularly productive operation in which the Brigade participated during the reporting period. The 2d Bde's participation in the operation was

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characterized by rapid movement and precise planning and massive and accurate fire control of both air and artillery. Opn JUNCTION CITY II missioned the 2d Brigade to conduct brigade airmobile assaults into eastern War Zone C commencing on 21 Mar 67; to conduct search and destroy operations, to find, fix, and destroy COSVN/VC/NVA forces and installations in AO DAGGER; and concurrently to conduct ground assault along Axis FANZER; to secure FSB CHARLIE on order and conduct search and destroy operations Obj FAUST area; to secure FSD THRUST on 29 Mar 67; to conduct airmobile assaults into Obj SIOUX area on 30 and 31 Mar 67; to continue search and destroy operations in AO DAGGER; to continue to secure FSB THRUST and CHARLIE and on order open and outpost Route YELLOW between bases during daylight hours; and to continue conducting search and destroy operations in AO DAGGER until termination of the Operation. Opn JUNCTION CITY II was conducted in three phases. Phase I (21 - 28 Mar 67): 2-18 Inf conducted airmobile combat assault into LZ BRAVO at 211115H Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in western Objective FAUST area and seized Obj 1, 2, 3, and 5; continued south to Route 246, 2-16 Inf conducted airmobile combat assault onto LZ CHARLIE at 211443H Mar 67, conducted search and destroy operations in eastern Objective FAUST area and seized Obj 2, 4 and 6; continued operations south to Route 246. 1-26 Inf remained at FSD CHARLIE as Bde RRF, secured the east portion of FSD CHARLIE (secured entire perimeter on 29 Mar 67) cleared and outposted Route 246, conducted road clearing operations between check points, and conducted search and destroy operations and ambush patrols in AO. 36th ARVN Rgr Bn secured west portion of FSD CHARLIE until 27 Mar 67 and conducted search & destroy operations in assigned AO. 2-11 ACR conducted ground assaults along Axis FANZER and Axis 88, secured Obj THRUST and FARRY and the fire support bases of these objectives, and conducted search and destroy operations in AO. Phase II (28 - 29 Mar 67): 2-16 Inf continued search and destroy operations in eastern Obj FAUST area through 280750H Mar 67; moved to secure pick-up point vic XT540243; moved by truck to FSD BRAVO at 201144H Mar 67, relieved 1-18 Inf in place and was attached 1st Brigade 281300H Mar 67. 1-18 Inf (attached after relief by 2-16 Inf) moved Bn (-) to field pens vic XT537846 closing at 281530H Mar 67 and moved Co C into FSD CHARLIE at 281520H Mar 67; assumed OFCON G Trp, 2-11 Cav at Obj THRUST at 290700H Mar 67; inserted company by air into Obj THRUST at 290732 and opened and outposted Route YELLOW in sector until passage of last convoy on 29 Mar 67; and coordinated security of FSD THRUST. 2-18 Inf continued search and destroy operations in western Obj FAUST area. 1-26 Inf continued search and destroy operations vic FSD CHARLIE; opened and outposted Route YELLOW in sector on 28 Mar until relief of 1-18 Inf by 2-16 Inf had been completed and on 29 Mar until passage of last convoy; and assumed OFCON of C 5-2 Arty for road security missions. 1-2 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vic FSD CHARLIE. Phase III (30 Mar - 13 Apr 67): 1-18 Inf (+) (G Trp, 2-11 Cav OFCON) daily outposted Route YELLOW in sector and coordinated security of FSD THRUST. At 021700H Bn was attached 1st Bde and security of FSD THRUST was also assumed by 1st Bde at that time; was returned back to control of 2d Bde at 051200H Apr 67; secured FSD BRAVO; secured and outposted Route 246 in zone and conducted combat recon patrols; conducted search and destroy operations N of FSD CHARLIE; was airlifted from FSD CHARLIE and attached 1st Bde 130835H Apr 67. 2-18 Inf continued search and destroy operations in western Obj FAUST area; at 301505H Mar 67 was airlifted to FSD CHARLIE closing at 301611H Mar 67 and assumed responsibility of the east portion of FSD CHARLIE, coordinated security of FSD CHARLIE; cleared and outposted Route YELLOW in sector (commencing on 31 Mar 67) with C 5-2 Arty; and was attached to 1st Bde at 01136H Apr 67; reverted back to 2d Bde control at 061155H Apr 67; secured FSD CHARLIE; secured and outposted Route 246 in zone; conducted recon patrols of FSD CHARLIE; 1-26 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into LZ GEORGE at 301331H Mar 67 in Obj SIOUX; secured LZ until arrival of 1-2 Inf on 31 Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in eastern Obj SIOUX area, seizing Obj 11, 13, and 15; and conducted S & D ops S and SE of Obj SIOUX; and at 021140H was airlifted from LZ GEORGE and upon closure QUAN LOI reverted 1st Bde control. 1-2 Inf cleared and outposted Route YELLOW in sector; was airlifted from FSD CHARLIE at 310906H Mar closing LZ GEORGE at 311005H Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in western Obj SIOUX area seizing Obj 12, 14 and 16; conducted search and operations south and east of NDFs (XT441857, XT442629, XT462810, XT449819); and was airlifted to FSD BRAVO on 7 Apr 67 and attached 3d Brigade. 1-16 Inf was airlifted from PHOU VINH to LZ GEORGE and became OFCON to 2d Bde upon closure at 311733H Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in zone vic XT4385, NE, NW of NDF (XT441857), NNW of NDF (XT441857); and was airlifted from LZ GEORGE at 041055H and attached 1st Bde upon closure at QUAN LOI. 2-16 Inf reverted back to 2d Bde control at 021110H Apr 67 and

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at 021130H Apr 67 airlifted from FSB BRAVO to LZ GEORGE closing at 021457H Apr 67; conducted search and destroy operations NE & E of LZ GEORGE, SW of NDP (XT428847), NW and SE of NDP (XT430805) and at vic 12 (XT406824), 14 (XT419817), 16 (XT414810); was airlifted from NDP (XT430805) commencing 070930H Apr 67, closing FSB BRAVO at 071115H Apr 67 relieving 1-28 Inf in place; secured FSB BRAVO; cleared and outposted Route 246 in zone; and conducted combat recon patrols and positioned night ambushes; became OICON to 1st Bde at 131720H Apr 67. 1-28 Inf was attached 2d Bde at 071015H Mar 67 and airlifted from FSB BRAVO to FSB THRUST; conducted search and destroy operations N of NDP (XT551768), NE and SW of NDP (XT548787, SE of NDP toward XT55178; and was airlifted commencing 130920H Mar 67 and reverted 1st Bde control upon closure at FHOUC VINH. D 1-4 Cav was placed OICON 2d Bde 070900H Apr 67, screened area N of FSD CHARLIE; and conducted aerial recons N and W of FSB CHARLIE. 1-7 Arty (+) remained in DS of 2d Bde throughout all three phases of the operation firing disruptive fires, targets of opportunity, preparations and defensive concentrations. On 13 Apr 67 the Brigade CF moved by road from FSD CHARLIE and closed QUAN LOI at 131513H Apr 67; and then moved by road to DI AN base camp, closing at 141344H Apr 67 thus terminating JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf and 2-18 Inf were airlifted from FSB BRAVO and QUAN LOI respectively to DI AN and both stood down for maintenance. The 1-18 Inf remain attached to 1st Bde on 14 Apr 67. The most significant contact during the Operation occurred at 010512H Apr 67. 1-26 Inf and 1-16 Inf collocated at LZ GEORGE (XT428847) came under a heavy mortar attack (est 1200 rds) followed by a ground attack from the N and NE: the attack was initiated by the entire 271 Regiment and together with elements of the 70th Guard Regiment was extremely well coordinated. Contact was maintained until 0807H. Extensive air and artillery were called into the area. Sporadic contact was made throughout the day. Results for the day at LZ GEORGE were 576 VC KIA (DC). On 1 Apr 67 at 0513H in coordination with the ground and mortar attack on LZ GEORGE 2d Bde Fwd CP at FSD CHARLIE came under intensive mortar attack. Approximately 250 rds of assorted caliber were received from the north. Counter-mortar fire was initiated immediately and a LFT, flareship, and FAC were airborne. Attack had ceased by 0615H. During the attack the Brigade Commander, Col Grimsley was wounded and evacuated to the rear area. Gen Hollingsworth, Ass't Division Commander assumed Command of the Brigade. At 011000H Apr 67 LTC Haig CO 1-26 Inf assumed Command of the 2d Brigade. The results of Opn JUNCTION CITY II were as follows: 796 KIA (DC), 5 FMs, 8 CHICOM LMGs, 1 hvy MG, 4 DARRs, 30-ANL47s, 1 Russian assault rifle, 9 CHICOM carbines, 2-60mm mortars, 2 rifles, 4-M79s, 1-.45 cal pistol, 10-RFGs, 33-81mm mortar rds, 56-60mm mortar rds, 8-75 RR rds, 5-57 RR rds, 22 AT mines, 1 CHICOM mine, 6 AF mines, 3 plastic mines, 3 U.S. grenades, 6 CHICOM grenades, 26 rifle grenades, 3,000 hand grenades w/o fuzes, 910 rds SA ammo, 7-claymores, 12 CBU's, 2-105mm rds (duds), 3 booby trapped CHICOM grenades, 1 booby trapped 81mm rd, 1 booby trapped 82mm rd, 3 cases TNT, 5 cases C-4, 10 lbs black powder, 933 bunkers, 166 mortar pens, 24 tunnels, 78 foxholes, 9 bomb shelter, 5 underground rooms, 2 classrooms, 2 mess halls, 13.7 tons rice, 50 lbs sugar, 17 gals cooking oil, 5 gals alcohol, 5 cans milk, 6 cans "C" rations, 75 lbs poppy seed, 1 pig, 12 chickens, 31 ponchos, 8 uniforms, 2 packs, 3 VC helmets, 14 hammocks, 2 pistol belts, 3 canteens, 1 crnteen cup w/cover, 7 ruck sacks, 8 sweat shirts, 5 pr black pajamas, 8 pr civilian clothes, 1 VC gas mask, 1 AM radio, 1 saw, 2 shovels, 2 typewriters, 1500' elec wire, 13 cooking pots, 21 bicycles, 1 printing press, 1 barber kit, 702 packs, cigarettes, 3 doz "I" beams, 3 oxcarts, 331 empty ammo boxes, miscellaneous documents and medicines.

(11) Operation LAM SON 67

On 17 Apr 67, 2d Bde assumed Operation LAM SON 67 from the 3d Bde. The Bde oriented upon Viet Cong local forces in the Brigade TAOR, supported GVN Revolutionary Development within TAOR in coordination with appropriate GVN, ARVN, FVMAF and U.S. organizations, trained assigned and attached personnel in the theory and practice of revolutionary development, and furnished forces to other Brigades as required. From 17 Apr 67 to the end of the reporting period, LAM SON 67 operations consisted of cordon and search operations, search and destroy operations, harassment, jungle clearing, population control activities, civic action/psychological warfare operations directed against priority targets as developed from current intelligence, saturation patrolling, and platoon and squad size ambushes. All operations stressed maximum use and integration of GVN forces. Opn LAM SON 67 continued to improve the secure environment in the vital central BINH DUONG Province between the SAIGON and DONG NAI Rivers. On 17 April 67, 2-18 Inf became attached to 2d Bde at 0700H (continuing Opn LAM SON 67) and was airlifted

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from THU LOI to LAI KHE at 180900H to become attached to 3d Bde on closure. On 20 Apr 67 at 0735H 2-16 Inf was airlifted from THU LOI to LAI KHE and was attached to 3d Bde upon closure. Beginning on 17 Apr 67 and during the remainder of the month, the 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. Elements of the 2d Bde conducted S&D and jungle clearing operations in the LAM SON 67 AO, secured engineer efforts at bridge site (XT909159) and laterite pit (XT909169), provided security for village chief at TAN PHOUK KHAMNH, conducted road clearing and jungle clearing operations along Route CRANGE, directed airstrikes and conducted artillery on VC base camps, supply areas, suspected VC locations and as ADF tgts, conducted VRs and "Eagle Flights" throughout LAM SON 67 AO, and conducted platoon size sweeps, saturation patrols, and platoon size and squad size ambushes. The 2d Bde in conjunction with elements of 5th Division ARVN, 16th Division ARVN and forces from DIEN HOA and BINH DUONG conducted seal and search operations with population control activities at BINH TRI, vic XT924097, on 23 Apr 67 and at DONG HOA, vic XT950045 on 26 Apr 67. Also, a seal and search operation was conducted at OLD DUNG DIA, vic XT905215, by 2d Bde in conjunction with elements from BINH DUONG. Results from Operation LAM SON 67 from 17 Apr to 30 Apr 67 were as follows: 14 KIA (VC), 3 Fws, 12 DEs, 153 detainees, 1-60mm mortar, 6-60mm mortar rds, 10 grenades, 100' claymore wire, 2 VC helmet liners, 1 gas mask, 1 bicycle, 1 AT mine, 1 AP mine, 1 pressure mine, 41 bunkers, 23 tunnels, 8 underground rooms, 4 mortar rds (unknown type), 3-8" rds, 4-4.2" rds, 3 huts, 1 case 7.62 linked ammo, 1-105mm rd, 4-155mm rds, 15 foxholes, 1-AN/FRC-10, 1 U.S. field pack, 1-175mm rd, 1 mine rigged for command detonation, 4 claymores, 5 rds 30 cal ammo, 7-4 1/2 volt batteries, 1 trench, 2 pr black pajamas, 8 base camps, 3 CHICOM grenades, 6 RPG rds, 6-M79 rds, 6 booby trapped hand grenades (US), 3-105mm rds (HE), 1-155mm rd (WF), 106 fighting pns, 3 VC gas masks, 1 runji pit, 1 pr binoculars, 1 typewriter, M-16 mag, 1 carbine mag, 110 lbs salt, 25 lbs tobacco, 15 cooking pots, 15 sets chopsticks, 6 rolls WD-1 wire, 1 gas stove, 4 1/2 gal cooking oil, 3 gals kerosene, dishes, 3 pr sandals, clothing, 1 AK47 rifle, 1 U.S. carbine, 1 French carbine, 250 lb bomb, 2-20mm rds, 250 lbs polished rice, 1 rifle grenade, 3-81mm rds, 3 booby trapped CHICOM grenades, 1 diary, 4 ponchos, 1 pk leaflets, 1-55 gal drum, 1-5 gal can, miscellaneous documents.

c. Results of operations during the period of this report.

865 KIA (VC), 12 DEs, 15 Fws, 392 detainees, 1 M60 MG, 1 heavy MG, 4 BAR, 3 AK47s, 1 Russian assault rifle, 4 rifles, 1-45 cal pistol, 10 RPGs, 3 US grenades, 26 rifle grenades, 5 360 rds SA ammo, 12 CBUs, 3 cases TNT, 5 cases C-4, 10 lbs black powder, 31.3 tons rice, 100 lbs sugar, 43.5 gals cooking oil, 5 gals alcohol, 5 cans milk, 6 cans "C" rations, 75 lbs poppy seed, 1 pig, 12 chickens, 1 mimeograph machine, 35 ponchos, 8 uniforms, 3 VC helmets, 14 hammocks, 2 pistol belts, 3 canteens, 1 canteen-cup w/cover, 7 ruck sacks, 8 sweat shirts, 7 pr black pajamas, 8 pr civilian clothes, 5 gas masks, 1 AM radio, 1 saw, 2 shovels, 2 typewriters, 1500' elec wire, 28 cooking pots, 1 motorcycle, 38 bicycles, 1 printing press, 1 barber kit, 702 packs cigarettes, assorted food stuffs, 3 doz "I" beams, 3 ox carts, 331 empty ammo boxes, miscellaneous documents and medicines, 100' claymore wire, 1 case 7.62 linked ammo, 1 AN/FRC-10, 1 US field pack 5 rds 30 cal ammo, 7-4 1/2 volt batteries, 1 pr binoculars, 1 typewriter, 1 M16 mag, 1 carbine mag, 110 lbs salt, 25 lbs tobacco, 15 sets chopsticks, 6 rolls WD-1 wire, 1 gas stove, 3 gals kerosene, dishes, 3 pr sandals, clothing, 1 US carbine, 1 French carbine, 250 lb bomb, 2-20mm rds, 250 lbs polished rice, map, 1 diary, 1 pk leaflets, 1-55 gal drum, 1-5 gal can, large variety of miscellaneous items of equipment, 40 lbs explosives, large variety of fuel, 3-60mm mortars, 6 mortar pns, 1 homemade 60mm mortar, 4 mortar rds (unk type), 66-81mm mortar rds, 66-60mm mortar rds, 16-75 RR rds, 10-155mm rds, 10-57 RR rds, 1-105mm rd, 2 105mm rds (ducks), 4-4.2" rds, 3-8" rds, 1-175mm rd, 10 M79s, 6 RPG rds, 3-105mm rds (HE), 1-155mm rd (WF), 3-250 lb bombs, 1-100 lb bomb, 26 assorted arty and mortar rds, 32 assorted grenades, 23 AT mines, 3 CHICOM grenades, 1 CHICOM mine, 20 booby traps, 7 AP mines, 1 pressure mine, 3 plastic mines, 6 booby trapped hand grenades (US), 16 claymores, 1 mine rigged for cmd det, 21 assorted mines, 6 booby trapped CHICOM grenades, 1 booby trapped 82mm rd, 1938 bunkers, 2 classroom facs, 100 blasting caps, 83 runji pits, 3,000 hand grenades w/fuzes, 97 tunnels, 9 bomb shelters, 5 underground rooms, 4 mess halls, 93 foxholes, 3 huts, 1 trench, 4 base camps, 106 fighting pns,

3. (C) Part III: Intelligence

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a. February 1967: There were 54 VC initiated incidents during the month of February 1967. Twenty-four involved vehicles detonating pressure mines. There were twelve reports of small arms fire being received and thirteen incidents involving booby traps. On 11 Feb 67 1-18 Inf received approximately 70 rds 82mm mortar vic XT825378 between 1930H and 1940H. The only other incident of note occurred vic XT911355 on 28 Feb when a tank from 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav had two rds of RFG-2 fired at it. One round struck the tank causing minor damage, the second one missed. The mining incidents in the Pde AO indicated that the VC are mining Hwy 2A from its junction with Hwy QL 13 vic XT796199 to vic XT835361 and all secondary roads leading away from TL 2A. The one exception to this is Hwy LTL 1A from vic XT834153 to vic XT859240; no mines have been found on this road. For the past month either a mechanized battalion or cavalry squadron has been in the northern LAM SON AO. During the early portion of the reporting period the VC were able to inflict casualties and damage by making maximum use of mines without endangering their own personnel. However, as the mechanized elements continued intensive operations in the northern LAM SON AO there was a significant reduction in VC activity in the area. This is significant in that the northern LAM SON AO has been an area dominated by the VC. A valid evaluation of small arms fire and booby trap incidents cannot be made. The incidents occurred over a wide area and at various dates and times. The VC continue to use grenade booby traps throughout the area to slow movement and cause casualties. Small arms fire has been extremely ineffective. Two or three rounds are fired and the individual immediately disappears. The mortar incident on 11 Feb 67 demonstrated the VC capability to mortar installations whenever they desire. The two RFG rds fired at 3-5 Cav on 28 Feb indicate that, following a month of our using armor in the northern LAM SON AO, local force units may have been supplied with light antitank weapons in an effort to provide them with greater antitank capability.

b. March 1967: VC initiated incidents remained normal in the LAM SON operational area. Two significant trends in incidents were noted. The use of B-40s in the northern portion of the LAM SON AO noted in February continued in early March. B-40s were used to attack tracked vehicles in defensive positions as well as during movement. They were employed only during hours of darkness and by individuals or small teams. In attack on PHU LOI base camp 10 March 75mm recoilless rifles indirect fire were used as well as mortars. Two Chieu Hoi's from C 63 Co, LAI THIEU Dist Co indicated that this company was far below strength and that morale was very poor due to fear of artillery. Also there were several agent reports stating that C 61, DEN CAT Dist Co, had broken up to fill up other units. Although not presently confirmed this would indicate personnel problems within VC units in the LAM SON area and correspondingly a decrease in VC influence and control. In War Zone "C" the following counter measure to airmobile operations was found. A likely LZ had been prepared with a demolition ambush. It consisted of 4 holes containing a total of 28-81mm mortar rds, 30-60mm mortar rds, 7 rifle grenades, 5 cases C-1, 1 case TNT, 8-75mm recoilless rifle rds, 23 blasting caps, all were connected for simultaneous detonation.

c. April 1967: There were approximately twenty-five VC initiated incidents during the month of April. These have to be broken into two groups. The first from 1-13 April 67 occurred in the area of FSB CHARLIE (XT5685) in War Zone "C". The second group, 14-30 April 67, took place in the LAM SON 67 AO, center of mass XT8825. During the first period there were 9 mortar attacks conducted by the VC. Six of these were at FSB CHARLIE. Significant attacks occurred on 1 Apr 67 0530H and on 6 Apr 67. The attack 1 Apr consisted of 200 rounds of 82mm mortar, 57 and 75 RR fire. At the same time the 1-3 Inf received 200 of 82mm rounds of mortar followed by a ground attack vic XT4, 5. On 6 April 67 FSB CHARLIE received 4 mortar attacks, one at 1115H and 1800H, both were 75-80 rounds of 82mm mortar. The remaining were SA fire, AT fire and mining of roads directed at units in the field. In the LAM SON AO the VC PHU LOI Bn attempted to seize the AN MY Outpost (XT835173) at 0200H 2 April 67. The attack was unsuccessful. On 262200H units at PHU LOI base camp (XT835160) reported incoming 82mm mortar fire. The remainder of the incidents were small arms fire directed at vehicles and personnel and 2 cmd det mines. There were no significant patterns established. The frequency and size of the mortar attacks carried out against FSB CHARLIE seems to indicate a high rate of resupply for mortar ammunition and a willingness to use the mortars both day and night in that area. There were no further incidents in either area from which a valid conclusion could be drawn.

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4. (C) Part IV, Personnel:

a. Present Strength: The assigned strength of the Brigade at the beginning of the reporting period was 130 Officers, 8 Warrant Officers and 2459 Enlisted Men. The strength of the Bde at the end of the reporting period was 121 Officers, 9 Warrant Officers, and 2304 Enlisted Men.

b. Replacements: The Bde received 1,121 personnel replacements and lost 1,214 personnel during the reporting period, resulting in a net loss of 93 personnel.

c. Military Discipline: Military discipline has been excellent. There were no unusual problems concerning law and order.

d. Burials: All grave registration activity is handled by the Forward Supply Section, 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion and also the 506th Quartermaster Company. All deceased have been evacuated through channels with no burials in the field.

e. Civilian Employees: At the present, the Bde hires 150 unskilled laborers for each day, under the temporary hire program, for tasks such as clearing fields of fire, filling sand bags, drainage ditches, and leveling ground for foundation pads. 216 local nationals are employed under the permanent hire program for jobs as kitchens, waitresses, carpenters, automotive mechanics, gardeners and janitors.

f. Morale and Personnel Services: Morale of this Bde continues to be excellent. The Bde is receiving adequate quotas for out of country R&R. Red Cross support for personal problems has been timely and excellent. This Bde has processed 713 awards during the reporting period.

g. Civil Assistance: Relations with the civilian communities within the Brigade TAOR have continued to be excellent. Close coordination with US/GVN officials at district and province levels has resulted in regular Medical Civic Action Programs, insuring that all major villages/hamlets receive maximum benefits from US/VN medical assistance teams. During the reporting period some 2,204 persons were treated. Civic Action Projects were coordinated with district/province officials to insure that only GVN-approved projects were undertaken. US assistance to ARVN/RF/IF units continued to include aid in the construction of outposts and bunkers; provision of barrier materials; maintenance contact teams for repair of weapons, vehicles, and signal items, and medcaps for military dependents.

5. (C) Part V, Logistics:

a. February 1967: During the reporting period logistical support was provided for Opn LAM SON by both helicopter and land transport. An MSR was opened and secured each day. The health of the Command and the physical condition of the troops remained good.

b. March 1967: The logistical situation remains good. During Opn LAM SON from 1 March 67 to 17 March 67 logistical support base was established in PHU LOI. No major problems were encountered during Opn LAM SON 67, however, some problems were encountered in support Trp B 1-4 Cav in the repair of track vehicle equipment. Parts were not readily available causing vehicles to be inoperative for excessive time. On 18 March the Bde Trains road marched to QUAN LOI for Opn JUNCTION CITY II. The convoy encountered no major difficulty. On 19 and 20 March 67, the Bde Trains planned and prepared for resupply of Opn JUNCTION CITY II. The Bde TAC CP moved by CH-47 at 1530H to FSB CHARLIE (XT565850). Bde Trains remained at QUAN LOI. On 21 March 67 Bde Trains commenced aerial resupply of units on closure in the forward area. To reduce aircraft turn around time, a forward resupply base was established FSB CHARLIE. In this area 2 DOS of Class V, "C" rations and units GIM were stored. Supplies and ammunition are being transported by vehicle to FSB CHARLIE by controlled convoy. Water was big problem at FSB CHARLIE because of the limited source. In future operations, when there is a limited water supply, 1st S & T should provide sufficient 5000 gal water tankers to provide the necessary water resupply. Units kitchens were located at Bde Trains at QUAN LOI. Class "A" rations are prepared at Bde Trains and airlifted to

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forward units. On a major supply problem was encountered during the period. 2d Sqdn 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was attached to 2d Bde. The unit moved deep into the objective area. The existing road was not cleared and secured, thus resulting in a major resupply effort in moving 105 mm howitzer ammunition, Class III and water into the area. Due to the tonnage requirement, this required CH-47 support. C, 5-2 Arty has had excessive engine failure in their track vehicles (M42A1). Purchase of ice through the imprest fund has become necessary since there is not sufficient ice issued through S&T at this location.

c. April 1967: Period 1 April to 14 April (Opn JUNCTION CITY II): During this period the Brigade logistical support base was established in QUAN LOI. Collocated at the base was section from 1st S & T Bn and a forward support element of the 1st Logistical Command. Overall stockage levels of all classes of supplies were sufficient to meet the demands of the tactical units. In some areas certain items were not readily available. However once the requirement was placed on the appropriate agency, the problem was resolved as quick as possible. One major problem was encountered with prepacked A-22 ammunition bags. Initially, the bags were packed with approximately 1000 to 1200 lbs of assorted Class V. During the operation, attempts were made to pick the bags up using the HU-1A helicopter external sling capability. Due to weather conditions, fuel aboard, the mechanical condition of the aircraft, many of the loads could not be picked up. By reducing the weight of the bags to 600 lbs, the helicopter was able to lift the ammunition into the operational area with no difficulty. Supporting the attached cavalry troop continued to be a problem, primarily that of transporting the quantities of Class III and Class V requirements from QUAN LOI to FSB THRUST. When the MSR was open, a small resupply convoy was dispatched each day, carrying sufficient supplies for the Troop. If the road was closed due to enemy action, approximately 18 sorties were used to resupply the Troop with Class III and Class V. Water continued to be a problem at FSB CHARLIE and FSB THRUST. Insufficient water was available at FSB CHARLIE to support the troops at both positions. An additional 5,000 gallon water trailer was obtained from 1st S & T Bn which relieved the problems to a large extent. Maintenance of equipment was supported by Company "D" 701st contact team. No difficulty was experienced in this area. On 14 April the Brigade returned to base camp at DI AN.

b. Period 15 April to 30 April 67: The Brigade stood down for maintenance for approximately 5 days while preparing to assume the LAM SON 67 mission. During this period all Battalions performed maintenance on all equipment. Contact Teams from Company "D" 701st Maintenance inspected and repaired signal, small arms and automotive equipment. In addition to maintenance, each unit had an opportunity to inventory all equipment prior to going on the next operation. A problem during this period was obtaining sufficient trucks to move battalions from DI AN to air head at PHU LOI. Also the problem exists when transporting units from one location to another in conducting the LAM SON mission. A limited number of cargo trucks were left in base camp by the battalions for support of the rear detachment and maintenance. During this period supply activities remained normal and met the operational requirements.

6. (C) Part VI, Chronology.

a. 1 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN. 2-16 Inf remained at DI AN Base Camp as Bde RRF. 1-18 Inf, 2-18 Inf (+)(with 1 plat Co B 2-34 Armor), and 2-2 Mech (+)(with D 2-34 Armor(-)) continued Opn LAM SON II. 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

2 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN. 1-18 Inf (+)(with 1 plat Co B 2-34 Arm), 2-18 Inf, and 2-2 Mech (+)(with D 2-34 Arm (-)) continued Opn LAM SON II. 2-16 Inf was airlifted from DIEN HOA and became attached to 1st Bde upon closure at QUAN LOI at 1415H. 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

3 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN. 1-18 Inf, 2-18 Inf, and 2-2 Mech (+)(with Co B 2-34 Arm (-)) continued Opn LAM SON II. 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

4 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and Opn UNIONTOWN. 2-18 Inf (+)(with 1 plat Co B 2-34 Arm) and 2-2 Mech (+)(with Co B 2-34 Arm(-)) continued Opn LAM SON II. 1-18 Inf motor marched from DI AN Base Camp

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commencing at 0925H closing LAI KHE at 1215H at which time became attached 3d Bde. 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

5 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN. 2-18 Inf (+)(with 1 plat Co B 2-34 Arm) and 2-2 Mech (+)(with Co B 2-34 Arm(-)) continued Opn LAM SON II. 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

6 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN. Bde CP displaced from XT863254 to XT824283 closing at 1215H. 2-18 Inf (+)(Co B 2-34 Arm), 3-7 ARVN, and 1-1 Tank Trp (ARVN) and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON II. 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

7 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN. 2-18 Inf (+) and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON II. 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

8 Feb: 2d Bde terminated Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN and initiated Opn LAM SON 67 (the continuation of LAM SON II). 2-18 Inf (+)(with Tn of Engrs) and 2-2 Mech(+) terminated Opn LAM SON II and began Opn LAM SON 67. 2-28 Inf terminated Opn UNIONTOWN. 2-60 Inf, 9th Division assumed at 1400H. 2-28 Inf was airlifted from BLEN HOA at 1506H closing LAI KHE at 1707H and reverted OICON 3d Bde.

9 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-18 Inf(*) and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf reverted OICON 2d Bde at 0600H and airlifted from LAI KHE at 1003H into 3 LZ: (XT833336, XT853345 and XT868358) closing by 1148H.

10 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf, 2-18 Inf (+) and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON 67.

11 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf, 2-18 Inf and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON 67.

12 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. Bde CP displaced at 1230H to vic XT845246 closing at 1330H. 1-18 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-18 Inf was airlifted from HHU LOI at 0730H to MINH THANH and was attached 1st Bde upon closure. 2-16 Inf moved by road from fld pns closing at which time reverted attachment 2d Bde. 2-2 Mech (-) cleared and outposted Hwy 13 between LAI THIEU and BEN CAT by 0815H. At 1500H 2-2 Mech was attached 1st Bde. Btry C 5-2 Arty moved from fld pns closing 2d Bde CP at 1830H.

13 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf, 1-18 Inf and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67.

14 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67 2-16 Inf, 1-18 Inf, and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67.

15 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 participating in a seal and search of village of AN LOI (XT822296).

16 Feb: 2d Bde continued LAM SON 67 and initiated Opn LAUREL. Bde TAC CP was established vic FHU LOI at 1255H. 2-16 Inf and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 and initiated Opn LAUREL as part of Opn LAM SON 67 at 2230H.

17 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67 and terminated Opn LAUREL at 1200H. Bde CP displaced at 1221H from vic XT845246 closing DI AN Base Camp at 1410H. 2-16 Inf and C 5-2 Arty continued LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 and terminated Opn LAUREL at 1200H.

18 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf stood down at DI AN Base Camp and continued care and maintenance.

19 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67 and initiated Opn SUTLAND as part of Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 and initiated Opn SUTLAND with Bn (-) moving toward village of TAN HIEP by 1530H. 1-18 Inf motor marched from DI AN Base Camp closing at FHU LOI at 0930H and at 0955H was airlifted to PHUOC VINH closing 1700H at which time the Bn assumed respon-

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sibility for security of THUOC VINH (1st Bde) base camp C 5-2 Arty stood down at THU LOI and conducted care and maintenance.

20 Feb: 2d Bde terminated Opn SUITLAND and continued Opn LAM SON 67. Bde TAC CF departed DI AN at 0700H and became operational in TAN HIEP. Upon completion of search, TAC CF returned to DI AN closing at 1400H. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 and terminated Opn SUITLAND at 1345H. 1-18 Inf continued THUOC VINH security missions. 1-16 Inf became OFCON 2d Bde at 0900H and assumed security of LAI KHE base camp. 3-5 Cav became OFCON 2d Bde at 0930H and closed THU LOI at 1132H. C 5-2 Arty stood down at THU LOI and conducted care and maintenance.

21 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. Bde Fwd CF displaced from DI AN Base Camp at 0940H and closed vic XT817253 at 1130H. 1-16 Inf continued LAI KHE security missions. 2-16 Inf and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf continued THUOC VINH security mission. 3-5 Cav stood down for maintenance at THU LOI.

22 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 participating in a seal and search at BINH CHUAN (XT866144) which terminated at 1052H. 1-16 Inf continued LAI KHE security mission. 1-18 Inf continued THUOC VINH security mission. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued participation in Opn LAM SON 67.

23 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf, 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued LAM SON 67. 1-16 Inf continued security mission of LAI KHE. 1-18 Inf CF airlifted at 1036H from THUOC VINH to LAI KHE closing at 1200H. Bn (-) assumed responsibility for security of LAI KHE base camp 1415H. 1-16 Inf continued security mission of LAI KHE until relieved by 1-18 Inf, and at 1535H was airlifted to SOU DA closing at 1810H to revert OFCON 3d Bde.

24 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf, 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE security mission.

25 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67 participating in a seal and search of HOA LOI I (XT822265) which terminated at 1250H. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions.

26 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 participating in a seal and search at TAN AN XA commencing 0750H. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH base camp security missions. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67.

27 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 participating in joint US/ARVN opn in TAN AN XA area. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH base camp security missions. C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. 3-5 Cav continued Opn LAM SON 67 participation in a seal and search of BINH MY (XT903343) sealing BINH MY at 1902H.

28 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf terminated operation at TAN AN XA and was airlifted from TAN AN XA area at 0701H and closed DI AN at 0910H. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH base camp security missions. C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. 3-5 Cav continued Opn LAM SON 67 maintaining seal at BINH MY. At 2215H Sqdn move west. Seal western TAN DINH (XT860362). Seal was completed at 2300H.

1 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf stood down at DI AN for care and maintenance. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. 3-5 Cav continued Opn LAM SON 67 maintaining seal of TAN DINH until 1235H, thus terminating the

2 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (-) stood down at DI AN Base Camp for care and maintenance. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67.

3 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf, 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH

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security missions.

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4 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. At 1355H Bde CP commenced move from fld psn to DI AN base camp closing at 1600H. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON participating in a seal and search operation of VINH THUONG (XT068175) which terminated at 1155H. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. B 1-4 Cav closed into IHU LOI at 1053H becoming OFCON 2d Bde. 3-5 Cav commenced road clearing and road movement from fld psn to LAI KHE at 0635H. At 1112H the Sqdn closed LAI KHE and was released operational control of 2d Bde.

5 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 participating in a seal and search operation of HOA NHUT (XT083176) which terminated at 1200H. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security mission. B 1-4 Cav and C 5-2 Arty (-) stood down for maintenance at IHU LOI.

6 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting search and destroy operations. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav and C 5-2 Arty (-) stood down for maintenance at IHU LOI.

7 Mar: 2d Bde initiated Opn CUMBERLAND as part of LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (-) initiated Opn CUMBERLAND conducting an airmobile assault and sealing E portion of TAN HIEP/DINH TRI (XT925100) at 1830H. D 1-4 Cav screened N and NW portion of TAN HIEP/DINH TRI between 1830-1930H. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav and C 5-2 Arty stood down at IHU LOI for maintenance.

8 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn CUMBERLAND as part of Opn LAM SON 67. Bde TAC CP departed DI AN Base Camp 0702H, becoming operational at 0900H vic XT921099. Bde TAC CP displaced to NDP vic XT911101. 2-16 Inf (-) continued Opn CUMBERLAND maintaining seal on TAN HIEP/DINH TRI in conjunction with GVN forces. Seal was broken at 1500H and Dn (-) conducted search with negative results. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67.

9 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn CUMBERLAND as part of Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (+) with 1 platoon B 1-4 Cav continued Opn CUMBERLAND conducting search and destroy ops in CO MI Jungle (east). 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav (-) and C 5-2 Arty (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67.

10 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn CUMBERLAND as part of Opn LAM SON 67. Bde TAC CP closed DI AN at 0830H. 2-16 Inf (+) continued Opn CUMBERLAND conducting search and destroy operations in CO MI Jungle (east). 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav (-) and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67.

11 Mar: 2d Bde terminated Opn CUMBERLAND and continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (+) continued Opn CUMBERLAND conducting search and destroy operations in CO MI Jungle (east); Bn (-) closed IHU LOI at 1646H thus terminating Opn CUMBERLAND. 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav stood down at IHU LOI until 1515H, departed IHU LOI to LAI KHE and upon closure at 1632H was OFCON to 9th Inf. C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67.

12 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67 participating in a seal and search operation at BINH CHUAN (XT888140) which terminated at 1745H. At 1820H Dn (-) moved to participate in a seal and search operation of TAN DA (XT930135). 1-18 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. C 5-2 Arty stood down for maintenance at IHU LOI.

13 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (-) maint. seal on TAN DA in conjunction with GVN forces and terminated the operation upon closure IHU LOI at 1402H. 1-18 Inf airlifted from THUOC VINH and LAI KHE closing QUAN LOI at 1550H at time the Bn was attached 1st Bde. Rear elements at DI AN base camp established a squad size night ambush vic XT914009. 2-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. A sod size night ambush was positioned E of DI AN Base Camp vic XT917078 by rear elements. 1-16 Inf airlifted from SCUI DA to LAI KHE and THUOC VINH closing at 1545H at which time Dn assumed both base

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camps security missions, under 2d Bde OFCON. C 5-2 Arty stood down for maintenance at FHU LOI and was RRF for Hwy 13 convoy.

14 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (-) with C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-16 Inf continued FHUOC VINH security missions with En (-) reverting 3d Bde control at 1225H. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde with their rear elements positioning sound size night ambushes vic DI AN Base Camp.

15 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde with their rear elements positioned sound size night ambushes vic DI AN Base Camp. 1-16 Inf (-) continued FHUOC VINH security missions at 1200H reverting to 3d Bde control. C 5-2 Arty stood down at FHU LOI and was RRF Hwy 13 convoy. D 1-4 Cav became OICON 2d Bde at 1500H and conducted Eagle Flights vic XTC05235 based on intelligence; Trp reverted to 1-4 Cav control at 1700H.

16 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remain attached to 1st Bde.

17 Mar: 2d Bde terminated participation in Opn LAM SON 67 at 0700H. 3d Bde assumed responsibility for 2d Bde TAOR 0700H. 2-16 Inf moved by road from FHU LOI to DI AN closing at 1153H and stood down for maintenance for the remainder of the day. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. C 5-2 Arty stood down at FHU LOI for maintenance.

18 Mar: 2d Bde continued preparing for Opn JUNCTION CITY II. At 0800H Bde Fwd CP moved by road from DI AN to QUAN LOI (XTC21908) closing at 1248H. 2-16 Inf stood down at DI AN base camp and prepared for Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. C 5-2 Arty moved by road from FHU LOI commencing at 0830H and closed AN LOC at 1222H at which time Btry came under 1st Bde control. 1-4 Cav (-) moved by road from FHU LOI at 0945H and upon reaching XT763806 at 1330H came under control of 1st Bde.

19 Mar: 2d Bde continued preparing for Opn JUNCTION CITY II. The Bde CP remained operational at QUAN LOI (XTC21908). 2-16 Inf moved from DI AN to DIEN HOA by truck at 0815H, closing DIEN HOA at 0920H. At 1134H the Dn commenced airlift by C-130's from DIEN HOA to QUAN LOI closing at 1314H and continued to prepare for Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde.

20 Mar: 2d Bde continued to prepare for Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Bde TAC CP moved by CH-47 at 1503H closing FSB CHARLIE (XT565850) at 1737H. 2-16 Inf continued preparing for Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde.

21 Mar: 2d Bde initiated Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Bde Fwd CP became operational at 0800H at FSB CHARLIE (XT568851). 2-16 Inf commenced participation in Opn JUNCTION CITY II making an airmobile assault onto LZ CHARLIE (XT524900) at 1443H. At 1519H Trp E 2-11 ACR was placed OICON 2-16 Inf, 1-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 2-16 Inf reverted 2d Bde control at 0800H and initiated Opn JUNCTION CITY II making an airmobile combat assault at 1115H onto LZ BRAVO (XT512904). 1-26 Inf with C 5-2 Arty was attached to 2d Bde at 0800H and secured E portion of FSB CHARLIE; En (-) secured and outposted Hwy 246 from FSB CHARLIE to vic XT573840. 2-11 ACR was attached 2d Bde at 0800H. Sqdn (-) attack W from FSB CHARLIE along Axis IANZER commencing 0952H and Trp E attacked N along Axis 88 commencing 0952H; Trp B was placed OICON 2-16 Inf at 1519H. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn became OFCON 2d Bde at 0800H and secured W portion of FSB CHARLIE. C 5-2 Arty was OFCON 1-26 Inf.

22 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D ops south from LZ CHARLIE. Trp E ACR was OICON 2-16 Inf and remained at LZ CHARLIE until 1455H at which time Trp was placed OFCON 2-18 Inf. 1-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D ops S of LZ BRAVO. At 1455H Trp E 2-11 ACR was placed OFCON 2-18 Inf and closed LZ BRAVO at 1830H. 1-26 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II securing E portion of FSB CHARLIE. 2-11 ACR (-) continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II attacking S from NDP (XT500802) commencing at 0643H. At 1100H Sqdn (-) was placed OFCON 173d Abn

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6 Bde. Trp E was placed ON 2-18 Inf. 36th ARVN Ranger continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II securing W portion.

23 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting plat size cloverleaf patrols vic Obj 2 (XT521868). 1-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting cloverleaf patrolling S from LZ BRAVO towards LZ ECHO (XT503-587). Trp E 2-11 ACR reverted to Bde control at 0800H. 1-26 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Bn (-) cleared and outposted Route YELLOW (Route 246) commencing 0900H. Co C with Recon Flat cleared and outposted Route 246 from FSB CHARLIE east to vic XT573840 by 0905H. All elements closed FSB CHARLIE by 1855H. Bn (-) continued to secure E portion of FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II securing W portion of FSB CHARLIE. Trp E 2-11 ACR reverted OICON 2d Bde at 0800H.

24 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting cloverleaf patrols S from Obj 2 (XT521868) towards Obj 4 (XT514855) commencing at 0900H. 1-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting cloverleaf patrols SW of LZ ECHO (XT503867) commencing at 0831H. 1-26 Inf (+) continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D opns vic XT533809 and XT546810 Co C elements of C 5-2 Arty cleared and outposted Rt 246 from FSB CHARLIE to vic XT573840. All elements closed FSB CHARLIE by 1810H. Bn (-) continued to secure E portion of FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II defending W portion of FSB CHARLIE. Trp E 2-11 ACR continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Trp (-) stood down for maintenance at FSB CHARLIE; C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II defending perimeter at FSB CHARLIE.

25 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D opns in zone towards Obj 6 (XT530847) commencing at 0734H. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D Opns in zone toward Obj 3 (XT495857) commencing at 0811H. All elements closed NDP (XT518863) by 1650H. 1-26 Inf with Trp E 2-11 ACR and 1 section C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Co A with 1 section C 5-2 Arty cleared and outposted Rt 246 from FSB CHARLIE to XT573840. Tm C (Co C and 1 plat Trp E 2-11 ACR) began S&D opns in AO PANTHER (XT570855) at 0858H. Trp E 2-11 ACR (-) and Recon plat outposted E portion of FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. At 0847H a company size patrol was conducted SW of FSB CHARLIE (vic XT560860). Bn (-) continued to support W portion of FSB CHARLIE. C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II providing section to 1-26 Inf for road clearing. Dtry (-) continued to secure portion of FSB CHARLIE.

26 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued S&D operations in eastern Obj FAUST area with B and A Cos moving to SE from NDP at XT518863 and conducting cloverleaf patrols S toward Obj 4 and 6; and with Co C and Recon plat in reserve. Opn commenced at 0838H. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued S&D opns in western Obj FAUST area. 1-26 Inf continued Opns vic FSB CHARLIE. At 0745H Co B with section of C 5-2 Arty OICON commenced road clearing opns between CF 14 and CF 18. At 0757H Bn (-) began S&D opns and local ambush patrols around FSB CHARLIE N of Route YELLOW. E 2-11 Cav stood down for maintenance and participated in defense at FSB CHARLIE. C 5-2 Arty furnished 1 section to 1-26 Inf for route security and participated in defense of FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn participated in defense of FSB CHARLIE and dispatched company size patrol to S of Route YELLOW.

27 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued S&D opns in zone; oriented patrols to SSE. 1-18 Inf remain attached to 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued S&D opns in zone; oriented towards Obj 3 and base camp to west. 1-26 Inf continued S&D opns and ambush patrols in AO; relieved 36th ARVN Rangers of perimeter at 1000H; secured entire perimeter until relieved by 1-2 Inf (-); and cleared and outposted Rt YELLOW from CF 14 to CF 18 by 0840H. At 0725 Co C roved out for road clearing. At 0755H Dr commenced S&D opns and ambush patrols vic FSB CHARLIE. 1-2 Inf (-) was 2d Bde at 1202H upon closure at FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger departed FSB CHARLIE at 1243H reverted to DS of 1st Bde at 1503H at QUAN LOI. E Trp 2-11 Cav cleared Route YELLOW from CF 14 to 54 N-S grid line commencing at 0750H for passage of Sdn convoy coming from FSB FARRY. After cancellation of convoy Troop (-) returned to FSB CHARLIE. At 1040H plat was placed OICON 1-26 Inf for action to N; reverted Trp control at 1425H. C 5-2 Arty furnished one section

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to 1-26 Inf for route security, one section to 1-26 Inf for action to N without contact.

28 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf concluded S&D opns in Obj FAUST area at 0750H; moved by truck to FSD LRAVO at 1144H; relieved 1-18 Inf in place; and was attached 1st Bde at 1330H. 1-18 Inf reverted to 2d Bde control at 1330H. After relief by 2-16 Inf, Bn (-) moved to field pens vic XT538844, closing at 1530H and Co C moved into FSD CHARLIE at 1520H. Bn (-) occupied NDP vic XT538845. 2-16 Inf continued S&D opns in zone; oriented opns toward VC base camp complexes located SW and SSW. 1-26 Inf conducted S&D opns N of FSD CHARLIE; opened and outposted Rt YELLOW from CP 18 to vic XT538841; and outposted NDP vic XT538844 until closure of 1-18 Inf. 1-2 Inf (-) conducted S&D opns to W of FSD CHARLIE. E 2-11 Cav pushed through 1-26 Inf and opened Rt YELLOW from XT538841 to link-up with 2-11 Cav (-) at 1555H; and reverted to Sqdn (-) control upon link-up. G 2-11 Cav OPCON 2d Bde at Obj THRUST at 1440H; secured area for engineer LZ clearance team; and remained vic XT500796 in NDP. C 5-2 Arty outposted perimeter during day; provided elements for 1-26 Inf for road clearance and outposting; placed one platoon OPCON to 2-16 Inf (attached 1st Bde); and and received OICON of platoon A 1-4 Cav.

29 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. 1-18 Inf secured and outposted Rt YELLOW from CP 153 (vic NDP) to XT500759. Bn (-) commenced opn at 0645H and moved SW. At 0700H Bn assumed responsibility for security of Obj THRUST; at 1905H Bn closed NDP vic XT500796. 2-18 Inf continued S&D opns in zone; oriented opns to W. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D opns N of FSD CHARLIE. 1-26 Inf with C 5-2 Arty secured and outposted Rt YELLOW from CP 18 to CP 137. At 0720H elements departed on road clearing opns and by 0850H linked-up with 2-16 Inf on east. At 1020H Bn linked-up with 1-18 Inf.

30 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-18 Inf with G 2-11 ACR secured and outposted Rt YELLOW (Rt 246) from THRUST (XT500800) to CP 137 (XT530853) with Tm G (1 plat CoA, 1 plat CoB, 1 plat Co C, 2 plats Trp G 2-11 ACR). 2-18 Inf continued S&D opns vic NDP (XT498862). At 1505H Bn was airlifted to FSD CHARLIE closing at 1611H and assumed responsibility of the E portion of FSD CHARLIE. 1-2 Inf cleared and outposted Route YELLOW from CP 18 (XT573842) to CP 137 (XT580033); at 1532H Co A closed FSD CHARLIE reverting Bn control. 1-26 Inf commenced local patrol vic FSD CHARLIE at 0657H. At 1331H Bn conducted an airmobile assault into LZ GEORGE (XT428847) in Obj SIOUX. C 5-2 Arty remained OPCON 1-26 Inf until 1330H and at 1611H was placed OPCON 2-18 Inf.

31 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-18 Inf with Trp G 2-11 ACR cleared and outposted Rt YELLOW from FSD THRUST to CP 137 with Tm G commencing at 0649H. 2-18 Inf continued to secure FSD CHARLIE and cleared and outposted Route YELLOW from CP 18 to CP 137. 1-2 Inf was airlifted from FSD CHARLIE commencing at 0906H and closed LZ GEORGE (XT428847) at 1005H. At 1013H Bn began S&D opns to SW. 1-26 Inf secured LZ GEORGE for 1-2 Inf. Bn (-) conducted S&D opns to S and E of LZ GEORGE. 1-16 Inf (-) became OPCON 2d Bde upon closure LZ GEORGE at 1733H and established NDPs vic XT427856.

1 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 1st Bde assumed responsibility for security of FSD CHARLIE at 1236H. At 1527H. At 1527H Bde TAC CP was established at LZ GEORGE (XT428847). 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-18 Inf continued to secure FSD THRUST (XT488800). 2-18 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSD CHARLIE and cleared and outposted Rt YELLOW from CP 14 (XT564843) to CP 18 (XT573844) by 0837H. At 1236H Bn (+) was attached to 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf conducted S&D opns NNE of LZ GEORGE. 1-26 Inf continued S&D opns in zone vic XT4385. 1-2 Inf continued S&D opns NNE of LZ GEORGE commencing at 1135H.

2 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf reverted to 2d Bde control at 1110H and at 1130H airlifted from FSD LRAVO to LZ GEORGE (XT428847) closing at 1457H. 1-18 Inf with Trp G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSD THRUST; and cleared and outposted Rt 246 from FSD THRUST to CP 137 (XT530833). At 1700H Bn was attached 1st Bde and security of FSD THRUST was also assumed by 1st Bde at that time. 2-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde.

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1-16 Inf continued S&D opns NE and NW of NDP (XT441857) commencing at 0835H. 1-26 Inf was airlifted at 1140H and upon closure QUAN LOI reverted 1st Bde control. 1-2 Inf (-) conducted S&D opns ESE of NDP (XT441857).

3 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D opns NE and E of LZ GEORGE (XT425848) commencing at 0902H. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D opns NNW of NDP (XT441857) beginning at 0830H. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D opns S from NDP (XT441857) commencing at 0830H.

4 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Bde TAC CP airlifted from LZ GEORGE closing FSB CHARLIE. 2-16 Inf conducted S&D opns SW of NDP (XT428847) commencing at 0800H. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf continued conducting local patrols vic NDP. Bn commenced airlifting from LZ GEORGE at 1055H and was attached 1st Bde upon closure at QUAN LOI. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D opns S and E of NDP (XT442829).

5 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf conducted S&D opns vic Obj 12 (XT406824), 14 (XT419419) and 16 (XT414810). 1-18 Inf returned to control 2d Bde at 1200H. Bn continued to outpost Rt 246 between FSB THRUST and CP 137 (XT530833) with G 2-11 Cav (-). 2-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D opns SE of NDP commencing 0805H.

6 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued S&D opns NW and SE of NDP (XT430805) commencing at 0800H. 1-18 Inf with Trp G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST, cleared and outposted Rt 246 from FSB THRUST to CP 137 by 1055H, and conducted local patrols. 2-18 Inf with C 5-2 Arty reverted to 2d Bde control at 1155H at which time responsibility for sety of FSB CHARLIE also reverted to 2d Bde. Bn (+) cleared and outposted Rt 246 between CP 14 and CP 18 closing FSB CHARLIE at 1522H. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D opns SE of NDP (XT462810) commencing at 0830H.

7 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. At 1115H Bde assumed responsibility for sety of FSB BRAVO (XT623815). 2-16 Inf was airlifted from NDP (XT430805) commencing at 0930H, closing FSB BRAVO at 1115H relieving 1-28 Inf in place; Bn conducted local recon patrols. 1-18 Inf with B 2-11 ACR cleared and outposted Rt 246 between FSB THRUST and CP 137. 2-18 Inf with C 5-2 Arty cleared and outposted Rt 246 from CP 18 to CP 137 and conducted local patrols NW of FSB CHARLIE. 1-2 Inf was airlifted to FSB BRAVO and attached 3d Bde. 1-28 Inf was attached 2d Bde at 1015H and airlifted from FSB BRAVO to FSB THRUST and conducted close-in local recon patrols. Trp D 1-4 Cav was placed OFCON 2d Bde at 0900H.

8 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSB BRAVO, cleared and outposted Rt 246 in zone, and conducted combat recon patrols vic XT5982, XT6182, and XT6382. 1-18 Inf with G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST, cleared and outposted Rt 246 in zone, and conducted local combat recon patrols. 2-18 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSB CHARLIE, cleared and outposted Rt 246 in zone, and conducted a plat size combat recon patrol NW of FSB CHARLIE. 1-28 Inf conducted S&D opns SE and E of NDP towards XT551768. D 1-4 Cav continued to screen area N of FSB CHARLIE.

9 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSB BRAVO (XT624815), cleared and outposted Rt 246 in zone, and conducted 4 combat patrols. 1-18 Inf with B 2-11 ACR secured FSB THRUST, cleared and outposted Rt 246 in zone, and conducted local recon patrols. 2-18 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSB CHARLIE, cleared and outposted Rt 246 in zone and conducted a plat size patrol to the NW of FSB CHARLIE. 1-28 Inf conducted S&D opns N of NDP (XT551768) commencing at 1035H. D 1-4 Cav continued to screen N of FSB CHARLIE. At 0815H Trp was placed OFCON 1st Bde and reverted to 2d Bde control at 1415H continuing screening mission without incident.

10 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSB BRAVO, cleared and outposted Rt 246, and conducted local combat recon patrols. 1-18 Inf w/G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST and cleared and outposted Rt 246 in zone. Bn departed FSB THRUST at 1330H and closed FSB CHARLIE at 1817H. Trp G 2-11 ACR reverted Sdn control at 1545H.

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2-16 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSD CHARLIE, cleared and outposted Rt 246, and conducted local recon patrols. 1-28 Inf conducted S&D opns NE and SW of NDP (XT548787). D 1-4 Cav continued to conduct aerial recons N of FSD CHARLIE.

11 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSD BRAVO, cleared and outposted Rt 246, and conducted combat recon patrols. 1-18 Inf conducted S&D opns N of FSD CHARLIE commencing at 0830H. 2-18 Inf continued to secure FSD CHARLIE, cleared and outposted Rt 246 from FSD CHARLIE to vic XT530833, and conducted a company size S&D opn NE of FSD CHARLIE. 1-28 Inf conducted S&D opns NE of NDP. D 1-4 Cav conducted aerial recons N of FSD CHARLIE.

13 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Bde CF moved by road from FSD CHARLIE and closed QUAN LOI at 1513H. 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSD BRAVO, cleared and outposted Rt 246 in zone, and conducted combat recon patrols. At 1720H 1st Bde assumed control of the Bn along with security of FSD BRAVO. 1-18 Inf was airlifted from FSD CHARLIE and attached 1st Bde at 0835H. 2-18 Inf with 1 section C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSD CHARLIE and cleared and outposted Rt 246 in zone. 1-28 Inf was placed OICON 2d Bde upon closure FSD BRAVO, airlifted commencing at 0920H and reverted 1st Bde control upon closure at THUOC VINH. D 1-4 Cav continued to conduct aerial recons N and W of FSD CHARLIE. One section, C 5-2 Arty remained OICON 2-18 Inf until 1720H at which time it reverted to Btry control.

14 Apr: 2d Bde Fwd CF moved by road from QUAN LOI to DI AN Base Camp, closing at 1344H thus terminating Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf airlifted from FSD BRAVO and reverted to 2d Bde control upon closure DI AN at 1557H and stood down for maintenance. 1-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf airlifted from QUAN LOI, closing DI AN at 1415H and stood down for maintenance.

15 Apr: 2d Bde stood down for care and maintenance. 2-16 Inf stood down for care and maintenance. 1-18 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf stood down for care and maintenance.

16 Apr: 2d Bde stood down for care and maintenance. 2-16 Inf stood down for care and maintenance. 1-18 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf stood down for care and maintenance.

17 Apr: 2d Bde assumed Opn LAM SON 67 from 3d Bde at 0700H. 2-16 Inf stood down for maintenance and conducted range firing at DI AN. 1-18 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf stood down for maintenance at DI AN. 2-28 Inf became attached to 2d Bde at 0700H, and continued Opn LAI SON 67. Co A conducted S&D operations in assigned AO (center of mass XT7115), destroyed secondary jungle along the north/south road in sector in coordination with mine plows and Division engineers, and maintained a show of force in sector vic XT906137.

18 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf stood down for maintenance at DI AN. 1-18 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf stood down for care and maintenance at DI AN. 2-28 Inf continued S&D and jungle clearing operations in the LAM SON AO and conducted security missions at the laterite pits (XT968060) and TAN THUOC KHANH.

19 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf stood down for maintenance at DI AN base camp and positioned a sqd size night ambush vic XT895070. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf stood down for maintenance at DI AN Base Camp. 2-28 Inf airlifted by C-123 from THU LOI to LAI KHE and reverted OFCON 3d Bde upon closure at 1040H. 1-26 Inf was attached 2d Bde upon closure THU LOI at 1155H. Co A relieved Co A 2-28 Inf in NDP vic XT904146. Co's B and C (-) and Recon plat remained at THU LOI. One plat Co A continued Rock Crusher sety mission vic XT968081 and one sqd provided village chief of TAN THUOC KHANH. D 1-4 Cav secured NDP vic XT904146 while Co A 1-26 Inf relieved Co A 1-28 Inf in place.

20 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf moved by road from DI AN at 0735H closing THU LOI at 0826H then airlifted to LAI KHE being attached to 3d Bde upon closure at 1025H. Rear elements at DI AN conducted a sqd size

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recon patrol to the W and positioned a sod size night ambush vic XT895074. 2-18 Inf continued to stand down for maintenance at DI AN, conducted range firing, and prepared for future ops. 1-26 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67. A search was made vic XT882100, area of contact 19 April. Co A continued jungle clearing ops along Route ORANGE in AO 4LHA (center of mass XT910160). B 1-4 Cav moved by road from FHU LOI at 0753H and upon closure of LAI KHE at 0915H was attached 3d Bde.

21 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. Rear elements positioned a sod size night ambush vic XT894065. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued to stand down for maintenance and conducted range firing at DI AN base camp. 1-26 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 with Co's A and B clearing and securing Route ORANGE in sector. Co A secured engr work parties conducting jungle clearing ops. Co C (-) remained at FHU LOI as Dn RRP. B 1-4 Cav was attached to 2d Bde upon closure at FHU LOI at 1530H and stood down for maintenance. A 5-2 Arty (-) was attached to 2d Bde upon closure FHU LOI at 1548H and stood down for maintenance. One Plat 2-2 Mech was attached to 2d Bde at 0650H and secured engr work parties S of BEN CAT. Plat reverted to Dn control at 1527H.

22 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached to 3d Bde. Rear elements conducted a sod size recon patrol to the W of DI AN base camp. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf moved by road from DI AN to FHU LOI at 0813H and was airlifted to LAI KHE commencing at 0932H and attached 3d Bde upon closure. 1-26 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 with Co's A and B clearing and outposting Route ORANGE in sector by 0823H. Co's A and B were relieved in place by 2-2 Mech (-) at 0843H with both companies closing FHU LOI by 1148H. At 1945H Dn and 4-52 Inf (ARVN) began moving from respective assembly areas and sealed BINH TRI by 2200H. The seal was maintained throughout the night. 2-2 Mech (-) was attached to 2d Bde upon arrival at FHU LOI at 0807H and relieved 1-26 Inf in place by 0843H. B 1-4 Cav was placed OFCON 2-2 Mech at 0807H. Dn (-) screened Route ORANGE throughout the night while 1-26 Inf and 4-52 Inf (ARVN) sealed BINH TRI. B 1-4 Cav (-) was OFCON 2-2 Mech. One plat was OFCON 1-26 Inf between 0746H-1300H for tunnel exploitation. A 5-2 Arty (-) stood down for maintenance at FHU LOI. B 2-34 Arm (-) was attached 2d Bde upon closure DI AN at 1433H and stood down for maintenance.

23 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf continued to seal BINH TRI (XT9309) in conjunction with 4-52 Inf (ARVN). The seal was broken at 1511H with the search resulting in 18 detainees evacuated to DI AN Sub-Sector. Of the 18, 2 were VC, 7 draft evaders, and 9 uncategorized. Dn moved to DI AN then by truck to FHU LOI closing at 1802H. A 5-2 Arty (-) stood down for maintenance at FHU LOI and at 1655H moved to vic XT908168 and RON'd. B 2-34 Arm (-) was OFCON 1-26 Inf and reverted to 2d Bde control upon closure of DI AN at 1634H.

24 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. Rear elements conducted a sod size recon patrol to the W of DI AN base camp between 0907H-1036H. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf stood down for maintenance at FHU LOI. One plat Co A relieved the plat Co C at Frenchman's Flat rock quarry (XT906081). 2-2 Mech (-) with B 1-4 Cav (-) cleared and outposted Route ORANGE between FHU LOI and DI AN by 0811. Dn also secured engr work parties clearing jungle along Route ORANGE to vic XT916179. B 1-4 Cav remained OFCON 2-2 Mech (-). A 5-2 Arty (-) remained OFCON 2-2 Mech (-). B 2-34 Arm (-) stood down for maintenance at DI AN.

25 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. Rear elements conducted a sod size recon patrol to the W of DI AN base camp between 1305H-1356H. 2-18 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 2-2 Mech (-) with B 1-4 Cav (-) continued jungle clearing ops along Route ORANGE, secured engineer efforts at bridge site (XT909159) and Laterite pit (XT909169), and continued to secure village center of TAN PHUOC KHANH. 1-26 Inf was attached 2d Bde upon closure FHU LOI at 1500H and stood down for maintenance. B 1-4 Cav (-) remained OFCON 2-2 Mech (-). A 5-2 Arty (-) - one section remained OFCON 2-2 Mech (-), one section remained at FHU LOI under Bde control. B 1-4 Cav was OFCON 2d Bde at 0620H. Aerial recon plat conducted Eagle Flights vic XT8822 and XT8530.

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26 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. Rear elements at DI AN positioned a sqd size night ambush vic XT892075. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. Rear elements at DI AN established a sqd size night ambush vic XT902091. 2-18 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf in conjunction with A-52 Inf (ARVN) sealed the village of DONG HA (XT950045) by 0353H. A search of the village commenced at 0740H. The seal was broken at 1309H with 1-26 Inf returning to DI AN. 2-2 Mech (-) with B 1-4 Cav (-) continued jungle clearing opns, secured engineer efforts at bridge site (XT909159) and laterite pit (XT909169), and continued to secure village chief of TAN THUOC KHANH. 1-28 Inf stood down for maintenance at FHU LOI. B 1-4 Cav (-) remained OFCON 2-2 Mech (-). A 5-2 Arty (-); one section remained OFCON 2-2 Mech (-) and another section remained under Bde control at FHU LOI. D 2-34 Arm (-) continued to stand down for maintenance at DI AN. D 1-4 Cav conducted Eagle Flights vic XT8623, XT8622, and XT8722. 100

27 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf relieved 2-2 Mech (-) at 1200H of jungle clearing opns, securing engineer efforts at bridge site (XT909159) and laterite pit (XT909169) and the security of the village chief of TAN THUOC KHANH. 2-2 Mech (-) with B 1-4 Cav (-) continued present mission along Route ORANGE until relieved by 1-26 Inf at 1200H. At 1204H based on intelligence Bn (-) with B 1-4 Cav (-) and D 2-34 Arm (-) commenced moving from fld pns to seal village of OLD LUNG DIA (XT85215). Seal was complete at 1309H and a search of the village conducted. Seal was broken at 1515H with search resulting in 65 detainees. 1-28 Inf based on intelligence was airlifted at 1323H from FHU LOI by UH-1D to vic XT8026, closing at 1530H and conducted S&D opns to the S. B 1-4 Cav remained OFCON 2-2 Mech (-). A 5-2 Arty (-); one section remained OFCON 2-2 Mech until 1200H at which time it was OFCON 1-28 Inf; one section remained at FHU LOI under Bde control. B 2-34 Arm (-) was OFCON 2-2 Mech at 1200H. D 1-4 Cav conducted VRs and Eagle Flights vic XT7924, XT8122, XT8219, XT8219, and XT8023.

28 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf with one section A 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67 securing engr efforts along Route ORANGE, bridge site and laterite pit, securing chief of TAN THUOC KHANH and the Frenchman's Flat rock quarry. 2-2 Mech (-) with B 1-4 Cav (-) and D 2-34 Arm (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D opns vic XT7923. 1-28 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D opns in HOA LOI woods (XT8026) commencing at 0605H. B 1-4 Cav remained OFCON 2-2 Mech. A 5-2 Arty (-); one section remained OFCON 1-26 Inf and one section remained at FHU LOI under Bde control. B 2-34 Arm (-) remained OFCON 2-2 Mech. D 1-4 Cav: Trp conducted VRs throughout LAM SON 67 AO. At 1030H Aerial Recon Flat (ARF) was inserted vic XT852344.

29 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf with one section A 5-2 Arty continued Operation LAM SON 67 securing engr efforts along Route ORANGE, bridge site and laterite pit, securing chief of TAN THUOC KHANH and the Frenchman's Flat rock quarry. 2-2 Mech (-) with B 1-4 Cav (-) and D 2-34 Arm (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D opns vic XT8218. 1-28 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D opns in HOA LOI Woods (XT8026) and with Division "Tunnel Rats" exploit tunnel vic XT804270. B 1-4 Cav (-) remained OFCON 2-2 Mech. A 5-2 Arty (-); one section remained OFCON 1-26 Inf and one section remained at FHU LOI under Bde control. B 2-34 Arm (-) remained OFCON 2-2 Mech. D 1-4 Cav conducted VRs and Eagle Flights throughout LAM SON 67 AO.

30 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. Rear elements conducted a squad size recon patrol to the W of DI AN base camp. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf with one section A 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67 securing engr efforts along Route ORANGE, bridge site and laterite pit, securing chief of TAN THUOC KHANH and the Frenchman's Flat rock quarry. 2-2 Mech (-) with B 1-4 Cav (-) and D 2-34 Arm (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D opns vic XT8026. 1-28 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D opns in HOA LOI Woods (XT8026) and was airlifted by UH-1D commencing at 1442H from field locations to FHU LOI upon closure became Bde RRF. B 1-4 Cav (-) remained OFCON 2-2 Mech. A 5-2 Arty (-); one section remained OFCON 1-26 Inf and one section remained at FHU LOI under Bde control. B 2-34 Arm (-) remained OFCON 2-2 Mech. D 1-4 Cav continued VRs throughout LAM SON 67 AO.

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7. (C) Part VII

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a. Discussion

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(1) Training

The 2d Brigade Replacement Training School continued to provide transition training for replacements in the Brigade. Personnel on their first tour in RVN in the grade of E-7 and below and officers in the grade of O1 and O2 attend the school. During the reporting period, a total of 13 classes were conducted and 820 personnel were graduated. Selected personnel in the Brigade received instruction on the characteristic and employment of the "Nightingale - Small Arms Simulator" and on the Detector, Intrusion, AN/FSR-1 during the reporting period. In accordance with 1st Infantry Division LOI 2-67, dated 17 April 67, a command orientation program was prepared for the training of commanders and members of their command prior to undertaking the mission of revolutionary development support. The instruction is designed to develop understanding of the LAM SON 67 area, the protagonists in the area, and principles and techniques in revolutionary development. During the reporting period, 525 personnel received the command orientation. As units are attached to the 2d Brigade, the orientation will be conducted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
1. Lessons Learned

Distribution:
20 Copies AVDB-G-3


CHARLES F. BAMFORD II
Major Infantry
Adjutant

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LESSONS LEARNED

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1. (C) During the initial employment of the Detector, Intrusion, AN/FSR-1 it was revealed that the device is extremely sensitive to the vibrations caused by friendly artillery as projectiles pass in the vicinity of the seismometers. It is recommended that the seismometers be dug into the ground at least two (2) feet to eliminate excessive vibrations. Vibrations caused by firing and impact of projectiles must be allowed so as to maintain sensitivity of device. Device is proving most useful on listening posts and ambush positions.
2. (C) Landing zones must be thoroughly checked for possible explosive devices. These consist of mines buried and on top of the ground. JUNCTION CITY
3. (C) To get captured documents and material evacuated rapidly. S-2s should have a length of rope with a sand bag attached so these items can be lifted by LOH through the trees. JUNCTION CITY
4. (C) Detaining VN along roads and highways, units must be prepared to evacuate bicycles, motor bikes and lambrettas with these people. LAN SON 67
5. (C) Bunkers, large caches of rice, trenches and other VC installations can be destroyed more rapidly and efficiently by the use of bulldozers.
6. (C) Each rifle platoon and weapons platoon within the rifle companies must designate one man to give the mortar alert. When possible, the same individual will shoot an azimuth to the sound of the mortars being fired. This will assist the units in obtaining early warning and rapid employment of counter-mortar fire.
7. (C) A minimum of four chain saws must be available at the battalion field trains location for immediate use in the forward area, to cut landing zones and dust off sites. A minimum of 4 each 120 foot lengths of rope must be on hand in order to lower the chain saws through the jungle canopy.
8. (C) A-22 bags containing ammunition required by the maneuver elements should not exceed 800 lbs or the UH-1D cannot lift them.
9. (C) Unit trains should accompany the maneuver elements moves ie when a unit is committed, its trains should be in a position and postured to support them.
10. (C) When units are committed to a location which requires a long aerial turn-around time, if possible, an intermediate log base should be maintained in a secure area for movement of prepared Class I, and Ordnance and accompanying Class V which is normally evacuated to the Dn trains upon movement of maneuver elements. Resupply from the Supply Point to this intermediate base can be accomplished by either wheel or aircraft, however the situation dictates. The overall resupply time is considerably reduced in this manner.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE AND LAI THE EAST
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDE-WB-C

3 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1))

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96345

1. PART I. INTRODUCTION:

a. During the quarter just prior to the reporting period five major unit operations were conducted with a major engagement being fought on 6 November 1966. During the reporting period five major unit operations were conducted and major engagements were fought on 28 February 1967 and on 10-11 March 1967. On 28 February 1967, while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY, Company B 1/16 Infantry made contact with elements from two battalions of the 101st FVA Regiment. The immediate employment of close air support and artillery fire combined with B Company fire power resulted in an enemy loss of 167 KIA (B3) and 45 assorted weapons. On the night of 10-11 March 1967, also during Operation JUNCTION CITY, the 2/2 Infantry (-) was attacked by at least 2 battalions of the 272d VC Main Force Regiment. Well prepared positions combined with close air support and responsive artillery fire assisted the defenders in inflicting 197 KIA's (C3) and 5 VCC upon the enemy while suffering only light casualties. There was no major contact during the remainder of the operation, but great quantities of VC food and materials were captured or destroyed.

b. Component Units and Commanding Officers:

1/16 Infantry; LTC Rufus C Lazell, 26 November 1966, present
2/2 Infantry; LTC Edward J Collins, 22 December 1966, present
2/28 Infantry; LTC Elmer D Pendleton, 11 August 1966-15 March 1967
LTC Jerry S Edwards, 15 March 1967, present
2/33 Artillery; LTC Charles D Daniel, 1 August 1966, present

2. PART II. NARRATIVE OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS:

a. Major operations conducted by the 3d Brigade during the reporting period included the following:

(1) Operation WILLISTON (1-12 February 1967): The mission was to conduct road clearing and security operations on HWY 13 between BEN CAT and CHAN THANH. Information received prior to the operation confirmed that civilian travelers on HWY 13 were paying VC tariff collectors. Also VC mines, booby traps, and road blocks, on HWY 13 were common occurrences. Although no large VC units were known to be permanently stationed around LAI THE, several supply routes were known to cross Highway 13 and the 3d Brigade TAOR. Operation WILLISTON was conducted in the BINH DUONG Province between BEN CAT and CHAN THANH on HWY 13 to keep the highway open to military traffic. The terrain in the area is flat to gently rolling. Vegetation is mostly dense with some open areas and rubber trees. The dense jungle afforded excellent cover and concealment, but fields of fire and observation were limited. There were no major obstacles in the area of operation. The weather was dry throughout the operation. The mornings and evenings were cool but the days were hot. Civilians encountered in the area were mostly women, children and old men. In the village of BEN CAT and CHAN THANH the people were cooperative and sometimes friendly.

During the period 1-9 February 1967 1/16 Infantry and 1/4 Cavalry secured HWY 13 from LAI THE to CHAN THANH with 2/28 Infantry replacing 1/16 Infantry on 10 February 1967. The road was cleared and secured each morning and extensive patrolling was conducted during the hours of daylight while resupply convoys were run daily

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between LAI KHE and QUAN LOI. The Brigade suffered 3 KIA and 13 WIA. VC losses were 15 KIA (BC), 1 WIA, 1 detainee, 7 individual weapons; 23 bags assorted clothing, 2 chemical grenades, 4 frag grenades and assorted documents.

The operation was supported by Air Force close air strikes and artillery operating out of LAI KHE, BAU BANG and QUAN THANH.

(2) Operation TUCSON D (15-21 February 1967). The mission assigned the 3d Brigade was as follows: Move to assigned AO with 2/28 Infantry and 1/16 Infantry Battalions conducting a combat assault into LZ's 1 & 2 respectively; and 3/5 Cavalry Squadron moving overland to position Delta. Units conduct combat reconnaissance in zone. Operation TUCSON D was a 1st Infantry Division operation with 3d Brigade operating in the Northern part of BINH DUONG Province Northeast of LAI KHE and close to the Eastern edge of MICHELIN Rubber Plantation. Intelligence received prior to the operation indicated that the general area was habitually used by the 272d VC Regiment. Elements of the PHU LOI Battalion; C 61, the BEN CAT District Company and C 45 the QUAN THE NH District Platoon also reportedly operate in the area and harass traffic along HWY 13. Terrain in the area was flat to gently rolling. The vegetation was mostly dense with a few open areas and some rubber areas. The dense jungle afforded excellent cover and concealment for most of the installations discovered. Fields of fire were extremely limited throughout the area. Weather did not affect the conduct of the operation. Since there were no villages in the area, no problem was presented by the civilian populace.

The 1/16 Infantry and 2/28 Infantry conducted air assaults into LZ's Northwest of LAI KHE. Neither landing was opposed. 3/5 Cavalry began moving West from vicinity BAU BANG and Southeast from QUAN THANH. The 2/28 Infantry conducted combat reconnaissance Eastward along the Northern boundary of BINH DUONG Province while 1/16 Infantry began moving Westward along the same boundary. Throughout the operation the VC refused to make major contact and continued to conduct harassing sniper fires, booby trap activity and mining activities along and adjacent to roads. Several base camps were found throughout the area most of which contained abundant rice caches. The units moving along the North BINH DUONG Province boundary could hardly move 25-30 meters off the road without discovering new caches of rice. Since the units did not have the capability to extract this much rice, most of it was destroyed. The 1/16 Infantry NDP was mortared on the morning of 15 February and again on the 17th. The battalion sustained 8 wounded on the first and no casualties on the latter. The 3d Brigade lost 3 KIA and 30 WIA during this operation while the VC lost 1,622.2 tons of rice, 140 tons of which was extracted; 27 tons of salt, 70 lbs fish; 1-12 gauge shotgun, 7 AP mines, 124 boobytrapped grenades, 6 M-79 rounds, 2 82 MM mortar rounds, 295 small arms rounds, 1 US protective mask, 1 wagon, 1 sewing machine, 60 gal tar, 55 gal oil, 25 gal coal oil, 2 bicycles, 5 ox carts, 3 lanterns, 23 huts, 9 base camps, 37 bunkers, miscellaneous clothing and documents.

3d Brigade units were supported on Operation TUCSON D by 2/33 Artillery (AS) and C 8/6 Artillery (GSR-2/33 Artillery). In order to provide close and continuous support the 2/33 Artillery (105) operated out of Base III (XT6658) and C 8/6 Artillery (155) out of Base IV (XT7361). The artillery was used extensively in LZ preparation and for blocking fires. The 2/33 Artillery fired a total of 7,267 rounds of 105 MM in support of the 3d Brigade during the operation. The Air Force flew a total of 71 close air support sorties in support of the Brigade.

(3) Operation JUNCTION CITY (22 February - 14 March 1967). The mission assigned the 3d Brigade was: 3d Brigade conducts a ground assault along AXIS IRON on 220630 February 1967; opens and secures Highway 4 from TAY NINH to KATUM; conducts combat reconnaissance within AO to destroy VC/NVA forces and bases; secure work parties in zone; prevents exfiltration of VC/NVA forces along the Eastern portion of the AO. Operation JUNCTION CITY was a Division operation with the 3d Brigade operating in TAY NINH Province North and East of TAY NINH City. Intelligence received prior to the operation was based upon confirmed information gained during Operation ATTLEBORO in November 1966. The area of interest to the 3d Brigade was generally the Eastern and Northeastern sector of War Zone C along Route 4. Throughout the area, which has been under VC control for many years, there were numerous base camps, supply depots, training sites and medical complexes. It was known, from documents, villagers reports and captured enemy material that both COSVN and 9th Division Headquarters were situated in the area of operation. Terrain in the area of operation was low flat land with very gentle slopes. Elevations were less than 100 meters. Most of the area was dense jungle interspersed with many clearings, marshes, ponds, waste land, and streams. Concealment and cover were generally excellent but fields of fire and observation were limited. Weather was hot and humid throughout and did not cause any significant change in plans or conduct of the operation. Dust, caused by supporting fires on the landing zone created hazardous conditions for helicopters making final approaches.

The operation began with 1/4 Cavalry, followed by 2/2 Infantry (Mech), making a thrust from SUOI K North along HWY 4 to vicinity of KATUM. 2/2 Infantry

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3. PART III. INTELLIGENCE (Enemy order of Battle):

a. Enemy activity during the reporting period was characterized by small unit actions involving sniping, mining, booby trapping, road block building and other harassing activities. There appeared to be a desire on the part of enemy main force units to avoid engagement with US Forces with the exception of the period 28 February and 10 March 1967 when battalion size forces initiated large scale attacks against 3d Brigade elements in TAY NINH Province. Principal units in the area of interest of the 3d Brigade which could have possibly influenced any battle situation in an around the Brigade TAOR included the following:

(1) 9th VC Division-The regiments of the division are deployed primarily in TAY NINH Province and the LONG NGUYEN area of BINH DUONG Province.

(2) 101st NVA Regiment in TAY NINH Province believed to be subordinate to the 9th Division.

(3) 273d Regiment: Believed to be in BINH DUONG Province.

(4) 165 A Regiment: GIA DINH Province.

(5) 141st NVA Regiment: PHUOC LONG Province.

(6) PHU LOI Battalion: BINH DUONG Province.

(7) C 61 District Company: BEN CAT District.

(8) C 63 LAI THIEU District Company

b. During the specific operation conducted by the Brigade in the reporting period, enemy actions and reactions varied according to the type of operation being conducted. For each operation, a brief summary of enemy activity is presented as follows:

(1) Operation WILLISTON:

Unidentified battalion size units were reported to be crossing HWY 13 in the operational area. These units had been reported to be selecting RON positions three to four kilometers from known crossing sites. Local force units and local guerrilla bands were known to be operating the entire distance along HWY 13 from LAI ME to CHAN THANH. The missions of the units were to collect taxes, lay mines, construct roadblocks, cut the highway and report US and ARVN activities in the area. The entire area was known to be a VC West to East supply route, crossing HWY 13 at several points. No major contact was made during the operation. There were numerous isolated harassing incidents from snipers, booby traps and mines. The layout units contacted were of squad size. Although no unit designations were made it was evident that forces encountered were local guerrilla type units. Several small base camps were located and were believed to be stopping off places for supply units passing through the Brigade TAOR.

(2) Operation TUCSON - D:

The general area of operation was reported to be habitually used by the 272d VC Regiment whose base areas are in the LONG NGUYEN secret zone and North of the MICHELIN Rubber Plantation. Elements of the PHU LOI Battalion; C-61, the BEN CAT District Company; and C 45, the CHAN THANH District Platoon also reportedly operate in this area and harass traffic on HWY 13. It was believed that the 272d Regiment would defend against search, sweep or penetration attempts in the MINH THANH, MICHELIN, and LONG NGUYEN areas. Several VC political headquarters elements were believed to be located in the operational areas. These elements were the BINH LONG Province Committee and the CHAN THANH District Committee. It was reported that there were heavy concentrations of VC installations in the Northern LONG NGUYEN and MICHELIN Plantation areas. Little was known of VC installations in the CHAN THANH District East of HWY 13. Numerous base camps, fortified positions and supply caches were expected to be found during the operation. During the operation the enemy employed harassing tactics. Isolated snipers and numerous booby traps were encountered. On two occasions RON positions were mortared with 82 mm mortars resulting in 8 US KIA. No major contact was made and the largest VC unit encountered was approximately 20 men in strength. Many large base camps, one of regiment size and two battalion size, were found. Many large rice caches and storage

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secured and established Artillery Base I, II, & III at XT2869, XT2879, & XT290815 respectively. 2/28 Infantry air landed vicinity XT321871 the following day and secured the road in sector. The 1/16 Infantry was air lifted into LZ's APPLE and BRACH (XT268748 & XT276713) on 24 February and secured HWY 17 in sector. On 28 February Company B 1/16 Infantry made contact with an estimated two VC battalions of the 101st NVA Regiment. Responsive artillery and close air support enabled Company B to be extracted with moderate casualties, while heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. On the night of 10-11 March an estimated two battalions from 272d VC Regiment attempted to overrun Artillery Base II. The base defended by 2/2 Infantry (-), 168th Engineer Company and 2/33 Artillery. The determined defense by these units and the outstanding support provided by artillery and close air strikes soundly defeated the VC. While receiving only 1 KIA and 31 wounded the defenders killed 197 of the attackers, and captured 5. These were the only major contacts made by the 3d Brigade. The enemy confined himself to harassing with sniper fire, booby traps and land mines. The Brigade losses during this operation were 35 KIA and 147 MIA. VC losses were: 414 KIA, 5 POW, 5 MIA, assorted weapons, ammunition, signal equipment and food stuff were captured during the operation that greatly depleted the VC's stores and supplies in TAY NINH Province and weakened his ability to dominate the area.

(4) Operation LAMSON-67 (17 March- 17 April 1967). The assigned mission: 3d Brigade will conduct Revolutionary Development Operations in the LAMSON South and central AO's; secure Divisional base camps at LAI KHE, PHUOC VINH, DI AN and PHU LOI; and secure the village chiefs of TAN PHUOC KINH and BINH CHUAN. Operation LAMSON-67 was a 1st Infantry Division operation with 3d Brigade working in Southeastern BINH DUONG Province and Western DIEN HOI Province in the PHU LOI-DI AN area. As a result of previous operations it was known that the area contained numerous base camps, supply depots, tunnels, bunkers, and other allied installations. Terrain in the area was flat to gently rolling. The vegetation was mostly dense with a few open areas. Weather was hot and dry and did not affect the operation. During the initial period (17-22 March) the Brigade sealed and searched 4 hamlets with exceptional results. In all instances the seal was not penetrated and from ten to fifteen suspected VC were culled from the detainees. While the Brigade secured the road from DIEN CAT to "PHUOC VINH" (23-31 March) all convoys passed without delay and with no loss to the convoys themselves. During the latter period (1-17 April) the Brigade cleared the TAN B' Jungle area finding base camp areas and tunnel complexes which had previously gone undetected by other units. US losses during the operation were 2 KIA and 75 MIA. VC losses were 7 KIA (PO), 31 detainees, 29 draft evaders arrested and 4 deserters apprehended, 1 AK 50, 21 assorted rifles, 7 shotguns, 1 chicom SMG, 2 US carbines, 1 homemade mortar, 1 French 7.5 MM MG, 1 French MAT 49 rifle, 1-9 M1 SMG, 2 M-1 rifles, 1 chicom carbine, 7 grenades, 2 claymores, 1 AT mine and miscellaneous equipment captured.

(5) Operation MANHATTAN (22 April 1967 - present). The assigned mission: 3d Brigade conducts a multi-battalion combat assault on 23 April 1967; conducts combat reconnaissance and jungle destruction in assigned AO; destroys VC/NVA forces and installations within the operational area. Operation MANHATTAN is a multi-division operation with the 3d Brigade operating in the TAN DIEN Forestry Reserve West of LAI KHE in the BINH DUONG Province. The area of operation is a known VC supply area. It had been partially covered during Operation CHAR FALLS but intelligence reports indicated increased activity in the area just prior to the operation. Terrain in the area is flat to gently rolling land covered mostly with dense jungle and open marshy areas. Many areas defoliated since August past are completely devoid of all growing vegetation. The principal stream in the area is the SAIGON River but it presented no obstacle to the tactical plan. Weather during the operation has been hot and humid with occasional thunder showers. On 22 April 1967 the Brigade began Operation MANHATTAN with diversionary touchdowns on LZ's PAT and WICK in the IRON TRIANGLE. On 23 April 1967 the 1/2 Infantry and 2/28 Infantry conducted air assaults on LZ JOE and 2/18 Infantry conducted an air assault on LZ AL. The Battalions then began combat reconnaissance operations in sector. In the operational area the battalions are finding mostly small base camps and small caches of ammunition, food and materials. So far in the operation the VC have refused to become engaged in a major contact but have continued harassing sniper and booby trap operations. So far in the operation 3d Brigade has lost 5 KIA and 16 MIA. VC losses have been 36 KIA (PO), 4 POW, 4 chicom 7.62 rifles, 1 M-79 grenade launcher, 2 7.92 mauser rifles, 12 VC gasmasks, 1 Soviet SMG, 1 Thompson SMG, 1 Springfield rifle, 1 P38 pistol, 2 US SMG's, 2 US rifles, 1 drill press, 158,000 lbs of rice, miscellaneous documents captured; 206,150 lbs of rice, 2075 lbs salt, 30 chicom claymores, 915 chicom grenades, 300 lbs TNT, 2 55 gals of oil, 60 50 kilo bags of cement, 18 AP mines, 1 250 lb bomb, 300 82 MM mortar rounds, 600 60 MM mortar rounds, 500 gallons of cooking oil, miscellaneous clothing, equipment and ammunition destroyed.

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areas were found and one POW camp with accommodations for approximately 30 POW's. There were numerous bunkers, huts, tunnels, and fortified positions throughout the area. Most of the bunkers discovered were either supply or bomb shelter type. Each base camp had an abundance of one and two man foxholes.

(3) Operation JUNCTION CITY:

(a) Information received prior to the operation was based upon confirmed information gained during Operation ATTLEBORO in November 1966. Throughout the area of interest there were numerous base camps, supply depot, training sites, medical complexes and many permanent type fortified defensive positions. There were strong indications that the VC would defend the area. It was known, from documents, rallier reports and captured enemy material, that both COSVN and 9th Division Headquarters controlled the largest VC Division in the III Corps and presented the greatest threat to friendly operations. CB information listed the following units in the operational area:

1 Main Force Units: The 271, 272, and 101st NVA Regiments of the 9th Division and the 70th Security Guard Regiment supported by elements of the 69th Artillery Group, and the 680th Training Regiment.

2 Reinforcements: The 52d, 111st and the 165th NVA Regiments, of the 7th Division, although weakened, were available to reinforce the 9th Division.

3 In addition, the 11th Local Force Battalion and TAY NINH Local Force Companies and other guerrilla units could be expected to employ harassing tactics or be employed in limiting reinforcing role.

(b) The VC initially did not defend base camps or supply installations. Numerous small contacts were made with fleeing VC squad size elements. Most base camps showed signs of recent use. Bunkers of all descriptions were found throughout the area. Most were foxhole type with overhead cover. Numerous trenches and storage bunkers containing rice and arms caches were also located. It appeared that the VC were well prepared to defend against armor and mechanized units. This was evidenced by the extremely heavy volume of AT fire directed against US tracked vehicles. The majority of AT fires were from RPG 2 rockets. Numerous AT mining incidents were recorded. The heavy volume of AT fire continued throughout the operation.

(c) Major contact was made with elements of the VC 9th Division on 28 February 1967. When elements of B 1/16 Infantry, while on a combat reconnaissance made contact with an estimated multi-battalion force believed to be from the 101st NVA Regiment. The action by B 1/16 Infantry disrupted what appeared to be a staging area for a planned attack on a US convoy passing thru the area. On the evening of 10 March 1967, the 2d Battalion (Mech) 2d Infantry and elements of the 168th Engineer Battalion, located at Artillery Base II, were taken under heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire by a multi-battalion force from the 272 Regiment. The VC attempted to overrun the base with a grand attack but were repulsed and suffered heavy casualties. The 272 Regiment was supported by the 69th Artillery Group who supported the attack with 120 MM mortars. A substantial amount of weapons, ammunition and explosives were captured during the operation.

(4) Operation LAMSON:

Numerous unidentified units were reported to be in the area of interest. Specifically to the East of HWY 13 and along HWY 21 and 14. The PHU LOI Battalion, C 301 (PHU GIO Company) the C 61 (BON CAT Company), C 62 (CHAN THIENH Company) and C 63 (LAI THEU Company) had been known to operate in the area. Additionally numerous small guerrilla units habitually operated throughout. Reports also indicated that a new company known as the LAI KHE Company was operating in the area. Base camps, supply depots and training areas were spotted throughout the LAMSON area. No major contact was made, however numerous squad size elements were engaged as they attempted to employ harassing tactics. Roads in the area were found to be very heavily mined. The mines consisted of both command detonated and pressure type AT mines. Base camps, two of which were battalion size, consisted of well prepared fighting hole with overhead cover. In the LAMSON South area a large base camp complex which included a medical facility and extensive tunnel networks was discovered. Documents found in the base camp indicated that it was a finance and supply depot used by the LAI THEU District Committee. Numerous weapons, medical supplies, miscellaneous equipment and documents were captured as a result of the operation. Three cordon and search operations were conducted during LAMSON.

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These operations netted a total of 16 VCS, 12 whom were released and 4 who were released to PHU LOI District for further interrogation.

(5) Operation MANHATTAN:

The area of interest was penetrated during Operation CINDER FALLS which ended on 26 January 1967. Although Operation CINDER FALLS disrupted the operation of MR IV Operations and uncovered numerous logistical bases, indications were that the 83d Logistical Group had re-established supply bases throughout the area. The area was reportedly covered with small supply facilities, base camps, tunnels bunkers and other allied installations. It was expected that all areas were heavily mined and booby trapped. Political elements that could have been encountered were: MR IV, TAU D'U MOT Province Committee, NEN C T and D'U TING District Committee and their subordinates. During the initial days of the operation numerous base camps, supply installations and medical facilities were located. The amounts of weapons, equipment, documents, and rice which were located substantiated the fact that this area was a logistical complex operated by the 83d Logistical Group. No major contact was made, however, sniper incidents, booby trapping and usual VC harassing tactics were encountered. The operation continues and follow up reports will be submitted as they occur.

4. PART IV PERSONNEL:

a. Strength:

(1) Authorized: Officers 134 WO: 12 EM 2554

(2) Assigned: as of 28 February - Officers 125 WO 6 EM 2467
as of 31 March - Officers 124 WO 8 EM 2529
as of 30 April - Officers 126 WO 8 EM 2568

(3) Replacements gained during the period 1 February to 30 April-1166.

(4) Hospital returns during the period 1 February to 30 April-170.

(5) Other troops authorized and assigned during period: one (1) Liaison officer (ARVN), one (1) driver (ARVN), and twelve (12) interpreters (ARVN).

b. Replacements: Presently, this unit is short 8 officers, short 4 WO, and over 14 EM. All newly assigned EM in the grade of E-7 and below and officers in grades O-1 and O-2 attend the "Combat Indoctrination Course" conducted by the Brigade S-3.

c. Discipline: During the period 1 February through 30 April 1967, one (1) enlisted man was tried by Summary Court Martial, sixteen (16) enlisted men were tried by Special Court Martial, and four (4) enlisted men were tried by General Courts Martial.

d. Prisoner of War: 15 VCS and 12 VCC were processed through US and ARVN channels. 2 rollies were returned to government control.

e. Burials and Graves Registration: None

f. Civil Assistance: See S-5 portion attached.

g. Morale and Personnel Services: Morale of the Brigade continues to be high. 2 distinguished Service Crosses, 10 Silver Stars, 11 Soldier's Medals, 5 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 2 Legion of Merit, 120 Bronze Stars (Valor), 199 Bronze Stars (Merit), 17 Army Commendation Medals (Valor), 230 Army Commendation Medals (Merit) and 60 Air Medals have been recommended for awarding to members of the Brigade. The facilities of the Red Cross Recreation Center were rejuvenated and a new filter unit was added to the pool. The pool is currently closed for a complete renovation and will be reopened in the near future. A new car purchasing outlet has been added to the PX offering one more service to the troops. "Radio LAI KHE" continues to operate from 1200-2400 daily for the enjoyment of the troops garrisoned at this base. Very fine ARC support is available at all times.

h. Personnel Management: Assignment of newly arrived replacements has been altered when ever necessary to allow an equalization in the distribution of personnel within the battalions normally attached to this headquarters.

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1. Civilian Employment:

(1) 1,034 Vietnamese personnel are employed within the base perimeter.

(a) 250 are employed by the firm of Pacific Architects and Engineers.

(b) 169 are employed by concessions, clubs, or individual groups as caretakers.

(c) 615 are employed as permanent and temporary laborers.

(2) Additionally there are 35 Koreans, 15 Filipinos and 9 US citizens employed within the base camp.

f. Psychological Operations: During the quarter 1 February to 30 April 1967 a total of five (5) leaflet drops were made. Due to the MACV Psywar Campaign for TET in February only one (1) leaflet drop was made. The 246th Psyops Company conducted all leaflet drops during February 1967. During March 1967 the psychological capability of the 3d Brigade S5 section was extremely limited due primarily to a non-availability of psychological aircraft. During the quarter 520,000 leaflets were dropped in support of TET festivities and operation "MANHATTAN". Among the leaflets dropped were 50,000 TET greetings from the 1st Infantry Division Commander, 80,000 Chieu Hoi, 140,000 Safe Conduct Passes, 50,000 Weapons Reward, and 200,000 Special Map Leaflets for operation "MANHATTAN". 10 & 1/2 hours of taped loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted during the quarter. Among the tapes played was one made by a POW and another made by a Chieu Hoi. All target areas for leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts were selected in conjunction with and upon recommendation of the 3d Brigade S-2.

(2) During the quarter sixty-two (62) tons of commodities and 180 cases of food stuff were distributed to local Vietnamese living within the 3d Brigade TAOR, with the majority going to refugees in the BEN CAT area. Among the commodities distributed were TET presents, cooking oil, corrugated tin. In addition, seventy (70) tons of captured rice and 500 lbs of captured salt were returned to SVN with the majority going to refugees in the BEN CAT area.

(3) One hundred twenty (120) houses have been completed at the BEN CAT Refugee Center. USAID has been unable to supply enough aluminum roofing and 1st Division G5 has not delivered approximately 5000 board feet of lumber that was purchased from CMR. Other projects under taken are the painting of the LAI KHE dispensary ward and cinva-ram block factory. The dispensary ward is 25% complete. 300 cinva-ram blocks have been produced so far in the factory.

(4) 1974 patients from the BEN CAT and LAI KHE areas were treated during the quarter under the Brigade MEDIC program.

(5) Two (2) Solatium Payments were made during the quarter.

5. PART V LOGISTICS:

a. The majority of operations during the reporting period were resupplied from the LAI KHE base. On two occasions a forward supply base was established near the operations area. The majority of resupply was effected by helicopter, although road resupply was used extensively. No significant problems were encountered.

b. Supply:

(1) Supported strength: 4300 average.

(2) Supply levels	Auth	On Hand
(a) Class I	15 days	15 days
(b) Class II & LV	draw as needed	
(c) Class V	3 days	3 days +
(d) Class III		

JP 4	90,000 Gallons	86,500 Gallon
AVGAS	21,500 Gallons	24,500 Gallon
MOGAS	60,000 Gallons	52,000 Gallon
Diesel	65,000 Gallons	62,500 Gallon

(e) Items in short supply: Engineers heavy equipment, ie bulldozers, road graders, and front end scope loaders. Also electrical wiring,

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flashlights, and water trailers.

(3) Local Procurement: Ice purchases constitute the principle purchase made from the local economy. Small amounts of electrical items and building materials (bricks) have been purchased. Quality is acceptable.

c. Evacuation:

(1) Casualties:

(a) From Hostile Actions:	135
(b) Disease	85
(c) Injury	75

(2) Prisoners of War:

(3) Refugees: No refugees were evacuated during the reporting period.

d. Transportation:

(1) Highway - 5000 tons of cargo were moved to LAI KHE over Highway 13. Minor repairs were required to keep the road in a passable condition.

(2) Air: 2100 tons of cargo were airlifted into LAI KHE.

e. Service:

(1) Maintenance: The direct support ordnance unit has been able to keep abreast of maintenance problems in the vehicle category. The number of jobs awaiting parts has dropped considerably. Engineer and Signal equipment has been the source of most problems, but the backlog of jobs has also decreased. PLL's and ASL's are approximately 75% of their authorized levels.

(2) Construction: Approximately 67% of the currently approved base plan has been completed.

(3) Miscellaneous: N/A

6. PART VI CHRONOLOGY:

1 February 1967	Operation WILLISTON commenced
12 February 1967	Operation WILLISTON terminated
15 February 1967	Operation TUCSON commenced
21 February 1967	Operation TUCSON terminated
22 February 1967	Operation JUNCTION CITY commenced
15 March 1967	Operation JUNCTION CITY terminated and LTC Jerry S. Edwards replaced LTC Elmer D. Anderson as G-2/23 Infantry.
27 March 1967	Operation LANSON II commenced
17 April 1967	Operation LANSON II terminated
22 April 1967	Operation MANHATTAN

7. PART VII DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Operation WILLISTON: Since Operation WILLISTON consisted of normal road runner and security operations no significant lessons learned.

(2) Operation TUCSON D:

(a) Armored fighting vehicles should not be utilized for transporting rice. The rice tends to interfere with the movement of the tank turret and leaves the vehicle vulnerable to ambush.

(b) There is an urgent requirement for a practical and effective method of destroying rice.

(3) Operation JUNCTION CITY: When used in conjunction with infantry patrolling the flanks, road runner operations greatly assist in keeping a road clear of mines. However, when used exclusively to secure an area, road runner operations cannot protect a convoy from sniper and anti-tank fire and the unit conducting the operation will probably suffer numerous losses to mines planted between runs.

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(4) Operation LAMSON-67: None

b. Recommendations:

(1) Operations should be planned so that in the event a large base camp, tunnel system or supply cache is found, additional time can be allotted to thoroughly search and destroy the area.

(2) When assigning AO's to units clearing and securing roads, enough area must be assigned to allow for adequate patrolling on both sides of the road. The unit should never be assigned less than 2500 meters from the road.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Robert D. Munro

ROBERT D MUNRO
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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COMBAT COMMENTS



2-67

Horseshoes with Charlie

On 22 February 1967 a gigantic military horseshoe was pitched into the pit of War Zone C and the largest operation of the Vietnamese war was underway. (See JUNCTION CITY I map attached) By evening of the 22d, a casual observer flying over War Zone C would have spotted settling dust as the well-aimed horseshoe slid into place. That settling dust was a direct result of mechanized, airmobile, and airborne forces of the US 25th Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade and the BIG RED ONE. The western and northwestern portions of the horseshoe were occupied by the 25th Infantry Division. The northeastern and eastern portions of the horseshoe were occupied by forces of the 1st Infantry Division and 173d Airborne Brigade.

From MINH THANH the 1st Bn, 2d Inf, 1st Bn 26th Inf and 1st Bn, 28th Inf conducted heliborne assaults in the north along Route 246. From QUAN LOI, the 4th Bn, 503d Inf and 1st Bn, 503d Inf of the 173d Airborne Brigade under the operational control of the 1st Division, conducted heliborne assaults in the northeast along Route 246. From BIEN HOA the 2d Bn, 503d Inf conducted the first battalion-size parachute assault since the Korean War. Their drop zone was north of KATUM along Route 246. The eastern portion of the horseshoe was occupied by the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav with Co B, 34th Armor attached, the 2d Bn (Mech), 2d Inf and the 1st Bn, 16th Inf. From 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav positions in the south to 1st Bn, 2d Inf positions in the north, 12 batteries of artillery thundered 105mm, 155mm, and 8 inch howitzer support. When all blocking units were in position, search and destroy forces surged into the open end of the horseshoe toward blocking forces in the north.

As those forces charged north, let's consider some of the reasons which brought about Operation JUNCTION CITY. In November 1966, the 1st Infantry Division entered the southern portions of War Zone C on Operation

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ATTLEBORO. The operation yielded large stores of VC foodstuffs and munitions and uncovered extensive logistical, administrative, and training complexes. In addition, forces of the 9th VC Division were encountered in well-fortified base areas. ATTLEBORO yielded 1136 tons of rice and 845 VC killed. If southern War Zone C was so productive, northern War Zone C, along the Cambodian border, was probably an equally ripe target. To confirm this, during the months of December, January, and early February, a thorough evaluation was made of documents captured during ATTLEBORO; a concentrated intelligence-gathering effort was focused on War Zone C. Captured enemy materiel, documents, prisoners, and ralliers indicated that both the Central Organization for South Vietnam (COSVN) and the 9th VC Division Headquarters were located in northern War Zone C. In short, the most logical pit for that giant horseshoe was northern War Zone C.

The forces pouring into the open end of the horseshoe continued their thrust northward. The 2d Bn, 28th Inf was helilifted into the area, and in coordination with all forces around the horseshoe, conducted search and destroy operations. On 28 February, just east of Route TL 4, Co B, 1st Bn, 16th Inf engaged two battalions of the 101st North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment. The brief engagement cost the NVA Regiment 167 killed. All units continued their missions, locating rice, supplies, munitions, base camps, and training areas throughout the zone of operations.

As JUNCTION CITY entered its third week with only one major enemy encounter and sizeable but unspectacular equipment finds, a prominent news magazine in the United States asked its readers, "Whatever became of JUNCTION CITY?" An answer developed as the BIG RED ONE prepared to charge into phase II of JUNCTION CITY and encounter three additional regiments of the 9th VC Division. However, before JUNCTION CITY I was finished an additional major engagement took place. On 10 March 1967 the 2d Bn (Mech), 2d Inf, minus Co B, was attacked at a fire support base along Route TL 4 by the 272d VC Regiment. The attack was initiated by a heavy 30 minute mortar, recoilless rifle fire preparation, employing 120mm, 82mm, and 60mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles. Near the end of the barrage the enemy launched a two battalion ground attack on the eastern portion of the perimeter. The attack met withering US caliber .50 and M60 machine gun fire from armored personnel carriers and ground-mounted positions. As the battle continued, mutually supporting artillery bases rained over 5000 rounds of artillery into the area surrounding the base being attacked. Forward air controllers directed over 100 sorties of tactical fighter support. The battle ended at 0500 hours. A police of the surrounding area revealed 196 VC killed and five wounded PW's. Friendly casualties were three killed and 38 wounded. Only ten of the wounded required evacuation. One week later, the 1st Infantry Division terminated Phase I of Operation JUNCTION CITY.

On 180001 March 1967 the Division initiated Operation JUNCTION CITY II. The area of operations was immediately east of the JUNCTION CITY I area, extending into the eastern portion of War Zone C between KATUM and Route 13. (SEE JUNCTION CITY II map attached) This area was selected for

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a number of important reasons. First, a CIDG compound and airstrip were to be constructed along Route 246 west of AN LOC. Forces in the area would provide security for engineer work parties. Second, this area was the only remaining portion of War Zone C which had never before been searched by US forces. In mid-February 1967, Operation TUCSON had covered the area south of MINH THANH between the Michelin Plantation and Route 13. JUNCTION CITY I covered the western portions of Zone C. To completely blanket the zone, the JUNCTION CITY II area was selected. Third, intelligence gathered from documents, informers, ralliers, aerial observers, and airborne radar indicated substantial VC traffic flowing northeast and southwest in the same general direction as the SAIGON River, north of DAU TIENG. JUNCTION CITY II was the last phase of a plan designed to sweep through War Zone C in TAY NINH Province and to demonstrate to the VC that an area they use as their major stronghold and headquarters for all South Vietnam is vulnerable to entry by American forces. Prior to this time no American forces had ever operated in eastern War Zone C.

The plan for the second phase in War Zone C was quite simple: place two brigades of infantry, reinforced with armored and mechanized forces, across the flow of VC traffic. The 2d Brigade and 173d Airborne Brigade, under operational control of the 1st Division, were chosen for the task. They executed search and destroy operations in the general area indicated on the JUNCTION CITY II map, attached. The 1st Brigade secured QUAN LOI, Route 246 to the bridge site, and Route 245 to MINH THANH. The 1st Brigade of the 9th Division, also under 1st Division control, secured Route 13 from LAI KHE to QUAN LOI. During this phase of the operation the 1st Infantry Division controlled five brigades and an armored cavalry regiment in addition to supporting artillery, engineer, aviation, signal, and logistical units.

Two significant enemy contacts occurred during JUNCTION CITY II. The first took place at a destroyed village named BAU BANG, eight miles north of LAI KHE along Route 13. At that location, the 3d Sqdn, 5th Cavalry was securing B Battery, 7th Bn, 9th Artillery inside a perimeter of 20 M113 armored personnel carriers and six M48A3 tanks. At ten minutes past midnight on 20 March the base came under heavy caliber .50 machine gun, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire. At 0135 hours the perimeter came under heavy ground attack from two battalions of the 273d VC Regiment reinforced with local guerrillas. Heavy enemy machine gun fire was directed into the perimeter from along a railroad track embankment 50-100 meters east of the perimeter. Friendly forces replied with intensive, sustained small arms fires, M60 and caliber .50 machine gun fires, 90mm tank fires, 4.2 inch mortar fires, 3000 rounds of 105mm, 155mm, 8 inch, and 175mm artillery fires, coupled with 87 sorties of tactical fighter support. A police of the battle area the following morning revealed 231 VC killed and three wounded PW's. US forces sustained three killed and 63 wounded; 26 of the wounded were evacuated. As in the 10 March battle, the ability of the mechanized/armored perimeter to fight off repeated attacks kept the VC in position for friendly artillery and air attack.

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The second major enemy contact involved the 1st Bn, 2d Inf, the 1st Bn, 16th Inf and the 1st Bn, 26th Inf. On 30 March the 1st Bn, 26th Inf conducted a heliborne assault east of KATUM along Route 246. On the following day, the 1st Bn, 2d Inf landed in the same area. At 1255 hours on 31 March, the reconnaissance platoon of the 1st Bn, 26th Inf made heavy enemy contact with an unknown VC force. Co B was sent to reinforce the recon platoon and encountered caliber .50 machine gun fires, recoilless rifle fires, claymores, and mortars, indicating a main force VC unit. Extensive artillery and air strikes forced the VC to break contact at 1700 hours. All elements of the 26th Inf returned to night defensive positions, dug in, and waited for morning. The 1st Bn, 16th Inf (-) had been helilifted into the area by 1730 hours to reinforce the position. At 0500 hours on 1 April a heavy enemy mortar barrage began to fall into the 16th and 26th Inf positions. The firing lasted for 15 minutes. 1st Bn, 2d Inf to the southwest also came under mortar attack. At 0522 hours enemy ground attacks were launched from the north and east against the 26th Infantry. US ground forces returned a heavy volume of small arms fires while artillery was massed on the east and air strikes delivering anti-personnel bomblets and napalm in the north. The massive US response broke the enemy contact. Immediate interrogation of a captured VC indicated that the enemy reassembly area was to the east of the battle site. Air and artillery were shifted into the area and followed by a sweep, employing the 1st Bn, 2d Inf and 1st Bn, 16th Inf. A total of 491 bodies were counted in and around the defenses of the 1st Bn, 16th Inf and 1st Bn, 26th Inf. The final count after a sweep of the area was 609 VC killed and three PW's. Friendly casualties were 10 US KIA and 64 WIA.

JUNCTION CITY I and II achieved very significant results. The tabulated materiel results are attached as the last page of this narrative. Not all of the units participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY had a chance to participate in one of these pitched battles. Those who did made the VC pay dearly for the mistaken idea that they could overrun a BIG RED ONE position. Other units contributed in other important ways. The 1st Engineer Battalion, for instance, constructed two new airfields in War Zone C and erected a new bridge capable of carrying tanks across the SAIGON River into the zone. Highway 13 was held open for military traffic almost continuously for three months from SAIGON to QUAN LOI.

Most important, the 1st Infantry Division and other US units marched at will throughout the length and breadth of War Zone C destroying base camps and gathering vital information. No longer can the VC regard this area as a "safe haven". Incidentally Operation TUCSON from 14 to 22 February deprived the VC of 1700 tons of rice and JUNCTION CITY deprived them of 311 tons more for a total of 2011 tons. That is enough rice to feed 15 VC battalions of 500 men each for one year.

Most significant of all, four regiments of the 9th VC Division were engaged in combat and resoundingly defeated. The 101st North Vietnamese Army Regiment and the 271st, 272d, 273d VC Main Force Regiments lost a combined total of 1203 combat soldiers killed in four separate battles.

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That is a substantial chunk of the fighting strength of any division. JUNCTION CITY permanently removed 1809 enemy soldiers from the field of battle. The enemy wounded figure could easily be twice that number. In the past two months the BIG RED ONE has dealt a staggering blow to the 9th VC Division from which it will take a long time to recover. "Whatever happened to JUNCTION CITY?" Ask Charlie; he may know!

Prepared by the
G-3 Section
1st Infantry Division

Operation JUNCTION CITY Totals

VIET CONG KILLED 1781
 VIET CONG CAPTURED 25
 VIET CONG RALLIERS 3
 TOTAL 1809

WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

Arty Ammo	98 rds	M79 Ammo	88 rds
Blasting Caps	1785	Mines	348
CBU	185	Mortar Ammo	519 rds
Demolitions	1179 lbs	Pack How Ammo	25 rds
Det Cord	1600 m	Small Arms Ammo	64,809 rds
Flares	1013	Small Arms	251
Grenades	4019		

FOODSTUFFS

Beans	700 lbs	Rice	311 tons
Dried Fish	10 tons	Salt	8 tons
Milk	233 cans	Sugar	75 lbs
Peanuts	200 lbs		

EQUIPMENT

Air Compressor Drill	2	Oil	535 gal
Amp Meters	3	Oil Lamps	83
Auto Coils	3	Pencils	700
Auto Gears	5	Phones	23
Axes	2	Plastic Wpns Cases	82
Ball Point Pens	500	Radios	18
Batteries	6,650	Reams of Carbon	10
Bicycles	127	Reams of Paper	70
Bicycle Tires	200	Rulers	10
Bicycle Tubes	222	Sandals	7,914
Bolt Threader	29	Sand Bags	586
Commo Wire	6 mi	Sand Paper	8,000 sheets
Copper Wire	6,000 ft	Saws	6
Drafting Kit	1	Screw Drivers	20
Drill Bits	50	Sewing Machines	5
Dynamos	2	Shovels	226
Electrical Resistors	100	Solder	17 spools
Electrical Wire	1,825 ft	Switchboards	2
Erasers	1,750	Tap and Die Tools	50
Field Glasses	1	Tape Recorder	1
Generators	6	Tin	473 sheets
Generator Brushes	50	Transformers	4
Hacksaw Blades	254	Transistor Radios	38
Hand Drills	50	Truck Gears	8
Hand Grinders	1	Typewriters	10
Kerosene	300 gal	Uniforms	761
Machetes	4	Water Pump	1
Med Supplies	637 lbs		

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST ENGINEER BATTALION
APO SF 96345

AVDB-CE-CO

14 April 1967

SUBJECT: 1st Engineer Actions on Operation Junction City

TO: All Men 1st Engineer Battalion

1. Operation JUNCTION CITY has been the largest, and in all probability, the most significant operation in all of Vietnam to this date. From an engineering viewpoint, we have done more construction in less time than ever before. The battalion has been continually over committed, working day and night under fire, to build three (3) C-130 airfields; open, clear, improve and maintain over 74 kilometers of roads on a daily basis; build three timber trestle bridges and two major Bailey bridges, one being the largest and most sophisticated structure built by an engineer battalion since World War II. In addition, tactical support of the infantry brigades included numerous landing zones constructed by engineers descending from CH-47 by ladder and by bulldozers, as well as preparing many fortifications and clearing fields of fire for infantry units in dense jungles. The battalion also supervised construction of two Special Forces camps and an additional C-130 airstrip, the actual construction being done by supporting engineers. JUNCTION CITY, which extended from 22 February to 15 April, has also been one of our more costly operations with 1 KHA and 42 WHA. Casualties occurred principally from mining incidents, mortar and sniper fire. Determined probes against perimeters, particularly B Company, accounted for a number of V.C. (body count included in larger unit reporting). During this period the battalion separately was given credit for 48 V.C.

2. The stage was set for the opening of JUNCTION CITY as A and C Companies moved directly from Operation TUCSON and D Company completed the C-130 field at Suoi Da. On TUCSON, A and C Companies had constructed two timber trestle bridges, put in and maintained six fords and three AVLB sites, and improved 33 kilometers of road. They also redecked two steel truss bridges to permit withdrawal of 1st Infantry Division troops thru the Michelin plantation enroute to the JUNCTION CITY operational area. In the mean time D Company completed the compacted silt C-130 strip and placed T-17 membrane to provide a logistical base for the 1st Division (primarily 3d Brigade) thrust north from Suoi Da to Katum. The airfield started by A Company in December before tactical reasons required their presence elsewhere - was another "first" for the "Always First" battalion. It is the only compacted silt field in II Field Force area and with proper maintenance will provide continuing service for a prolonged

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period. Few believed when the project was conceived that we could get CBR's up to 100 (averaging 35-40) out of what is commonly referred to as "elephant manure".

3. Phase I of JUNCTION CITY commenced on 22 February as the 1st Bde and 173d Airborne Brigade air dropped and landed in the vicinity of Katum and to the northwest of Katum and the 3d Bde thrust north along the road from Suoi Da to Katum. The objective was to provide blocking forces on the east and north for an attack by the 11th ACR and 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division to the north in the westernmost portion of War Zone C. Engineers with the lead elements (naturally) of the 3d Bde Task Force found the going rough as we lost two tank dozers the first morning to mines (one later salvaged). By that evening the force reached Katum to link up with the 173d Airborne Brigade.

4. Engineer tasks assigned during this first phase (see sketch map attached) were for A and C Companies, along with the 173d Engineer Company to provide combat support to their brigades and open and improve the roads in their brigade sectors including any necessary bridging. D Company was to build the airstrip at Katum and our supporting engineers to build an airstrip and Special Forces Camp at Prek Klok and improve the road south of Prek Klok. After A Company opened the road to Katum, C Company immediately set about making a 500' corduroy road and building a 60' timber trestle bridge to keep a fast failing section of road open to convoy traffic and replace a hasty AVLB site. On 24 February, D Company moved to Katum and was shortly followed by the Battalion Headquarters. D Company set to work on the Katum strip on 25 February and in six days it was fully opened to C-123 traffic (type II) and C-130 traffic on an emergency basis (type I). This strip of compacted silt over laid by a coarse grade of laterite was literally hewn from the jungle as fighting continued. While searching for a source of laterite a party was attacked suffering three casualties within 200 yards of the Battalion CP. Surveying was interrupted several times by sniper fire and each night the engineer base at Katum was mortared. Similarly, C Company providing local security to its work parties suffered casualties from V.C. snipers 20 meters from their work site. A Company's work was stopped in several instances either by mortar attack or to permit infantry to clean out local ambushes. Regardless of enemy action the work progressed and the six day record for the D Company airstrip will be remembered for a long time. As the field was opened and the first C-123 landed a small celebration including cake and champagne was held to commemorate the occasion.

5. On completion of the Katum field the 1st Engineers were withdrawn south to refit for Phase II operations. The 168th Engineers continued work on the airstrip and special forces camp at Prek Klok which were completed about a month later.

6. After a day's standdown for maintenance A Company, B Company, E Company (-) w/Battalion Headquarters (being flown directly from Suoi Da to

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Quan Loi), moved into Phase II establishing an engineer base in the rubber about 5 kilometers west of An Loc. During this phase B Company was to open the road west to the Saigon River; A, B and E Companies were to work on a 220' Bailey bridge to enter War Zone C; D Company was to build yet another C-130 strip at the bridge crossing site; and the 27th Engineers were to put in the Special Forces Camp at the site. B Company was to push on west after the crossing with the 2d Brigade.

7. On 7 March A Company engineers accompanied the infantry to the Saigon River Bridge site and attempted unsuccessfully to extract the existing collapsed 160' DD Bailey from the stream bed to permit erection of a pier. The alternate plan of constructing a bridge just up stream of the existing bridge using a sand bar as a base for the pier was implemented and on 8 March layout and construction began. As A Company and B Company alternated working day and night pouring a concrete foundation for the pier, the now extensive approaches and abutment retaining walls were constructed. E Company implaced a high line to transport concrete to mid stream and as soon as the near shore approach was completed they commenced assembly of the Bailey structure consisting of 2 spans of 120' DD and 100' TS. The morning of 11 March the nose of the 100' TS was launched to the Bailey pier and by noon on 12 March the bridge was completed and opened to traffic. Considerable additional effort was required to provide an adequate road net work on the far shore and to replace a concrete and timber fender around the supporting Bailey pier. A Company moved from the Bailey bridge to a 50' timber trestle bridge so that the 27th Engineers could commence clearing operations at the special forces camp.

8. On 14 March, D Company rolled north to the engineer camp west of An Loc and the next day commenced clearing for the C-130 airstrip west of the bridge site. This field required considerably greater earth moving than the Katum field but fortunately we were blessed by abundant laterite sources. Cuts up to 8' and fills to 4½' were required over extensive areas of the field to provide proper alignment and profile. Earth moving went on day and night through the construction period. On 1 April the field was accepted and D Company shortly withdrew to Di An (less a platoon to up grade the Quan Loi airstrip) to perform maintenance on some weary bodies and pieces of equipment.

9. Battling Bravo Company, which was not actively engaged in Phase I, soon found much action as they were heavily mortared on 5 nights and withstood probing attacks on their perimeter in the 2d Brigade base camp. After completing the Saigon River Bridge they pushed forward along route 246 to Fire Support Base Charlie and later to Objective Thrust where major jungle clearing for artillery and fields of fire for the infantry were required. Road work continued to take considerable effort particularly as the showers commenced after the long dry season. From controlling dust (about 50,000 gallons of palliatives used by B Company alone) to suppressing mud became the name of the game.

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10. Since engineers are never in reserve, particularly the First Engineers, A Company on completion of the fender for the Saigon River bridge was road marched to Lai Khe and thence to their home base of Phuoc Vinh (they've been there for 1 week since last October) to prepare for the Song Be bridging job. (We are checking records but it is understood that this is the longest (437') and most sophisticated (110' DD single span cantilevered off of two 163.5' DD spans) bridge constructed since World War II). Calculations for the bridge design were made by LTC Smith, Battalion Executive Officer and considerable technical assistance was provided by B Company in modifying existing Bailey parts for the modified bridge (a requirement was to place the DD trusses within the 17' 8" clearing between the old French concrete trusses - normal clearance required is 21' 10"). A unique method of construction was used wherein the modified trusses and transoms were erected in skeleton form on the existing steel bridge truss whose capacity was rated as 30 tons. Specially fabricated pinned joints were emplaced and braced while the skeleton frames were jacked up from the old steel truss and the older truss dropped into the river 100' below with a beautifully executed demolition charge. The new truss was then jacked down into final position, the cantilevered spans completed, abutments and approaches prepared, the pinned joints freed to permit the center section to act as a simple 110' span, and the double story emplaced on the 110' span. This structure was completed as Operation JUNCTION CITY came to a close and enabled the next Division operation for the Phuoc Vinh area to employ tanks and fully loaded resupply vehicles whereas before Class 23 was the maximum allowable load. While initial estimates by other organizations proposed a double-triple design using a Company-month of effort, the "Always First" battalion accomplished the job using a double-double cantilever (saving 1/3 of the panels) and a Company (-) for 10 days.

11. Including bridging in JUNCTION CITY, you have now constructed more than one half of all Bailey Bridging employed to date in Vietnam (in comparison with the accomplishments of 20 engineer battalions of the Engineer Command plus all divisional engineer battalions and separate companies). You have constructed half of all C-130 airfields built by U.S. Engineers in the II Field Force area. You have literally changed the face of the map in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

"Always First"



J.M. KIERMAN, JR.
LTC, CE
Commanding